The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

College of the Liberal Arts

ALL THE KING’S GREEKS:

MERCENARIES, POLEIS, AND EMPIRES IN THE FOURTH CENTURY BCE

A Dissertation in

History and Classics and Ancient Mediterranean Studies

by

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

May 2013
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This dissertation examines Greek mercenary service in the Near East from 401-330 BCE. Traditionally, the employment of Greek soldiers by the Persian Achaemenid Empire and the Kingdom of Egypt during this period has been understood to indicate the military weakness of these polities and the superiority of Greek hoplites over their Near Eastern counterparts. I demonstrate that the purported superiority of Greek heavy infantry has been exaggerated by Greco-Roman authors. Furthermore, close examination of Greek mercenary service reveals that the recruitment of Greek soldiers was not the purpose of Achaemenid foreign policy in Greece and the Aegean, but was instead an indication of the political subordination of prominent Greek citizens and poleis, conducted through the social institution of xenia, to Persian satraps and kings.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was completed with the support of many others. I am grateful to have received generous funding from the Pennsylvania State University, including a dissertation release from the College of the Liberal Arts, a Hill Fellowship from the Department of History, and various financial awards from the Department of Classics and Ancient Mediterranean Studies. I am indebted to the American School of Classical Studies at Athens for the intellectual stimulation provided by the Regular Program and for the use of its exceptional research facilities. The first chapters of this project were written in the American School’s Blegen Library.

I have benefitted greatly from many professors at Penn State. Foremost among these is Mark Munn, who advised this dissertation with a deft balance of constructive criticism and encouragement. I have found his example as a scholar and teacher to be more than worthy of emulation. I am thankful to have worked with Gary Knoppers, in whose seminar and under whose guidance I wrote the paper which would eventually become this dissertation many years ago, and Garrett Fagan, who has been an enthusiastic and strong advocate on my behalf. I am fortunate to have Kenneth Hirth serve as my external field committee member. I am very grateful to Carol Reardon for her willingness to join the committee on short notice and for providing her expertise on matters of military history. Other faculty who made a positive impression on my time as a doctoral student include Baruch Halpern, Daniel Berman, Aaron Rubin, and Zoe Stamatopoulou. A special thanks goes to Paul Harvey, who has been an invaluable mentor in his role as head of CAMS.
I am glad to have learned alongside and from the other two members of my CAMS cohort, Amanda Iacobelli and Andrea Gatzke. Likewise, I am glad to have shared my studies at Penn State with colleagues David Lunt, Lauren Kaplow, Jonathan Greer, Deirde Fulton, Ken Ristau, Matt Sjoberg, Margaret Cohen, Matthew Adams, Eric Welch, Thad Olson, Brandon Olson, Jeff Herrick, and Sara Hoffman. This project was improved as a result of countless conversations with Alex Knodell, Matt Buell, Andriy Fomin, Johanna Hobratschk, Tristan Barnes, Reema Habib, and Dallas DeForest during my time at the American School. Thanks also to Philip Hnatkovich, John Hoenig, and Spencer Delbridge, who patiently humored discussions about Greek mercenaries despite working in fields unrelated to ancient history. Many other friends, but in particular David Vriesman, Alex Talsma, and my brother, Kevin, proved to be a helpful and necessary source of wisdom and perspective from outside of academia.

Finally, I thank my parents for their encouragement and support in this and every endeavor in my life. Words cannot express what your constant love has meant to me over the years. To my partner, Mary Faulkner, I am deeply grateful. I could not have completed this project without you or your Henry James, my reliable canine writing companion.
Introduction

This dissertation reassesses the nature and purpose of Greek mercenary service in the ancient Near East during the fourth century BCE. From the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger in 401 until the death of Darius III in 330 BCE, large numbers of Greeks served in the armies of the Persian Achaemenid Empire and the Kingdom of Egypt. Classical sources – writing for Classical audiences – insist that these soldiers were superior to their Near Eastern counterparts and that they were highly sought after for their skill in combat. They indicate that the security of Egypt and depended primarily upon mercenaries from mainland Greece. They are not contradicted by sources from the Near East, for in this period there are no extant Achaemenid or Egyptian historical narratives. As a result, modern scholarship has largely followed the portrayal of Greek mercenary service as presented by Classical authors.

I examine anew the role played by Greek mercenaries in the Near East during the fourth century BCE. My sources include the works of a wide range of ancient writers, from contemporary writers such as Xenophon, Demosthenes, and Isocrates, to later Hellenistic and Roman authors such as Diodorus, Arrian, Plutarch, and Curtius Rufus. I demonstrate that the reliance upon Greek mercenaries of the Persian Empire and the Egyptian Kingdom during this period is a literary fabrication of our Classical sources, particularly those writing after the conquests of Alexander the Great. I document the variety of ways in which these sources exaggerate the importance of Greeks in fourth century Near Eastern armies, and offer a more historically accurate depiction of Greek mercenary service during this period.
My project redefines Greek mercenary service as a political, diplomatic, and social phenomenon. Previous scholarship, and the ancient Greeks themselves, used the experiences of Greek mercenaries in the armies of Persia and Egypt to illustrate stark cultural differences between Greece and the Near East. My work exposes the artificiality of this distinction, and instead uses mercenaries to reveal the degree to which Greece had become inextricably interconnected with the world of the Near East by the fourth century BCE. By understanding Greek soldiers – particularly their commanders – as political agents rather than mercenaries available to the highest bidder, my analysis sheds new light on the complex and ever-shifting political environment of the fourth century, when Persian satraps, Egyptian pharaohs, and Greek poleis each attempted to expand their own influence on the western fringes of the Achaemenid Empire.

An Overview: Greek Mercenary Service in the Fourth Century BCE

While there is evidence for the presence of Greek mercenaries in the Near East prior to the fourth century,¹ few would contest the statement that Greek soldiers found employment there more frequently and in greater numbers beginning in 401 BCE.² In that

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¹ In the seventh century, Herodotus records Ionian Greeks and Carians serving under Psammetichus in Egypt (2.152-154); in the sixth, there is inscriptive evidence for the presence of Greeks at Abu Simbel under Psammetichus II (Tod 1933: 4), the brother of Alcaeus of Mytilene reportedly served in the Babylonian military (Strabo 13.2.3); in the fifth, Lycon of Athens aided the rebellion of Pissuthnes from 414-412, according to Ctesias (F15.53).

² This is often explained in socio-economic terms. From this perspective, the increased presence of Greeks in the Near East is the result of either a post-Peloponnesian War economic crisis, leaving large numbers of trained soldiers in need of employment, or a structural feature of the broader Eastern Mediterranean economic reality, in which soldiers from relatively poor, small Greece were hired en masse by larger, wealthier neighbors to the east. Such large-scale socio-economic analyses provide us with an understanding of the broader environment within which the phenomenon of Greek
year, an Achaemenid prince named Cyrus the Younger marched from his satrapal capital at Sardis to the interior of the Empire at the head of an army which included roughly thirteen thousand Greeks in an attempt to usurp the throne from his brother, King Artaxerxes II (Xenophon *Anabasis* 1). Although Cyrus’ rebellion failed, his decision to employ a large number of Greek soldiers would be repeated by subsequent Persian satraps of western Anatolia and several pharaohs of Egypt.

Indeed, the rebellion of Cyrus marked the beginning of what one scholar has called a Greek mercenary “explosion”.³ Only four years after the failure of Cyrus and his Greek soldiers, Artaxerxes and his loyal satrap, Pharnabazus, hired a number of Greek sailors under the command of Conon, an exiled Athenian admiral, for service in the Aegean Sea against the Spartan navy. Conon served the Persians from 397 until 392, when he was arrested by Tiribazus, a freshly appointed Persian satrap with Spartan sympathies (Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.12-16).

Despite Conon’s unfortunate end, Greeks continued to serve in the Near East. Chabrias, another prominent Athenian general, found employment at the head of number of other Greeks under Pharaoh Acoris of Egypt between 386 and 380 (Diodorus 15.29.1-4); his colleague Iphicrates and 12,000 other Greeks spent several years in the 370s on the opposite side, helping the Persians prepare and launch an unsuccessful invasion of

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mercenary service in the fourth century occurred, but they do not provide an explanation for why specific Near Eastern satraps and kings chose to hire specific groups of Greeks as mercenaries, which is the question this project seeks to answer. See Miller 1984, Aymard 1967, and Trundle 2010. Against this consensus, Luraghi 1996 argues that there was no significant increase in the number of Greeks serving abroad in the fourth century, but that the apparent increase is merely due to increased documentation during this period.

³ Miller 1984. This “explosion” also took place in Sicily and mainland Greece, but my concern here is limited to the Near East.
Egypt, which deployed 20,000 Greeks in its own defense (Nepos *Iphicrates* 11.2; Diodorus 15.2-4, 8-9, 91-93).

Athenians were not the only Greeks to soldier for Near Eastern rulers. In 360, the Spartan King Agesilaus ventured to Egypt, where he joined the Athenian Chabrias on an abortive Egyptian offensive into the Levant, and subsequently served on the victorious side of an Egyptian civil war (Diodorus 15.92-93; Plutarch *Agesilaus* 37-40.1). Likewise between 356 and 353, the Athenian Chares and the Boeotian Pammenes took turns fighting in the armies of Artabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Diodorus 16.22.1-2, 34.1-2), who also employed his Rhodian brothers-in-law Mentor and Memnon (Demosthenes 23.154; Diodorus 16.52.4). At the end of the 350s, Diodorus reports that Diophantus of Athens and Lamius of Sparta were among those who helped Pharaoh Nectanebos II fend off another Persian invasion, about which little else is known (Diodorus 16.40.3).

Greek military service in the Near East continued into the 340s. Phocion of Athens served Idrieus of Caria and Evagoras II of Salamis on Cyprus (Diodorus 16.42.3-9, 46.1-2), while Mentor of Rhodes found employment in Egypt, Sidon, and then in the armies of Artaxerxes III, who also hired Nicostratus of Argos and Lacrates of Thebes during his successful invasion of Egypt from 343-342 (Diodorus 16.41-51). Opposing the King, Pharaoh Nectanebos II retained his own Greeks, who were at this time commanded by Philophron of Sparta and Cleinius of Cos (Diodorus 16.46.8-9, 48.4-5).

With Egypt vanquished, Artaxerxes III turned his attention to a new rival in the west. In 340, he ordered his satraps to prevent Philip II of Macedon from capturing Perinthus, and they complied by hiring a contingent of Greek mercenaries under
Apollodorus of Athens (Diodorus 16.74.2-75.2; Pausanias 1.29.10). Artaxerxes also appointed Mentor to a position of command in Anatolia, where the former mercenary helped consolidate the King’s authority (Diodorus 16.52).

Prior to his death in 340, Mentor had secured the return into the King’s favor of his brother Memnon and his father-in-law Artabazus (Diodorus 16.52). Thus when Philip sent the Macedonian vanguard to Asia in 337, Memnon helped lead the Persian response (Diodorus 17.7.3-9). Later during Alexander’s invasion, Memnon again figured prominently in the Achaemenid resistance: he fought at the Battle of Granicus in 334 (Diodorus 17.19; Arrian 1.12.8-16.7), co-commanded the defense of Halicarnassus later that year (Diodorus 17.23.4-27.5; Arrian 1.20.2-23.5), and directed the Persian counter-offensive in the Aegean until his death in 333 (Diodorus 17.29.1-4; Arrian 2.1.1-3).

Memnon was far from the only Greek to serve in the armies of Darius III. He was joined at Granicus by thousands of Greeks (Arrian 1.14.4-16.6; Plut. Alex. 16.13-14) and at Halicarnassus by even more, including Ephialtes and Thrasybulus of Athens (Diodorus 17.25.6-27.5). Another prominent Athenian citizen, Charidemus, journeyed to the court of Darius at Babylon (Diodorus 17.30.1-6; Curtius 3.2.9-19), while many other Greeks garrisoned important citadels and cities for the Persians in Anatolia (Arrian 1.24.4, 26.5, 29.1-2). According to Curtius, 30,000 Greek hoplites formed the center of Darius’ battle line at Issus in 333 (3.9.2-11.18; see also Arrian 2.8.6-11.2), among them Amyntas of Macedon, Thymondas of Rhodes, Aristomedes of Pherae, and Bianor of Acarnania (Diodorus 17.48.1-5; Arrian 2.13.1-3; Curtius 4.1.3, 27-33, 38-40). Even as Alexander’s forces advanced against Tyre and into Egypt, Greek mercenaries – including Chares of Athens – were aiding the last gasps of the Persian counter-offensive in the Aegean.
Finally, 4,000 Greek mercenaries, led by Patron of Phocis and Glaucus of Aetolia, remained at Darius’ side even after his final defeat at Gaugamela in 331 (Diodorus 17.73.2; Arrian 3.16.2, 21.4; Curtius 5.9.15, 5.11-12), only surrendering to Alexander following the King’s death in 330 (Diodorus 17.76.2; Arrian 3.24.4-5).

With the death of Darius III in 330, the era in which Near Eastern monarchs hired Greek mercenaries came to a close. Although Greeks found employment in the armies of Alexander and his successors, the world in which they soldiered changed significantly and, consequently, their experiences fall outside the boundaries of this study.⁴

The Greek Thesis

The most common explanation for the presence of so many Greek soldiers in fourth century Near Eastern armies is what Pierre Briant has called the “Greek Thesis”, or the notion that the Achaemenid Empire and the Kingdom of Egypt sought Greek hoplites and strategoi because their own soldiers and generals were inferior.⁵ This explanation has often been connected to the idea that the Achaemenid Empire was in a state of decline throughout the fourth century, as H.W. Parke wrote in 1933:

The central authority of the Persian Empire had begun to weaken. The local governors grew more independent and ambitious. Their position needed military support, and they found it most readily in Greek mercenaries. For the infantry hired from Greece continued to prove itself superior to any which Asia could produce. The Great King was forced to follow the example of the rebels and employ Greeks to coerce them. This process went on till all the armies of Asia depended for their foot-soldiers on Hellenic mercenaries.⁶

⁴ For a study of mercenaries in the Hellenistic period, see Griffith 1935.
⁵ Briant 2002: 783.
⁶ Parke 1933: 21.
A.T. Olmstead advocated a similar thesis in his monograph, *History of the Persian Empire* (1948). In his account, the Achaemenid Empire began as a strong military force, conquering the most powerful but disunited Greek states of Ionia before failing to conquer the weaker but united states in Attica and the Peloponnese. The Empire steadily declined in military might thereafter – exemplified by the march of Xenophon’s Ten Thousand, frequent satrapal revolts, and the inability to reconquer Egypt – while loosely maintaining control of its territories through diplomacy, bribery, and the use of Greek mercenaries, until finally Alexander III of Macedon overcame the Greek mercenaries of Darius III, just as he and his father had earlier defeated the soldiers of the Greek *poleis*.7

The importance of Olmstead’s history is difficult to overstate. At the time of its publication, it was the first general treatment of the Achaemenid Empire since Rawlingson’s *The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Near Eastern World* (1871). Not until Pierre Briant’s *Histoire de l’Empire perse* (1996) was another work of similar or greater depth and breadth on the Persians attempted.8 For nearly fifty years, Olmstead’s was the definitive history of the Achaemenid Empire.9

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7 Olmstead 1948: xv.
8 Here, I use the revised English translation of Briant’s work, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire* 2002.
9 The intervening years did see an increase of interest in the Persians. J. M. Cook’s *The Greeks in Ionia and the East* (1963) followed the basic narrative and characterization of Olmstead’s work where appropriate, although he also emphasized more heavily the roles luxury and decadence played in the decline of the Persian Empire. Frye’s *The Heritage of Persia* (1963) and Bengtson’s *Greeks and the Persians* (1968) do the same, except in their efforts the Persians are contrasted even more strongly against Greece.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, several scholars began to revise this Hellenocentric, traditional synthesis of Achaemenid history. Pierre Briant’s *Rois, Tributs et Paysans* (1982) adopted a structural approach for examining the Empire in an attempt to avoid the bias of Classical sources. David M. Lewis’ *Sparta and Persia*, (1977) and Simon Hornblower’s *Mausolaus* (1982) each also largely eschewed the major tenets of traditional scholarship and examined their topics from a perspective more sympathetic to Persia.

Two general histories of the 1980s, J. M. Cook’s *The Persian Empire* (1983) and M. A. Dandamaev’s *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* (1989), showed some movement away from the traditional synthesis. Dandamaev incorporated more Achaemenid source material than many of his predecessors, and Cook’s description of the process of Hellenization in the East in this monograph become much more complex and less Hellenocentric than that of his previous work, *The Greeks in Ionia and the East* (1963). Still, these authors continued to follow the traditional synthesis in other respects, portraying the Persians as weak and reliant upon Greek mercenaries. Dandamaev, for example, wrote that the Empire’s security was maintained “in the main with the assistance of Greek mercenaries, instead of with the Persian army, who for a

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10 So far as I am aware, the term “traditional synthesis” was coined by Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg in her introduction to the first volume of the *Achaemenid History* series (1987).

11 Lewis 1973: 149-50 dismissed the notion that luxury was the cause of the decline of the Achaemenid Empire. In other respects he demonstrated that Achaemenid policy regarding Sparta, Athens, and Ionia in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE was, contra the traditional synthesis, reasonable and relatively effective. Hornblower, for his part, showed that the cultural interaction between East and West at this time was far more complicated and diverse than what had been previously argued. Rather than the steady, inevitable march toward the Hellenization of the East, he found in Caria a fusion of Greek, Persian, and local Anatolian cultures.

long time had drawn its military quality and strength from the Greeks, both in tactics and in weaponry”.

The tide turned decisively against the traditional synthesis on May 13 and 14 in 1983, when a group of scholars convened at the Department of Classics of Groningen University for the purpose of questioning the purported decadence of the Achaemenid Empire. From this conference came the *Achaemenid History* series, dedicated to studying the Persian Empire on its own terms, free as possible from the bias they found in the Classical sources. Indeed, the first two volumes of this series, *Sources, Structures and Synthesis* (1987) and *The Greek Sources* (1987), were in large part dedicated to identifying and accounting for this bias.

Nearly every element of the traditional synthesis has been challenged and revised by the *Achaemenid History* series and the movement it spawned. For instance, Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg’s chapter in *Achaemenid History I* (1987), “Decadence in the Empire or Decadence in the Sources?” argued that the idea of a decadent Persian Empire was a creation of Greek authors such as Ctesias. Van Driel’s contribution in the same volume, “Continuity and Decay in the Late Achaemenid Period: Evidence from Southern Mesopotamia,” supported that notion, as the archaeological and epigraphic evidence from the heart of the Empire indicates not decay, but rather growth in and after the Achaemenid period. Similarly, Michael Weiskopf’s monograph, *The So-Called ‘Great Satraps’ Revolt’, 366-360 B.C.* (1989), demonstrated that the Empire was politically and militarily stable in the fourth century BCE, and that the severity of the satrapal revolts of

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13 Dandamaev 1989: 312. See also Cook 1983: 210-228.
the 360s was greatly exaggerated by Greek authors. Stephen Ruzicka’s *Politics of a Persian Dynasty* (1992) built upon Simon Hornblower’s earlier analysis of Hecatomnid Caria, arguing for a complex fusion of Anatolian, Greek, and Persian cultures in that region rather than a simplistic, one-sided Hellenization – a process also observed at the Persian capital of Lydia, according to Elspeth Dusiberre’s *Aspects of Empire in Achaemenid Sardis* (2003).

A number of recent general histories of the Persian Empire have followed in the rejection of the traditional synthesis, namely Amélie Kuhrt’s treatment in volume II of *The Ancient Near East c. 3000 – 330 B.C.* (1995), Josef Wiesehöfer’s *Ancient Persia* (1996), Pierre Briant’s *Histoire de l’Empire perse* (1996), and Maria Brosius’ *The Persians: An Introduction* (2006). These works are all more suspicious of ancient Greek sources and reject the narrative of Persian imperial decline and decadence. While there are traces of the traditional synthesis in other recent works, such as John Curtis’ *Ancient Persia* (2000), by and large it has been excised from current Achaemenid scholarship.\(^\text{15}\)

The ramifications of the Achaemenid Empire’s scholarly rehabilitation have yet to be fully appreciated or accepted in Classical scholarship. Persian influence on Greek political affairs in the fourth century is largely downplayed by a number of general works on Greek history, such as P. J. Rhodes’ *A History of the Classical Greek World: 478-323* (2006). Thomas Harrison’s *Writing Ancient Persia* (2011) sharply criticizes what he views as an overly-dismissive attitude Achaemenid scholars hold toward Greek sources.\(^\text{16}\) This is not to say that the recent trends in Persian history have been completely ignored or rejected by Classicists. For example, in *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia* (2005),

\(^{15}\) Wiesehöfer 2007.

\(^{16}\) For further discussion of Harrison’s critiques, see Chapter 2.
George Cawkwell argues that Persia remained more involved in fourth century Greece politics than previous scholarship has acknowledged.

This dissertation is concerned with one significant aspect of the traditional synthesis that has to this point largely remained outside of the Achaemenid Empire’s rehabilitation: the supposed Persian reliance upon superior Greek mercenaries during the fourth century. While some who study the Achaemenid Empire have rightly doubted the Greek Thesis,\(^{17}\) no full-length study on the subject has been carried out in order to demonstrate its shortcomings. Indeed, recent work on Greek mercenaries has continued to view the Empire as dependent upon Greek mercenaries. In his recent monograph, *Greek Mercenaries: From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander* (2004), Matthew Trundle offered an interpretation little changed from Parke’s seventy years prior:

> The increasingly independent satraps of the western Persian Empire…sent ambassadors to the Greek mainland to enlist men to fight for them against the Great King. The satraps could send these men back to the Greek mainland and took no responsibility for them after their service ended. In turn the Persian king needed Greeks to fight the Greeks of his satraps, and so a vicious circle was created that promoted a huge Greek mercenary migration eastward.\(^{18}\)

Even Stephen Ruzicka, whose 2012 *Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire 525-332 BCE* offers a number of significant insights into eastern Mediterranean affairs during the fourth century, remains a proponent of the Greek Thesis. Throughout his account, he emphasizes the military importance of Greek mercenaries for both Persians and Egyptians: for example, he accepts Isocrates’ statement that Greeks were the

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\(^{17}\) Briant 2002: 783-800 provides the most thorough rebuttal to the idea of Persian reliance on Greek mercenaries of which I am aware. His analysis is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. See also Wiesehöfer 1996: 89-93.

most effective part of one Persian infantry force (4.135), notes that Iphicrates was
“essential to the initial success of the Persian attack” in 373, and later describes Iphicrates
and his Greek mercenaries as “indispensable”. In his view, once the Egyptians began to
employ Greek hoplites alongside their own heavy infantry, the Persians were forced to
turn to Greece as well, since they were apparently bereft of any similarly equipped
soldiers of their own, concluding:

Ultimately, the Persians reconquered Egypt by adopting the Egyptian
military practice of employing Greeks in great numbers. That is, the
Persians themselves ended up depending on far western resources to tip
the balance in the conflict.

It is clear that the Greek Thesis continues to be the dominant explanation for why
Greek soldiers were hired by Persian satraps and Egyptian pharaohs. The aim of the first
half of my project, then, is to examine anew the role played by Greek mercenaries in the
Near East during the fourth century. I argue that the reliance upon Greek mercenaries of
the Persian Empire and the Egyptian Kingdom during this period is a literary fabrication
of our Greek sources. I document the ways in which these sources exaggerate the
importance of Greeks in Near Eastern armies, explore the motivations behind such
exaggerations, and offer a more historically accurate depiction of the military value of
and need for Greek mercenary service in the Near East from 401 to 330 BCE.

In Chapter 1, I examine the Greek Thesis as presented in the opening book of
Xenophon’s Anabasis. I analyze the literary strategies Xenophon employs in order to
enhance the role played by Cyrus’ Greeks up to and just after the Battle of Cunaxa. While
Xenophon portrays the Greeks as the best soldiers in Cyrus’ army and the most effective

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20 Ruzicka 2012: 211.
troops on the field at Cunaxa, he provides little tangible evidence to support his thesis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that Cyrus the Younger did not consider his Greek mercenaries superior to his own Anatolian levies, and I demonstrate that they played a relatively insignificant role at Cunaxa.

Chapter 2 examines the Greek Thesis in Diodorus’ Bibliotheca and other ancient accounts of Greek mercenary service in the Near East from 400-340. I examine two literary tropes, the “tragic advisor” and the “energetic subordinate,” which Diodorus and other writers employ in order to misrepresent the military significance of Greek mercenaries. I also offer my own reconstruction of the military role(s) played by Greek mercenaries in Persian and Egyptian armies, finding that their contributions, though not insignificant, fall far short of what their reputation would suggest.

Chapter 3 examines the contributions of Greek mercenaries on the Persian side during Alexander’s conquest. My analysis concentrates on the information provided by Diodorus, Arrian, Plutarch, and Curtius Rufus, showing that ancient and modern reconstructions consistently overrate the military significance of Greek mercenaries and generals, especially Memnon of Rhodes. Taken together, the first three chapters of this project demonstrate that Greek mercenaries were not superior soldiers or generals to their Persian or Egyptian counterparts and that the Achaemenid Empire was never dependent upon their service.
An Alternative Thesis

The final four chapters of this project provide an alternative explanation for the presence of Greek soldiers in Near Eastern armies during the fourth century. I examine Greek mercenaries, in particular Greek mercenary commanders, as political agents and as intermediaries between foreign patrons and Greek client poleis. I then use the insight provided by understanding Greek military service abroad as a fundamentally political endeavor to offer a fresh analysis and reconstruction of fourth century Greco-Persian relations.

Viewing Greek mercenaries as political agents is not an entirely new idea. Although Parke compared Greek generals serving abroad to the freebooting condottieri of Italy in the second millennium, W.K. Pritchett demonstrated that Athenian generals serving in the Hellespont and Thrace during the fourth century always acted to the benefit of Athens. More recently, Matthew Trundle attempted to find a judicious medium between these two extremes, but his monograph’s synchronistic perspective and pan-Mediterranean scope necessarily – and understandably – results in an overly simplistic discussion of the political implications to Greek mercenary service in the fourth century Near East. For example, his portrayal of Athens as a fertile recruiting ground for Persian satraps in need of mercenaries does not recognize that this was the case only under very

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21 Parke 1933: 113-114, 128, 144.
23 Trundle 2004: 147-159, 163-164. There is much to recommend about his monograph. In particular, his efforts to analyze and describe the technical aspects of mercenary recruitment, organization, remuneration, and service are second to none, and his analysis of the role played by xenia in mercenary recruitment has significantly influenced my own.
specific conditions and limited periods during the fourth century, instead broadly concluding that:

The Persians’ perception of the Greeks in this period, used as they were to availing themselves of conquered foreign expertise and innovations, and their ability to request and replace Athenian generals at will, demonstrate their powerful position in the Greek world. Greece was not a satrapy, but it might as well have been.\(^{24}\)

Here, I argue that Pritchett’s position is correct, although I apply it in a different arena.\(^ {25}\) Greek mercenaries were political actors in nearly every instance, and, contrary to the claims made on occasion by ancient authors, they almost always acted in the interests of their home \textit{poleis} or, at the least, in the interests of prominent factions within their home \textit{poleis}. They viewed their service as a means to both further the causes of their city-states internationally and to further their own causes in domestic politics, using military success abroad and the patronage of Persian and Egyptian rulers in order to gain political influence at home. This means that, \textit{contra} Trundle, the Persians only had access to Greek mercenaries during periods when the interests of the individual Greek \textit{poleis} from which they were recruited aligned with those of the Achaemenid Empire.

Moreover, there is one aspect in which all previous scholarship on Greek mercenaries serving in the Near East is deficient. Most scholars have assumed that Persian and Egyptian leaders sought Greek mercenaries solely for their superior skill in war. Consequently, the political implications of Greek mercenary service from a Persian or Egyptian perspective have not been explored in significant detail.

\(^{24}\) Trundle 2004: 155.
\(^{25}\) Pritchett’s analysis is limited to Athenians serving abroad, largely in the north Aegean and Thrace. I consider all Greek service for Persia and Egypt during the fourth century.
The second half of my project thus offers a corrective in two ways: first, I provide a thorough, chronological account of Greek mercenary service in the Near East; second, I offer explanation for this service from multiple perspectives, namely Greek, Persian, and Egyptian. Understanding Greek mercenary service as a fully integrated aspect of international politics provides previously unappreciated insights into the history of the fourth century, and reveals that Achaemenid policy toward Greece in this period was more complex and influential than scholarship has heretofore acknowledged.

My analysis here is profoundly influenced by two particular strands of scholarship. The first relates to the study of *xenia*, or ritualized foreign guest-friendship, and was explored in detail by Gabriel Herman’s *Ritualised Friendship & the Greek City* (1987). Herman identified the existence of trans-ethnic aristocratic relationships, which extended beyond local Greek *poleis* and into the Near East, and traced their development and function in the ancient world. Central to Herman’s argument is the idea that these relationships were at odds with the development of the Greek *polis*; in his view, the Greek aristocracy was often forced to choose between loyalty to *polis* and loyalty to their foreign aristocratic *xenoi*. In my own analysis of the fourth century, I find that these loyalties are more often complementary than conflicting. Greek leaders often exploited their *xenoi* in order to advance the cause of their *poleis* abroad, and then leveraged this success to increase their own personal influence domestically.

In *Greeks Bearing Gifts* (1997), Lynette Mitchell elaborated upon Herman’s analysis of *xenia* and its related ritualized friendship, *philia*. Examining these social institutions in a variety of ancient societies, Mitchell demonstrated key differences in how Greeks and others understood their purpose and obligations. Most importantly for
my project, Mitchell argued that Greek – and, in particular, Athenian – notions of *xenia* and *philia* tended to be egalitarian, while the Persians understood them to be hierarchical. From the Persian perspective, the Great King’s authority as a ruler of state was reinforced by his position at the top of a vast network of ritualized relationships in which he, as the wealthiest individual, was able to ensure the loyalty of his subjects through the giving of the most expensive gifts, placing their recipients in a perpetual state of debt and obligation to him. In turn, the Persian nobility expanded their own influence by placing less wealthy individuals in their debt through ritualized gift-giving, and these individuals did the same to their own clients, and so on, creating an unending chain of social and political obligation from the King down to the lowliest peasant.

Since, as Herman and Trundle established,26 *xenia* was the primary avenue through which Greek mercenaries were hired by foreigners, the significance of employer-employee relationships could be interpreted differently by each party (though, in my view, not so starkly as Mitchell argues). Greek mercenary soldiers and commanders could plausibly portray their relationships with Persian employers as if they were conducted on relatively equitable terms; their employers, however, would have undoubtedly viewed themselves as patrons to their Greek clients, who received payment/gifts and were then obligated to repay their debts through military service. Furthermore, because these Greek clients were most often influential citizens in the most prominent Greek *poleis*, their Persian employers were also able to use their patronage to ensure that these *poleis* enacted foreign policies that were beneficial to the King’s

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26 Trundle 2004: 159-162.
interests, and could therefore justifiably consider themselves as patrons of the Greek states themselves.

The second strand of scholarship that has influenced my reconstruction is best represented by Michael Weiskopf’s The So-Called “Great Satraps’ Revolt”, 366-360 B.C. (1989). I apply three critical insights from his more temporally and geographically focused monograph to the rest of the fourth century: first, that satraps competed with one another for local influence, and so any analysis of broader “Achaemenid” policy must also consider the motivations and actions of individual satraps; second, that when this competition spilled into open conflict, it did not necessarily mean that one satrap or another was in rebellion from the King, even if the King preferred one side over the other or sanctioned the conflict; third, that although these conflicts occasionally became severe enough to require the King’s intervention, they nevertheless did not pose a serious threat to the King’s authority or the Empire’s stability, despite assertions to the contrary in some of our Greek sources.  

Applying recent scholarship on xenia and Weiskopf’s analysis of Achaemenid imperial administration in the West to the study of Greek mercenary service, I trace the political relationships between individual Persian satraps and their Greek xenoi, providing in the process both a new explanation for the presence of Greek soldiers in the fourth century Near East and a new reconstruction of the history of Greco-Persian interactions during this period.

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27 Weiskopf’s thesis has generated some controversy; Briant 2002: 993 (993-1006 for full discussion and bibliography) nonetheless described it as having “very innovative, very convincing interpretations rendering largely obsolete previous work.”
I return to Xenophon’s *Anabasis* in Chapter 4, arguing that Cyrus the Younger valued his Greek soldiers more for their loyalty than for their military competence. As the only members of his army that were not rebels, Cyrus could rely on his Greeks to remain loyal to his cause. Cyrus used them to help ensure that his subject levies, which were of more doubtful loyalty, did not betray him. This analysis examines the political calculations Cyrus made while on campaign, provides insight to the larger geo-political context in which Greek mercenaries were recruited and employed in the fourth century Near East, and serves as a model for understanding subsequent accounts of Greek mercenary service.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine the political implications of Greek mercenary service during the reigns of Artaxerxes II (405-358) and Artaxerxes III (358-338) until the latter’s recovery of Egypt in 342. I explain how different Persian and Egyptian rulers used *xenia* relationships with prominent Greek citizens to extend their own influence throughout the Greek world. I demonstrate that the ability to hire mercenaries from these *xenia* networks was not their purpose, as previous scholarship has posited, but was instead a byproduct of their successful creation. Understanding the recruitment of Greek mercenaries as evidence of political alliance provides a new window through which to view relations between Greece and Persian in the fourth century, and gives clarity to several controversial historical problems during this period.

Chapter 7 extends the analysis of the previous chapters to the final years of the Achaemenid Empire, with special attention given to the relationship between Athens, Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Memnon of Rhodes. I argue that many, if not the majority, of Greek mercenaries fighting on the side of Persia during this period
were either Athenians or supplied by the anti-Macedonian faction in Athens. From there, I discuss the social and political reasons behind Darius III’s appointment of Memnon to commander of the Aegean resistance to Alexander, and I examine the political motivations behind other mercenaries who opposed Macedon until the death of Darius in 330.

In the end, the presence of Greek mercenaries in Persian armies in the fourth century is an indication of the success of Achaemenid policy towards Greece during this period. Through the sponsorship of prominent Greek citizens, Persian satraps and, by extension, kings were able influence and co-opt the most powerful Greek poleis, essentially incorporating Greece into them into the Achaemenid Empire as client states. The ability to recruit soldiers from the Greek peninsula was therefore a byproduct of Persian patronage, not a sign that the Empire’s military capabilities had declined.

A Note on Translations and Terminology

The analysis in particularly the first half of this dissertation relies upon the close reading of many sources. It is for this reason that I have chosen to use the translations of others, since, as Kenneth Sacks observed, “translations are commentaries. To use one’s own renderings is to run the risk of altering the evidence in one’s favor”. For the sake of accuracy, I include the original Greek or Latin text where the translations are insufficiently literal or where I otherwise consider it helpful.

It is with some reluctance that I make use of the term “mercenary” to describe Greeks soldiering in Near Eastern armies. I do so for want of a more precise descriptor

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and because it has been widely adopted in previous scholarship on this topic. The word in this context is an anachronism; the Greeks themselves did not have a precise equivalent for mercenary, instead referring to this type of soldier with two terms: *xenos*, the meanings of which include foreigner, stranger, foreign friend, ritualized foreign friend; and *misthophoros*, a general term for a professional or wage-earner regardless of occupation. Sometimes ancient authors, particularly Arrian, referred to mercenaries as *xenoi misthophoroi*, literally “foreign wage-earners”.\(^{29}\) Although ‘mercenary’ has many negative connotations in contemporary usage, it is important to note that this was not necessarily the case for *xenos* or *misthophoros*.\(^{30}\) Insofar as it is possible, I use the word in a value-neutral manner.

\(^{29}\) For discussion of the definition of “mercenary” in the ancient world, see Parke 1933: 20-21; Seibt 1977: 16-19; Trundle 2004: 10-27; Van Wees 2004: 71-76. Earlier texts also used the word *epikouros* to describe soldiers which some have identified as mercenaries.

\(^{30}\) See discussion by Trundle 2004: 24-39.
Chapter 1

The Traditional Paradigm

Xenophon’s *Anabasis* records “one of the great adventures in human history”:¹ the story of an army of Greek mercenaries, often called the Ten Thousand, who hired themselves out to Cyrus the Younger, a rebel prince of the Achaemenid Empire. Having marched with Cyrus to Babylon in the heart of the Empire, they found themselves stranded after their leader was killed in his battle for the throne. Bereft of allies, provisions, and reliable guides, and hounded by hostile forces, the Greeks nonetheless marched north to the Black Sea and eventually found their way to Thrace. There they served a local warlord until finding employment with Sparta, and as the *Anabasis* ends remnants of the Ten Thousand are again on their way to war with Persia.

Xenophon, one of the leaders and survivors of the Ten Thousand, wrote the *Anabasis* based on his personal experience. Parts history, memoir, encomium, travelogue, tactical manual, and philosophical discourse on leadership, the *Anabasis* defies clear categorization. This is perhaps not surprising for a writer responsible for popular treatises on all manner of subjects and in a variety of genres (*Hellenica*, *Agesilaus*, *Cyropaedia*, *Symposium*, etc.).

The *Anabasis* remains Xenophon’s most enduring achievement. Authors in antiquity praised (Plutarch *Artaxerxes* 8.1) and imitated (Arrian’s *Anabasis of Alexander*) the work, and the *Anabasis* continues to be relevant today: it is a standard second year text for students of the ancient Greek language (e.g., Mather and Hewitt’s *Xenophon’s Anabasis: Books 1-4*), the subject of historical fiction (Michael Curtis Ford’s *The Ten

¹ Durant 1939: 460-461.
Thousand), the inspiration for novels in modern, fantasy, and science fiction (John Ringo’s *The Last Centurion*, Paul Kearney’s *The Ten Thousand*, and Andre Norton’s *Star Guard*), and even the subject of a song (Parkway Drive’s “Anasasis (Xenophontis)” from *Killing with a Smile*). Most prominently, the *Anabasis* was the basis for Sol Yurick’s novel, *The Warriors*, which was adapted into a Hollywood movie of the same name in 1979 and a video game by Rockstar Games in 2005; as of this writing, a remake of the movie is reportedly in preparation.² Tim Rood explores the lasting cultural importance of the *Anabasis* in his 2005 book, *The Sea! The Sea! The shout of the ten thousand in the modern imagination*.

Likewise, the *Anabasis* is a critical source for scholars of ancient Greece. In the last decade, there have been prominent monographs (e.g., Robin Waterfield’s 2006 *Xenophon’s Retreat: Greece, Persia, and the end of the Golden Age*) and edited volumes (Robin Lane Fox’s 2004 *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*) devoted to its study. Others have mined the text of the *Anabasis* for information on a broad range of subjects, from daily life in an ancient Greek army (John W.I. Lee’s 2007 *A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon’s Anabasis* and G.B. Nussbaum’s 1967 *The Ten Thousand: A Study in Social Organization and Action in Xenophon’s Anabasis*) to its presentation of the world outside of Greece (Jan Stronk’s 1995 *The Ten Thousand in Thrace: An Archaeological and Historical Commentary* and Steven W. Hirsch’s 1985 *The Friendship of the Barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire*).

Unsurprisingly, then, the *Anabasis* – and in particular the first book, which details the time of the Greeks in the army of Cyrus the Younger – is one of the most important

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sources for historians studying Greek mercenaries in the time of the Achaemenid Empire. Of all the ancient works that discuss Greek mercenaries, Xenophon’s is the most detailed and specific. Unlike our other sources, Xenophon was present for most of the events he describes. Large portions of seminal works on Greek mercenaries rely on information from the Anabasis, including Parke’s 1933 Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, Best’s 1969 Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare and, most recently, Trundle’s 2004 Greek Mercenaries: From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander.

The events of the Anabasis are often seen as ushering in a new era of Greek and Persian interactions, where Greeks increasingly hired themselves out to the satraps and kings of the Near East. In many ways, Xenophon’s presentation of the role of Greek mercenaries in the first book of the Anabasis frames our understanding of later Greek mercenary service in the Near East, as it did ancient understandings of the same.³ Our information concerning mercenary activity from other sources is comparatively limited, making Xenophon’s account all the more important and influential.

Trundle described the events of the Anabasis as “a paradigm” for Greek mercenary service in the Near East prior to the fall of the Achaemenid Empire.⁴ It is the first presentation of a Persian army reliant upon hired Greek hoplites who, despite the ultimate failure of Cyrus’ expedition, proved to be the best soldiers on the field at the battle of Cunaxa.⁵ Later Greeks cited the success of the Ten Thousand as evidence for the

superiority of Greeks over Persians in war and the general weakness of the Achaemenid Empire. Modern historians, too, have viewed the victory of the Greek wing at Cunaxa as illustrative of the inherent weakness of the Achaemenid military due to its lack of heavy infantry, thus explaining the need for Cyrus and later Persian commanders to hire Greek hoplites. Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, then, is the first extant expression of what Pierre Briant has called the Greek Thesis: the idea that Greek mercenaries were superior to any soldier the Near East could produce, and therefore the armies of the fourth century Achaemenid Empire and Egypt were utterly reliant upon them.

Even so, scholars have long noted the biased nature of Xenophon’s self-presentation in the *Anabasis*, as well as the affinity the Athenian had for Cyrus the Younger. Likewise, problems have been noted with Xenophon’s account of Cunaxa, and much discussion has surrounded the question of reconstructing the battle itself and the particular role of the Greeks therein. Yet there has been no systematic analysis of the importance of the Greeks in Cyrus the Younger’s army throughout the first book of the *Anabasis*. Xenophon did not set out to write a measured, objective account of the

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6 For example, Isocrates *Panegyricus* 138-149; Plutarch *Artaxerxes* 20.1-2; Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 8.8.7.
7 Parke 1933: 23; Cawkwell 1972: 5; Anderson 1974: 74-78; Seibt 1977: 51-69; Rahe 1980; Dandavaev 1989: 312; Briant 2002: 620, although he also notes the importance of Cyrus’ cavalry; Trundle 2004: 51-52, 73-74; Cawkwell 2005: 248; Waterfield 2006: 80 states that, “with almost 300 years of experience of hoplite warfare, the Greeks were the supreme warriors of the ancient world, and therefore in demand as mercenaries”.
expedition of Cyrus, but a dramatic and entertaining tale of a Greek army’s return home from Cunaxa. Indeed, for the majority of the *Anabasis* the Greeks are not actually in the service of others, and the time they spent in Cyrus’ army functions as the introduction of the story and of Xenophon’s Greek protagonists.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that the stereotypical superiority of the Greek mercenary in the *Anabasis* is founded less upon the historical realities of Cyrus’ rebellion and more upon Xenophon’s own literary manipulations of the campaign narrative. In large part, he accomplishes this by excluding the non-Greek troops in Cyrus’ army from the narrative, providing inconsequential anecdotes meant to showcase the military prowess of the Greeks, and by inventing speeches and projecting thoughts which confirm Greek superiority from the perspective of non-Greek characters. Apart from these literary devices, however, Xenophon offers no clear evidence revealing what specifically makes these Greeks better than the rest of Cyrus’ soldiers. Xenophon’s *Anabasis* is a carefully crafted and highly successful work of literature, but the very literary strategies employed to enhance the story’s entertainment value also obfuscate the historical reality of the Greek role in Cyrus the Younger’s army. The paradigmatic expression of the Greek Thesis is rooted in the fictional embellishment of Xenophon’s account of the Ten Thousand and, to a lesser degree, in other ancient accounts of the same events.

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10 As a result, the non-Greek contributions are severely understated. See Briant 2002: 620 and the discussion below.
11 That the literary framework of *Anabasis* is constructed so as to enhance the dramatic and tragic elements of the story was recognized already by Calhoun 1920, who referred to the author as “Xenophon Tragodos.” See also Kingsbury 1956; Wencis 1977; Tsagalis 2009.
12 As Nussbaum 1967: 2 commented about the events up to Cunaxa, “even this first part of the story is seen and told in the *Anabasis* essentially from the point of view of these Ten Thousand: it is the introduction to their story. When it really begins, it is the story of the fortunes and adventures of this body of Greeks.”
From Sardis to Babylon

The first sections of the *Anabasis* serve as a prelude to the Battle of Cunaxa. Xenophon describes the nature of the strife between Cyrus and his brother, King Artaxerxes II, details the manner in which Cyrus gathers his army in preparation for rebellion, and relates the army’s march from Sardis to the environs of Babylon. Xenophon’s narrative privileges Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries in several ways, each of which underlines their importance and/or superior military skill.

Xenophon focuses his narrative almost exclusively on the Greeks, only rarely mentioning Cyrus’ own barbarian soldiers. This is best exemplified by his discussion of how Cyrus prepared for his rebellion. Within the first few paragraphs of the work, Xenophon presents the Greek mercenaries as the lynchpin of Cyrus’ revolt. This point is set up by the note that Cyrus, having been first summoned to the deathbed of his father Darius II, took 300 Greek bodyguards with him on the journey (1.1.2). It is then explicitly stated in the description of Cyrus’ preparations that, “as regards his Greek force, he proceeded to collect it with the utmost secrecy, so that he might take the King as completely unprepared as possible” (1.1.6).13

What follows is a long description of the manner in which Cyrus gathered his Greek mercenaries (1.1.7-2.9; 1.2.9).14 The secrecy with which Cyrus did this is repeated twice (1.1.9, 10), as is the note that Cyrus used the pretexts of restoring Milesian exiles and campaigning against the Pisidians as a cover for collecting even more Greek soldiers (1.1.7, 11). By emphasizing the secretive and misleading tactics Cyrus used to hire his

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13 τὴν δὲ Ἑλληνικὴν δύναμιν ἠθροίζεν ὡς μάλιστα ἐδύνατο ἑπικρυπτόμενος, ὡς ὡς ὦτι ἀπαρασκευάσατον λάβοι βασιλεία.
14 See Parke 1933: 24-26 and Roy 1967 for full discussion of this passage.
Greek soldiers, Xenophon implies that these Greeks are to be a sort of secret weapon against his brother’s army.

This implication is then heightened by the length of the descriptions devoted to a number of the Greek contingents collected. Some are gathered by the commanders of his garrisons in Ionia (1.1-6), some by Clearchus – a Spartan exile – for operations in the Chersonese (1.1.9), and still more by Aristippus for deployment in Thessaly (1.1.10). Once Cyrus was ready to march east, he summoned these mercenaries and their commanders, as well as others raised by Proxenus the Boeotian, Sophaenetus the Stymphalian, and Socrates the Achaean (1.1.11). Xenophon then devotes considerable space in the narrative to when and where these soldiers arrive (1.2.1-3, 9, 4.3).

By contrast, Xenophon only rarely makes reference to his barbarian soldiers. None are mentioned as accompanying him to his father’s deathbed, although it seems reasonable to assume he would have brought more than his Greek bodyguards. The preparation and collection of barbarian troops for Cyrus’ rebellion is limited to two terse statements: “he also took care that the barbarians of his own province should be capable soldiers and should feel kindly toward him” (1.1.5),15 and “when he thought the time had come to begin his upward march, the pretext he offered was that he wished to drive the Pisidians out of his land entirely, and it was avowedly against them that he set about collecting both his barbarian (τὸ βαρβαρικόν) and his Greek (τὸ Ἑλληνικόν) troops” (1.2.1).

Unlike the Greeks, we are not given any details about how the barbarians were levied, who their commanders were, or how many there were. In fact, Xenophon

15 καὶ τῶν παρ’ ἑαυτῷ δὲ βαρβάρων ἐπεμελεῖτο ὡς πολεμεῖν τε ἰκανοὶ εἴησαι καὶ εὔνοικος ἔχοιεν αὐτῷ.
withholds the number of barbarians in Cyrus’ army until just before the battle of Cunaxa (1.7.10), despite already giving a detailed count of the number of hoplites and peltasts when each Greek commander joined him and full summary at Celaenae (1.2.9), one of the first stops on his march east. The importance of the barbarian troops is thus minimized, even as, according to Xenophon, they made up a force ten times larger than the Greeks (1.7.10). Moreover, by locating the alarmed response of Tissaphernes, a rival satrap to Cyrus in Anatolia, immediately after the detailed description of Cyrus’ Greeks, Xenophon implies that a collection of little more than 10,000 Greek troops is enough to provoke alarm and action on the part of the Great King:

Meanwhile, Tissaphernes had taken note of these proceedings and come to the conclusion that Cyrus’ preparations were too extensive (μείζωνα) to be against the Pisidians; he accordingly made his way to the King as quickly as he could, with about five hundred horsemen. And when the King heard from Tissaphernes about Cyrus’ array, he set about making counter-preparations (1.2.4).

This same technique is on display in Xenophon’s description of Cyrus’ troop review for the Cilician queen at Tyriaeum (1.2.14-18). During the review, Xenophon limits his discussion of the barbarians to a single statement, writing that “Cyrus inspected the barbarians first, and they marched past with their cavalry formed in troops and their infantry in companies” (1.2.16).16 The Greeks however, are described in detail: we learn how deep their line was, where individual commanders were arranged (1.2.15), and the impressive details of their armament: “the Greeks all had helmets of bronze (κράνη χαλκᾶ), crimson tunics (χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς), and greaves (κνημίδας), and carried their shields uncovered (ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαλυμμένας)” (1.2.16). Not only does the narrative focus

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16 ἐθεώρη τὸν ὁ Κῦρος πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς βαρβάρους· οὶ δὲ παρῆλαυντον τεταγμένοι κατὰ ἕλας καὶ κατὰ τάξεις.
on the Greeks, but each of the details provided within also demonstrates to the reader the impressiveness of the Greek soldiers.

After the troop review, the narrative continues to lack details or discussion of the barbarian contingent. They are referenced in a speech of Clearchus (1.3.12), an anecdote about their incompetence even in dislodging wagons stuck in mud (1.5.7-8), a speech of Cyrus in which he disparages them (1.5.16), and in reference to the traitorous plot concocted by Orontas, in which he proposed to use 1,000 horsemen to prevent the King’s troops from burning supplies in advance of Cyrus’ army (1.6.1-3). Other than these few appearances, the story continues to focus on the Greek soldiers and Cyrus’ interactions with them, each of which is presented in a manner that reveals the importance of the Greek mercenaries.

Xenophon’s silence on the activities of Cyrus’ barbarians means that, according to the narrative, only his Greeks participated in a number of events, namely: the attack on the countryside of Lycaonia, which “he gave over to the Greeks to plunder” (1.2.19); the escort of Epyaxa home by the shortest route, performed alone by Menon and his troops (1.2.20); the plundering of Tarsus by the survivors of these same troops, after 100 had been lost during the escort (1.2.25-26); the near-mutiny of the Greeks at Tarsus, who “suspected by this time that they were going against the King, and they said they had not been hired for that” (1.3.1). The resolution of the mutiny (1.3.2-21) is entirely the work

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17 Here, Clearchus reminds the Greeks that Cyrus is a dangerous enemy and, should they desert, the proximity of his army presents a significant threat. However, the narrative which follows the speech (1.3.13-14) emphasizes the danger in other terms, pointing out that the Greeks do not possess the guides, supplies, and ships required for a safe journey home.

18 Xenophon never comments on the reaction of the rest of Cyrus’ army to this, even as he was forced to remain at Tarsus for 20 days – were they, too, opposed to marching
of Clearchus, who manipulates the rest of the Greeks into agreeing to continue on after
Cyrus claims his intention is merely to attack Abrocomas, a rival satrap with an army in
their vicinity – notably, the entire army is free to continue once the Greeks are placated.
Xenophon gives no indication of how Cyrus’ barbaroi reacted to the Greek refusal to
move on or to his intended rebellion.

Xenophon’s fixation on Cyrus’ Greek troops creates the impression that they are
the most important part of his army. He connects this importance to their superiority as
soldiers by employing two other literary techniques in combination with one another: the
inclusion of anecdotes and the attribution of speeches (direct or indirect) and thoughts to
barbarians. The two incidents which best exemplify this are the troop review at
Tyriaeum, discussed briefly above, and a strategy session before the battle during which
Cyrus addresses the generals and captains of the Greeks.

After Cyrus has inspected first the barbarian line and then the Greek line at
Tyriaeum, Xenophon relates an anecdote, which I quote here:

[Cyrus] gave orders that the troops should advance arms and the phalanx
move forward in a body. The generals transmitted these orders to the
soldiers, and when the trumpet sounded, they advanced arms and charged.
And then, as they went on faster and faster, at length with a shout the
troops broke into a run of their own accord, in the direction of the enemy
camp. As for the barbarians and the others, they were terribly frightened
(φόβος πολύς); the Cilician queen took to flight in her carriage, and the
people in the market left their wares behind and took to their heels; while
the Greeks with a roar of laughter came up to their camp. (1.2.17-18).

against the King? Were there other reasons behind the delay here? Xenophon’s
hellenocentric perspective keeps us in the dark about the larger political situation within
Cyrus’ army, and it denies us the opportunity to truly judge the importance of the Greeks
themselves. We are left only with the impression that they were able to put a halt to the
entire rebellion, should they so desire.
Though it may seem otherwise, this anecdote provides no real evidence of Greek military superiority. What, in fact, does it demonstrate? The Greeks, formed in a phalanx, charge "in the direction of the enemy camp (ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς)", causing only the queen in her chariot and the "people in the market (οί ἐκ τῆς ἄγορᾶς)" to flee. Although the implication may be that Cyrus’ non-Greek troops are among those fleeing and frightened, Xenophon never specifically identifies the frightened “barbarians and the others”. It makes little sense for this group to include his barbarian soldiers, since they had paraded past Cyrus and were unlikely to have already returned to camp, which is where the Greeks charged.

Even so, Xenophon indicates that the charge of the Greeks should be taken as evidence of their military prowess by how other characters in the episode react. Not only are “the barbarians and others” said to be “terribly frightened”, but “the Cilician queen was filled with admiration (ἐθαύμασε) at beholding the brilliant appearance (λαμπρότητα) and the order (τάξιν) of the Greek army; and Cyrus was delighted (ήσθη) to see the terror (φόβον) with which the Greeks inspired the barbarians” (1.2.18). An anecdote about frightened non-military personnel put to flight by an unexpected charge, then, becomes evidence of Greek military superiority by means of Xenophon’s right as narrator to assign whatever thoughts he desires to certain characters within the story.

Likewise, not long before the Battle of Cunaxa Xenophon records a meeting between the Greeks and Cyrus, purportedly to take counsel “as to how he should fight the battle (πῶς ὡν τὴν μάχην ποιϊτο)” (1.7.2), in which he uses a similar strategy to
misrepresent the importance of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{19} While this incident may be taken to reveal the respect Cyrus has for the opinions of his Greek commanders, the surrounding context indicates otherwise. First, the night before Cyrus held another review of his troops in which he drew up his army in battle order (1.7.1), implying that the battle strategy had already been determined before his meeting with the Greeks. Second, Xenophon gives no details about the counsel Cyrus received from the Greeks or any sign that he altered his battle plans according to their advice.

Instead, the speech that Xenophon attributes to Cyrus at this strategy session states what, to this point, the narrative has only implied or referenced obliquely: that Cyrus considers the Greeks his best soldiers and that the success of his campaign rests upon them. He begins by explaining that he included Greeks “not because I have not barbarians enough” but “because I believe that you are braver and stronger (ἀμείνονας καὶ κρείττους) than many barbarians” (1.7.3). In the same passage, Cyrus attributes the superiority of the Greeks to their status as free men, and then disparages the barbarian army that they will face in battle, stating that “our enemies have great numbers and they will come on with a great outcry; for the rest, however, if you can hold out against these things, I am ashamed, I assure you, to think what sorry fellows you will find the people of our country to be” (1.7.4).\textsuperscript{20} Finally, Cyrus reinforces the special status of the Greeks in his army by promising them preferential treatment in the event of victory. He intends to

\textsuperscript{19} Two other incidents, Cyrus’ use of Greeks as guards during the trial of the traitor Orontas (1.6.4-11) and his plea to Menon and Clearchus to resolve a dispute without fighting one another (1.6.16-17), will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

\textsuperscript{20} τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλήθος πολὺ καὶ κρατῆσις πολλῆ ἐπιστέφη· ὃν δὲ ταύτα ἀνάσχησθε, τὰ ἄλλα καὶ αἰσχροσθαί μοι δοκῶ ὦ ὡς ἦμῖν γνώσεσθε τοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Contrary to Cyrus’ expectation, the King’s army approached battle silently and in order (1.8.11).
put all of his friends in control of provinces, but “as for you men of Greece, I shall give each one of you a wreath of gold (στέφανον…χρυσοῦν) besides” (1.7.7).

Like the troop review at Tyriaeum, this anecdote and the attached direct discourse would seem to be another piece of supporting evidence for Xenophon’s thesis of Greek superiority, but in fact has little historical reliability. The invention and inclusion of verbatim speeches, much like the placement of thoughts in the minds of characters, is a common aspect of Greek historiography and the prerogative of the writer. In this case, the acknowledgement of the superiority of the Greek hoplites by foreigners is a literary device used to great effect in the Anabasis, both at Tyriaeum and in the strategy session. The reason Xenophon chose to demonstrate the supremacy of the Greeks in this way is obvious, since it is more impressive and convincing when foreigner characters acknowledge Greek superiority than when Greeks or the narrator himself make the claim. Even if Cyrus did make the statements quoted above, they were made only in the presence of Greeks are cannot be taken for more than mere flattery. In any case, Cyrus ultimately lost and so Xenophon’s record of his promises cannot be evaluated against his actions.

Xenophon’s narrative up to the battle of Cunaxa is thus arranged in order to stress the importance of the Greek mercenary contingent in Cyrus’ army. He does this in two ways: first, by concentrating his narrative on the background and deeds of the Greeks

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22 See Briant 2002: 786 for brief overview of the use of this literary technique in Greek historiography, specifically concerning Greeks and Persians.
23 Perhaps this is one reason Xenophon goes out of his way on several occasions to emphasize Cyrus’ reliability (1.2.11-12; 1.4.12-13; 1.9.7-10). Contrast this with Seuthes’ behavior later (7.5.15-16).
while largely excising the non-Greeks. Second, he includes several anecdotes and speeches or thoughts which seem to confirm that Cyrus’ Greeks were the most important soldiers in his army due to their competence in war. None of the evidence he provides conclusively supports this thesis, however, and the case for Greek mercenary superiority in these first sections of the *Anabasis* rests completely on the manner in which Xenophon has constructed his story.

**The Battle of Cunaxa**

Unlike the events of the narrative discussed above, the performance of the Greeks at Cunaxa provides evidence against which we are able to test Xenophon’s thesis that 1) the Greeks were superior soldiers to their Near Eastern counter-parts and 2) Cyrus, recognizing this fact, arranged his rebellion (and, therefore, his battle plan at Cunaxa) in order to exploit the superiority of his Greeks. At first glance, it would appear that the Battle of Cunaxa provides confirmation of Xenophon’s thesis. The Greeks suffer no casualties, resist the charge of Artaxerxes’ scythed chariots, and decisively drive the division opposite them from the field of battle. The reason for their ultimate defeat is the untimely and tragically ironic death of Cyrus himself, killed, as Calhoun long ago described,

> in the moment of victory, the strange working of human destiny by which the gallant young prince lay dead upon the field of battle, slain by his own uncontrollable passions, while his irresistible phalanx was sweeping all before it, a blind agent of destruction whose guiding purpose had ceased to live.\(^\text{24}\)

Xenophon’s account blames Clearchus for the death of Cyrus, even as the Greeks remained undefeated on the battlefield. According to the account, before the battle Cyrus

\(^{24}\) Calhoun 1921: 142.
ordered Clearchus to attack the King’s position in the center of his own line, but Clearchus, not wanting to risk exposing his own right wing, ignored this command (1.8.12-13). Thus the Greeks were victorious but in the wrong position. Cyrus was left to attack the King with only 600 cavalry and, being overwhelmed, was slain (1.8.24-29).

Other ancient authors, such as Ctesias (F16.64), Diodorus (15.23.7), and Isocrates (5.90-2), seem to have blamed Cyrus’ death on his own audacity and overconfidence, but Xenophon goes out of his way to write Cyrus’ death scene in a way to absolve him of guilt.25 Following Xenophon, Plutarch addressed the question of blame and found Clearchus to be at fault (Artaxerxes 8.3-5).

Modern scholars, too, have taken up the question of who was responsible for Cyrus’ defeat at Cunaxa. Most of the debate has centered on whether Cyrus’ order to Clearchus was sensible. Hewitt posits that Cyrus’ march to Babylon was too slow, allowing Artaxerxes to gather an army larger than he had originally planned to face. As a result, Cyrus’ plan to have the Greeks attack the center of the royal army, where the King was located, no longer made sense and Clearchus was justified in choosing to continue straight ahead instead of marching to his left, which would have exposed his right flank.26 Whitby argues that Cyrus never intended for the Greeks to attack the King’s position, but is at a loss to explain his command to Clearchus to advance obliquely left.27

25 See Bassett 1999.
26 Hewitt 1919; Rahe 1980: 94-95.
27 Whitby 2004: 227-228. “Diodorus’ version makes more sense than Xenophon’s, although this does not guarantee that it is more accurate.” That is, given Xenophon’s figures, Cyrus’ command makes no sense; with Diodorus’ smaller figure for Artaxerxes’ army, he argues that the order to march slightly left does make sense. See discussion below.
Waterfield proposes instead that Cyrus’ command to Clearchus did not refer to an oblique advance, but instead that the Greeks should pivot to the left after defeating the division in front of them. Following Wylie’s suggestion, he argues that Clearchus’ failure to do so was not a mistake but a result of Tissaphernes’ brilliant strategy: by feigning retreat, he lured Clearchus into giving chase. Pursuit ordinarily would have been the responsibility of the peltasts and attached cavalry, but Tissaphernes had directly attacked these divisions and separated them from the hoplites, who then took it upon themselves to follow up on their purported victory.

According to Prevas, Cyrus’ original plan was to split the Greeks, putting half on his right wing and half on his left. As a result of his careless advance, however, Cyrus and the rest of his army was taken by surprise at the King’s approach. In the ensuing confusion, the Greeks refused to separate themselves and instead formed together on the right wing. Cyrus’ command to march left was a last-minute, desperate response to an unexpected turn of events.

Wylie is the most critical of Cyrus of all modern commentators. He argues that Cyrus’ defeat was due to his lackluster marching pace, his failure to procure more cavalry, and his decision to place the Greek hoplites, “the one wild card which might have gained him victory” in the wrong position, which led him at the last moment to desperately suggest “an impracticable alternative” to Clearchus.

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29 Waterfield 2006: 17-18. Briant 2002: 629 agrees that the Greeks “too confidently” pursued the division opposite them, but does not view the Persian retreat as a feint.
30 Prevas 2002: 91-93.
31 Wylie 1992. My own interpretation (see below) agrees with his in many respects.
Others have argued that Cyrus’ order made sense, but only seems poorly conceived due to the exaggerated figure Xenophon gives for the size of Artaxerxes’ army. Bigwood summarizes this position as follows:

According to Anabasis 1.8.13 and 23, Artaxerxes’ army so outnumbered that of Cyrus that Artaxerxes at the center of his forces was outside Cyrus’ left. How then could Cyrus have ordered the Greeks who comprised his right wing to attack the enemy center (1.8.12)? They would have been required to march obliquely across the advance of the entire left wing of Artaxerxes’ army, which is surely absurd...it seems, in fact, as a number of scholars have suggested, that Xenophon has been led astray by his gross overestimation of the size of Artaxerxes’ army.33

All of these reconstructions offer valuable insight into the problematic nature of Xenophon’s account. The lack of scholarly consensus, however, reflects the failure of each individual reconstruction to address comprehensively the literary agenda underlying Xenophon’s narrative. Nearly all scholars follow Xenophon by errantly assuming two features of the account are true: first, that the Greeks were superior soldiers and second, that Cyrus, recognizing this fact, ordered his Greek mercenaries to advance against the King’s position in the center.34

33 Bigwood 1983: 342. See also Whitby 2004: 227-228; Cawkwell 2005: 248 argues that Artaxerxes’ army was not much larger than Cyrus’. All commentators agree that the figure given for the army of Artaxerxes is exaggerated, but many still take the comment that Artaxerxes’ center was beyond the left wing of Cyrus to mean that, regardless of the exact number of soldiers on each side, Artaxerxes had a roughly 2:1 advantage. See Waterfield 2006: 15; Briant 2002: 629; Prevas 2002: 88-90.
34 Briant 2002: 633 doubts Xenophon’s portrayal, but fails to follow up on his comment that “as in the battles in Greece and Asia Minor in 490 and 480-479, the Greek foot soldiers seemed to exhibit clear superiority over the infantrymen they faced. This observation, however, needs to be tempered: for one thing, let us recall that Plutarch (Artaxerxes 7.5) and Xenophon (1.8.14) stress the maneuverability of the royal army.” Whitby 2004: 228 also acknowledges that “it would be unsurprising if Greek writers had not exaggerated the Greek achievements at Cunaxa,” but he qualifies this by noting the confidence of the Greeks after the battle “suggests that their performance had given them reason to trust their own abilities.”
In the remainder of this section, I will argue that neither of these assumptions is accurate, but are instead products of Xenophon’s literary agenda. First, I demonstrate that Xenophon continues to employ the same literary techniques in order to misrepresent the importance and military superiority of Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries. Second, I show that the reported exchange between Cyrus and Clearchus, in which the former’s order to attack the King’s position is ignored by the latter, is an authorial invention designed to absolve Cyrus from criticism and to blame Clearchus for the defeat at Cunaxa. Finally, I offer my own reconstruction of the battle, explain the role of the Greeks in it, and identify the reasons behind Cyrus’ defeat.

As in the sections of the *Anabasis* before Cunaxa, Xenophon’s narrative of the battle itself is focused on the Greeks and largely omits the contributions of Cyrus’ *barbaroi*. In his description of the battle formation, the position of the Greeks is described in more detail than any other contingent: Clearchus on the right, Proxenus in the center, and Menon on the left wing, with Paphlagonian horsemen and Greek peltasts to the right of Clearchus (1.8.4-5). By contrast, the barbarians are described in half a sentence: “the left was Ariaeus, Cyrus’ lieutenant, with the rest of the barbarian army” (1.8.5). In order to increase the tension of the battle narrative, the royal division opposite the Greeks is also described in vivid detail: the “white cuirasses (λευκοθώρακες)” of the horsemen, the “wicker shields (γερροφόροι)” and “wooden shields (ξυλίναις ἀσπίσιν)” of the infantry, “and then more horsemen and bowmen” along with their formation (ἐν πλασίῳ πλήρει), the scythed chariots, and the silent, steady manner in which they marched (1.8.8-11). Those troops arrayed against Ariaeus’ wing are not mentioned, and
in fact Xenophon omits the fact that Artaxerxes arrayed his scythed chariots along his entire line, not only against the Greeks.\textsuperscript{35}

Once the battle is joined, the actions of the troops under Ariaeus are referenced twice. First, they are the passive objects of a flanking maneuver by the King (1.8.23). Second, they retreat to the previous day’s camp once Cyrus is killed (1.9.31-10.1).

The Greeks, however, are followed closely. The manner in which they break the enemy line opposed to them is described in detail: they strike up the paean, their march turns quickly into a run, the phalanx billows out, they frighten the enemy horses by banging their spears against their shields, pursue the enemy line after it breaks suddenly and immediately, open gaps in their formation in order to avoid the scythed chariots, and do not suffer any casualties at all, except for one man who was struck by an arrow (1.8.18-20). Following the description of Cyrus’ death and eulogy of his life (1.8.24-9.31), the Greeks continue to be the object of Xenophon’s attention: they turn around and prepare to face the King’s army again, charge it and once again drive their enemies away and spend time in pursuit (1.10.4-15). Finally, with no one left to oppose them, the Greeks march back to their camp (1.10.16-19).

Xenophon scatters anecdotes throughout the battle narrative which demonstrate the superiority of the Greeks, too. On two occasions Persian forces break and flee before the Greeks reach them (1.8.19, 10.10). The manner in which the hoplites avoid Artaxerxes’ scythed chariots, by opening gaps in their lines, demonstrates their discipline,

\textsuperscript{35} The reported alignment refers only to those scythed chariots positioned opposite the Greeks, rather than to the entire chariot corps in Artaxerxes’ army. Diodorus reports that “Artaxerxes stationed before the length of his battleline scythe-bearing chariots in no small number” (14.22.7, trans. Oldfather), and Plutarch agrees (\textit{Artaxerxes} 7.4). For further discussion of the role of scythed chariots at Cunaxa, see Rop 2013 (forthcoming).
as does Xenophon’s report that, in their pursuit, they “shouted meanwhile to one another not to run at a headlong pace, but to keep their ranks” (1.8.19-20). Similarly, the Greek peltasts open up their ranks on the right wing, allowing the charge of Tissaphernes to pass through without damage to themselves, but inflicting such that “Tissaphernes had come off the worst of it (ὁ δ’ οὖν Τισσαφέρνης ὡς μεῖον ἐχθον ἀπηλλάγη), he did not wheel round again, but went on to the camp of the Greeks” (1.10.6-8). When Artaxerxes’ army breaks into their baggage train, only the Greek guards manage to form up and defend themselves, killing a number of plunderers while defending the persons and property under their care (1.10.3).

Scholars have rightly questioned the positive frame Xenophon gives a number of these anecdotes. The success of the Greek charge has been viewed as the result of a feigned retreat – in which case, the assault of the scythed chariots may be seen as tactical rather than ineffectual – or as negated by the choice to continue pursuit.36 Likewise, Briant has convincingly argued that the Persian decision to avoid the second charge was motivated by the fact of Cyrus’ death, not by fear of the Greek mercenaries: the battle was over, and the King’s strategy was to usher the Greeks out of Mesopotamia without a needless confrontation.37 Several commentators have noted, furthermore, that Xenophon severely understates the effectiveness of Tissaphernes’ charge, which separated the Greek hoplites from the peltasts and put Cyrus in a precarious position by virtue of exposing his right flank. Xenophon’s decision to narrate this event out of order, placing it after the death of Cyrus, seems to have been an attempt to minimize its importance.38 Finally, the

glowing report that several Greeks were able to protect the baggage train from plunderers is not only inconsequential to the battle but also undermined by the later admission that, in fact, the Greek camp and supplies had been plundered and, as a result, the Greeks were forced to go without dinner upon their return (1.10.18-19).

Despite doubts concerning the effectiveness of the Greek actions at Cunaxa, scholars have nevertheless taken Xenophon’s report that Cyrus ordered Clearchus to advance left – and the implication that, in giving it, Cyrus acknowledged Greek superiority and desired their presence at the point of his attack on the King’s position – at face value:39

At this moment Cyrus rode along the line, attended only by Pigres, his interpreter, and three or four others, and shouted to Clearchus to lead his army against the enemy’s centre, for the reason that the King was stationed there; “and if,” he said, “we are victorious there, our whole task is accomplished.” Clearchus, however, since he saw the compact body at the enemy’s centre and heard from Cyrus that the King was beyond his left wing (for the King was so superior in numbers that, although occupying the centre of his own line, he was beyond Cyrus’ left wing), was unwilling to draw the right wing away from the river, for fear that he might be turned on both flanks; and he told Cyrus, in reply, that he was taking care to make everything go well (1.8.12-13).40

It is difficult to overstate how critical this passage is to the account, since it provides the lens through which Xenophon intends his audience to view the rest of the battle narrative.

39 Every reconstruction attempts to account for Cyrus’ command and Clearchus’ decision to ignore it, since the sensibility of the command is the critical factor in determining which figure is to blame for the Cyrean defeat. See discussion above.

40 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Κύρος παρελαύνων αὐτὸς σὺν Πίγρητι τῷ ἐρμηνεύ καὶ ἄλλοις τρισίν ἦ τέτταρσι τῷ Κλεάρχῳ ἐβόα ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ μέσον τὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ὅτι ἐκεῖ βασιλεῖς εἶχα· καὶ τοῦτ’, ἔφη, νικώμεν, πάνθω' ἡμῖν πεποίηται· ὥραν δὲ ὁ Κλέαρχος τὸ μέσον στύρος καὶ ἀκοῦσιν Κύρου ἔξω ὑπάντητα· ἔχουσαν τῷ Ἐλληνικῷ εὐονύμῳ βασιλέᾳ (τοσούτων γὰρ πλήθει περίτην βασιλείας ὅστε μέσον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον τοῦ Κύρου εὐονύμου ἔξω ἦν) ἄλλο· ὅμως ὁ Κλέαρχος οὐκ ἦθελεν ἀποστασία απὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸ δεξιόν κέρας, φοβούμενος μὴ κυκλωθείση ἐκατέρωθεν, τῷ δὲ Κύρῳ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι αὐτῷ μέλει ὅπως καλὸς ἔχοι.
Yet there are several reasons to doubt its veracity. The timing and purpose of the command do not make much sense. It is odd that we learn of Cyrus’ battle plans here, despite the earlier strategy session between Cyrus and his Greek generals (1.7.2). Xenophon was likely not present to witness the purported exchange. As a *xenos* of another Greek general, Proxenus (3.1.4-11), it is unlikely that he would have been near Clearchus in the Greek battle formation. In fact, the following section provides confirmation, since it describes Cyrus subsequently “riding along at some distance from his army…making a survey” when Xenophon himself “approached so as to meet him” and inquire about further orders (1.8.14-16). The command is relayed in direct discourse, a medium in which, as we have seen above, Xenophon and other ancient authors often take factual liberties in order to manipulate their narratives for thematic and dramatic purposes. Diodorus does not include it in his version of the battle, but the extent to which this is significant is debatable, as the reliability of his account has been called into question.  

By placing this information right before the battle, Xenophon ensures that his readers remember the plan of attack and will therefore contrast what actually happened (according to the narrative, at least) with what Cyrus had purportedly planned. This literary strategy serves several purposes: first, it acts as an apology for Cyrus, since the implication after the battle is that he would have been victorious had only Clearchus followed his instructions. Second, it elevates the importance of the Greek mercenaries, since they are the key to Cyrus’ strategy – and this is proven when, without them, his gambit at Artaxerxes ends in failure. Third, it dramatically foreshadows Cyrus’ defeat,

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41 Most notably Bigwood 1983; Westlake 1987.
particularly emphasized by Clearchus’ hubris in thinking he knew better than Cyrus, evidenced by his non-committal response that “he was taking care to make everything go well.”

The events at Cunaxa make far more sense when Xenophon’s literary embellishments, especially the command from Cyrus to Clearchus, are removed from consideration and they are taken in chronological, rather than narrative, order.

Accordingly, my reconstruction is as follows:

1. The King’s army approaches, arrayed in battle formation (1.8.8-11): the King himself is in the center along with 6,000 cavalry, while Tissaphernes is in command of his far left wing. His right wing extends far beyond Cyrus’ left, and the King’s own position is likely across from, if not also beyond, Cyrus’ left wing (1.8.13, 23).
2. Cyrus’ army is surprised and hurriedly rushes into formation (1.8.1-7). Cyrus is in the center of his own line, with 600 cavalry. The Greek mercenaries are arrayed on the far right of his line, with only their light peltasts and 1,000 Paphlagonian cavalry between them and the Euphrates River. The left wing is commanded by Ariaeus.
3. The Greek hoplites begin to advance against the King’s left wing (1.8.18). Tissaphernes charges with his horsemen and breaks through the peltasts on Cyrus’ far left, threatening Cyrus’ right flank before eventually moving on to plunder the Greek camp (1.10.7-8).
4. The King’s left wing retreats in the face of the Greek advance (1.8.19). The Greeks pursue, retaining their formation but, by the nature of their advance, are exposed to attack from their left and rear.
5. Artaxerxes begins to bring his right wing around the end of Ariaeus’ troops on the left wing, threatening Cyrus’ left flank with encirclement (1.8.23).
6. Cyrus, recognizing that his position is in danger on both left sides, charges at Artaxerxes’ position with his cavalry and is slain (1.8.24-29).
7. Ariaeus flees with his cavalry upon seeing Cyrus’ charge fail (1.9.31).
8. The Greeks continue their pursuit and are separated from the battlefield (1.10.4).
9. The King pursues Ariaeus and captures the camp of Cyrus (1.10.1-2).
10. The King rejoins Tissaphernes behind Cyrus’ original battle line (1.10.8).
11. The Greeks march back to their camp, finding it plundered. The King, victorious, withdraws with his forces (1.10.9-19).

Despite the lack of information about Cyrus’ army outside of the Greeks and his own personal guard, the basic troop movements provided here belie Xenophon’s
insistence that the Greeks played a critical role in Cyrus’ battle plan and were unquestionably victorious in their own part of the battle. Tissaphernes’ charge to the right of the Greek hoplites and through their peltasts appears to be a point of embarrassment, which Xenophon attempts to minimize by noting the maneuver out of order, after the death of Cyrus, and by offering praise of the peltast commander for letting him through.\(^{42}\) The argument that the retreat of Artaxerxes’ soldiers across from the Greeks was in fact a planned feint is, in my view, persuasive.\(^{43}\)

These movements left Cyrus in a very precarious position: not only was the King’s right swinging around the edge of Ariaeus’s troops in order to envelope Cyrus’ line on one side, but Tissaphernes’ successful charge on the Greek right left Cyrus with enemy soldiers threatening his own position from both sides. Additionally, as the Greeks were being lured away from the fight, their left flank and rear became progressively more exposed to attack from the center of the King’s line. Cyrus’ only remaining option was to attempt an outnumbered charge at the King’s position and hope to slay him. Even in this, Xenophon’s portrayal of Cyrus’ death is implausibly dramatic and was written as an apology against charges that the young prince had been too reckless.\(^{44}\) It seems more likely that he was killed before coming close enough to threaten Artaxerxes himself.

While it is not clear from Xenophon’s description of the battle exactly what Cyrus’ plan was, it is clear that the rebel prince was significantly outnumbered, outmaneuvered, and overmatched. This forced him into the dangerous gambit that cost him his life. From the outset, it appears that he had severely miscalculated in several places.

\(^{42}\) See Hewitt 1919: 248-249.
\(^{44}\) Bassett 1999. On the tragic structure of Book 1 of the \textit{Anabasis} and the foolishness of Cyrus’ charge, see Calhoun 1921; Wylie 1992: 130, 133.
respects. Although Xenophon emphasizes the secrecy of his preparations (1.1.6), the King was warned well enough in advance to prepare and organize his defenses, a problem Cyrus only exacerbated with the slow pace of his march inland.⁴⁵ Cyrus was therefore left hopelessly outnumbered, forced to fight at a time and place of his opponent’s choosing, and even, according to Xenophon, hubristically thought that his opponent feared to fight him (1.7.14-20). This left his army off guard and unprepared when the King suddenly approached (1.8.1-4), further diminishing his already slim chances for victory.⁴⁶

Cyrus’ Greek force, which Xenophon builds up as the critical factor in the rebel army, did essentially nothing to affect the outcome of the battle. They are stationed furthest away from the King’s position, manage to be outflanked by Tissaphernes’ cavalry despite being close to the river, and are either tricked into pursuing an intentionally fleeing force or, more generously, simply fail to follow up a quick victory.

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⁴⁵ Although Xenophon emphasizes the speed of Cyrus’ march, as Briant 2002: 628 notes, but his narrative also reveals several unexpected delays. He was forced to remain at Tarsus for 20 days (1.3.1) and for 5 days each at Caystru-pedion (1.2.11-12) and Thapsacus (1.4.11-13) when his army refused to go on further. See also Hewitt 1919: 245-247; Ruzicka 1985: 210-211; Wylie 1992: 131; Waterfield 2006: 102-111.

⁴⁶ Despite his apologetic treatment of Cyrus in the Anabasis, Xenophon himself recognized several of Cyrus the Younger’s errors and, in his pseudo-historical account of the Battle of Thymbrara in the Cyropaedia, implicitly corrected them in the behavior of Cyrus II. As Anderson 1970: 172 writes, “Xenophon takes good care not to let the hero of the Cyropaedia fall into the same errors. This Cyrus had spies in the enemy’s camp…Cyrus also marched in good order, with patrols out front. He therefore knew well in advance what forces Croesus had collected, and did not blunder into the enemy’s position.” He also notes that “at Cunaxa, the Greeks had gone into action unfed…In the Cyropaedia, the men were to be fed and given a night’s rest before the battle.” Finally, he adds (184-185) that at Thymbrara, Xenophon offers a different plan for countering a flanking maneuver much like the one Cyrus the Younger faced at Cunaxa, and the Cyrus of the Cyropaedia takes care to command his troops not to chase enemy forces in flight so long as there are others still holding their ground.
by turning on any part of the King’s army which wasn’t in full flight.\textsuperscript{47} The fact that only one Greek soldier was wounded should not lead us to conclude that the Greeks were overwhelmingly superior to their opponents.\textsuperscript{48} Rather, taken with the fact that Xenophon never mentions that the phalanx even killed a single enemy soldier,\textsuperscript{49} it is a sign that they actually did little fighting during the battle. Instead, one receives the impression that the Greeks spent the day of the battle fruitlessly running to and fro, always chasing but never catching their much more nimble prey. In spite of the reputation generally assigned them, the Greeks were little more than a sideshow to more important but omitted events at Cunaxa, and there is no concrete evidence to support the notion that Cyrus intended otherwise.

\textsuperscript{47} Xenophon’s note at 2.1.7 that Tissaphernes had in his employ a Greek named Phalinus, who “professed to be an expert in tactics and the handling of heavy infantry (προσεποιεῖτο ἐπιστήμων εἶναι τῶν ἀμφί τὼ ἱππεῖς τε καὶ ὀπλομαχίαν),” suggests that Artaxerxes’ army had prepared to confront Cyrus’ Greek contingent. Whether or not we attribute the tactics used against the Greeks to Phalinus or Tissaphernes or some other unnamed general, it seems more likely that the Greek victory was indeed won over an enemy that had intentionally retreated. Again, see Wylie 1992: 129-130 and Waterfield 2006: 18.

\textsuperscript{48} As Rey 2010: 36-37 points out, “superiority” is a highly subjective idea: “the notion of superiority demands not only elements but also criteria and terms for comparison – ‘superior’ in what, over what and according to what? ...shields, for example, considerably improve the protection of a soldier, but they are heavy and cumbersome artifacts that can eventually become a nuisance for their bearers. Thus, a weapon can be superior in one respect, but clearly inferior in another.” On the plains of Cunaxa, it is unclear, then, whether the hoplite phalanx - heavily equipped, slow-moving, limited in maneuverability – was really a superior force. See Wylie 1992: 119-120.

\textsuperscript{49} In the entirety of the battle narrative (1.8.18-29, 10.1-19), only the peltasts are credited with doing any damage to the King’s soldiers: “but the Greeks, after opening a gap for his [Tissaphernes’] men proceeded to deal blows and throw javelins upon them as they went through” (1.10.7). Even here, the language used is lacking specificity and detail, and Hewitt 1919: 248-249 notes the positive presentation of the peltasts’ actions here are belied by the fact that they allowed Tissaphernes’ to charge past them.
Alternatives to the *Anabasis*

Xenophon’s contemporary Ctesias, a doctor in the court of Artaxerxes II, also recorded an account of Cyrus the Younger’s rebellion.\(^{50}\) Ctesias appears to have published his version before Xenophon, since the latter cites the former in his description of Cyrus’ death (1.8.27). Unfortunately, the full account of Ctesias is not extant. Fragments, however, survive in the summary by Photius and in the narratives of Plutarch’s *Artaxerxes* and Diodorus’ *Library*, both of which cite Ctesias and Xenophon as sources.\(^{51}\) While these alternative sources provide some minor corrections to Xenophon’s own account, for the most part they also misrepresent the importance of the Greek contribution without offering tangible supporting evidence.

From the summary of Photius, it is clear that Ctesias provided more information about Artaxerxes’ army and court politics than Xenophon (e.g., F16.57-62). Nevertheless, the Greeks remain the focal point of Cyrus’ army. For instance, the disputes between Clearchus and Menon receive special attention (F16.63). According to Photius, Ctesias described the battle as a victory for Cyrus, undone only by the death of the young prince “because he disobeyed Clearchus” (F16.64). Photius does not provide details about how the battle was a victory for Cyrus, but since all other sources on the event credit the Greeks, it is not unreasonable to assume that such is the implication here as well.

\(^{50}\) Deinon’s *Persica* also apparently recorded the events of Cyrus’ rebellion (see Plutarch *Artaxerxes* 6.6, 9.4, 10.1, 13.3), but the extant fragments are too few to allow substantial analysis.

\(^{51}\) Diodorus may have accessed Ctesias via Ephorus, whom he cites at 14.22.2. Since Diodorus is known to have based large portions of earlier books on the *Persica* of Ctesias and was aware that the *Persica* covered events including and after Cyrus’ rebellion (14.46.6), we cannot rule out a direct consultation of Ctesias here either. See Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 2010: 38-40. On Diodorus’ sources for Cunaxa, see Bigwood 1983: 348-356 and Westlake 1987, who argues that Ephorus’ ultimate source was the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. 
Regarding the nature of Cyrus’ disobedience, Plutarch reports that Clearchus had advised
Cyrus to avoid direct participation in the battle (Artaxerxes 8.2), advice which in
Xenophon’s version is attributed to the Greeks in general (1.7.9). Photius’ summary is
too brief to serve as an alternative to Xenophon, but even so it confirms that Ctesias also
privileged the Greeks in Cyrus’ army.

Owing to the subject of his work, Plutarch focuses more on the politics of the
Persian court and the contrasts between Artaxerxes and Cyrus the Younger in his
Artaxerxes. For this information, it is clear that his source is Ctesias and, to a lesser
extent, Deinon.\footnote{Plutarch cites Deinon several times, namely Artaxerxes 6.6, 9.4, 10.1, 13.3.} Still, he avoids recounting the Battle of Cunaxa itself since, as he says,
Xenophon’s own version was more than sufficient (8.1). His discussion is concerned
more with assigning fault to Clearchus than with the details of the battle itself, and here
he explicitly states what Xenophon’s account only implies (8.1-9.3). Plutarch blames
Clearchus for Cyrus’ death and defeat (8.7) while emphasizing the clear superiority of the
Greeks (8.5, 9.1). Clearchus’ refusal to support Cyrus’ charge left the prince exposed
(8.3-5), and as a result of Clearchus’ disobedience the best soldiers on the field were
absent from the only place that mattered – where the King and prince met one another
(9.1-11.6). Plutarch’s misrepresentation of the role of the Greeks actually goes beyond
Xenophon’s, since his discussion not only lacks any mention of Cyrus’ left wing but also
directly states that the Greeks were Cyrus’ only hope for victory.

After Xenophon, Diodorus provides by far the most detailed narrative of Cyrus
the Younger’s campaign. Like Xenophon, his account emphasizes the important role of
the Greeks while largely ignoring Cyrus’ barbaroi. According to Diodorus, Cyrus’
preparations were largely concerned with collecting a sufficient body of Greeks, both mercenaries and allied Spartans (14.19.2-5). His description of Cyrus’ army includes more detail on the Greek side, with individual commanders identified by name and place of origin (14.19.7-9), while the Persians are left anonymous. Diodorus’ summary of Cyrus’ march inland includes, in briefer form, several anecdotes from Xenophon’s larger narrative, namely the near-mutiny of the Greek soldiers (14.20.4-5) and Cyrus’ promises of lavish rewards to the Greeks not long before the battle (14.21.6).53

Diodorus’ battle narrative also privileges the Greeks in Cyrus’ army. Although he provides different figures than Xenophon and does not mention Cyrus’ order to Clearchus, the order of events proves similar. The majority of the account is focused on the success of the Greeks on the right wing, who drive the division opposite them off the field without difficulty and continue to give chase (14.22.5-23.4). Despite the Greek victory, Cyrus’ charge fails and he is killed by the King’s guards (14.23.5-7). The Cyrean left wing under Ariaeus54 receives a single line after the death of Cyrus, in which it is reported to have withstood the initial assault of the King’s forces but put to flight following the death of Cyrus (14.24.1). After the battle, Diodorus records a second clash between the Greeks and the King’s forces, in which the latter are overcome by the “deeds of valor (τόλμας) and skill (εὐχερίας)” of the former (14.24.2-3). The Cunaxa narrative concludes with the Greeks returning to their plundered camp and a report, following Xenophon, that not a single Greek was slain that day (14.24.6). Diodorus adds that the

53 In each of these anecdotes, it should be noted that Diodorus does not explicitly identify the soldiers as Greeks; within the context of the narrative, however, it is plain that Diodorus means the Greeks and not Cyrus’ entire army.
54 Or Aridaeus, as Diodorus calls him.
Lacedaemonians and mercenaries under Clearchus were responsible for most of the 15,000 casualties on the King’s side (14.24.5).

Despite minor differences, Diodorus’ narrative largely follows that in the *Anabasis*, and Diodorus adheres to the Greek Thesis by portraying Cyrus’ campaign as reliant upon Greeks. Yet a closer reading here also reveals the inconsequential nature of the Greek contribution to the battle itself. They are victorious over all who oppose them, but the Greeks do not fundamentally affect the outcome of the conflict, which is decided by the confrontation between Cyrus and the King’s bodyguards. Unlike Xenophon, Diodorus does not mention Cyrus’ order to Clearchus. The battle appears to have gone according to plan, except that Cyrus was killed as a result of his own imprudence. In this respect, at least, Diodorus provides a useful corrective to the *Anabasis*.

Still, Diodorus and the other alternative accounts of the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger largely reinforce the misrepresentations of Xenophon’s narrative. In each, the Greeks are said or implied to be far more important than the evidence provided by the authors actually indicates. As a result, none offer reliable evidence for the historicity of the Greek Thesis. Like Xenophon, other Classical authors were not interested in providing a measured account of Greek contributions to the campaign of Cyrus, instead making the entirely understandable decision to concentrate on and exaggerate the role of the Greeks, with whom their intended audiences identified most.
Conclusion

In the first book of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon depicts Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries in the most positive manner possible. He does this using a variety of techniques, most prominently by focusing his narrative almost exclusively on his Greek protagonists, by including several anecdotes, such as the Greeks’ charge at Tyriaeum, which are meant to reveal their military prowess, and by placing praise for the Greeks in the mouths and thoughts of Cyrus and other characters. Cyrus’ failures as a general and the Greeks’ lack of an impact on the battle of Cunaxa, moreover, are obscured by framing the event with the report of Cyrus’ command to Clearchus, whose failure to follow orders is implied to be the reason for the King’s victory. In his narrative of the aftermath of the battle and the beginnings of the Greek retreat to the Black Sea, Xenophon continues to misrepresent the precarious position in which the Greeks found themselves, as other scholars have convincingly argued.\(^55\)

The story Xenophon presents in the *Anabasis* of the Ten Thousand’s achievements and struggles is an entertaining and successful work of literature. As a work of history and a source for the study of ancient Greek mercenaries, it is important but highly problematic. The reality of the Greek participation in the march to and the battle at Cunaxa was more mundane than Xenophon or his intended audience would have preferred, and the simple lesson that Cyrus invested his hopes for the Achaemenid throne in the singular fighting ability of his Greek mercenaries is not supported by a close reading of the text of the *Anabasis* itself or by other ancient accounts of the Cyrean campaign.

This conclusion has significant repercussions for our understanding of the role played by Greek mercenaries in the fourth century Near East. If the so-called paradigm of Greek mercenary service does not, in fact, support the Greek Thesis, might later, less detailed accounts similarly exaggerate the extent to which Greek mercenaries were militarily necessary in the Near East? The following two chapters answer that question in the affirmative. I return to the *Anabasis* in chapter four and argue that, in spite of the discussion above, it does contain important and reliable information about the nature of Greek mercenary service in the Near East.
Chapter 2

Tragic Advisors and Energetic Subordinates

Xenophon’s portrayal of Cyrus the Younger’s dependence on Greek mercenaries in the first book of the *Anabasis* is the first and most detailed expression of the Greek Thesis in Classical literature. Still, according to Briant “the person really responsible for it [the Greek Thesis] is Diodorus,” who applied Xenophon’s paradigm to his accounts of Greek mercenary service in the fourth century Near East.¹ The Greek Thesis in Diodorus’ *Bibliotheca* is supported the author’s artful use of several different literary techniques, not by the actual evidence he provides.

At first glance, Diodorus seems to portray Greek mercenaries as the *sine qua non* of military security in the fourth century Near East in books 14-16 of the *Bibliotheca*. From Conon’s Aegean campaign of the 390s to the Persian reconquest of Egypt in 343-342, Greek mercenaries play a preeminent role in every major military action Diodorus narrates. The success or failure of nearly every campaign is determined by the willingness of Persian and Egyptian employers both to recognize the superiority of their Greek mercenaries and to allow their Greeks the freedom to conduct operations as they saw fit. Readily accepting the veracity of Diodorus’ presentation, proponents of the Greek Thesis interpret the consistent appearance and performance of Greek mercenaries in the *Bibliotheca* – and other supplementary sources, particularly the writings of

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¹ Briant 2002: 784 actually credits Ephorus, claiming that Diodorus almost exclusively used the earlier historian’s work in his own. However, the extent to which Diodorus adapted his source material remains a matter of considerable debate (e.g., Stylianou 1998: 1-139; Green 2006: 7-47), and I see no clear way of distinguishing the original Ephorean material from that of Diodorus. In this chapter, I have chosen to sidestep the debate, which is largely irrelevant to my argument, and simply examine the information in the *Bibliotheca* on its own merits.
Plutarch and Nepos – as evidence for the superiority of Greeks over their barbarian employers during the fourth century.\textsuperscript{2}

Detractors of the Greek Thesis point to the same consistency in Diodorus’ portrayals of Greeks (almost always positive) and Near Easterners (almost always negative) as evidence against its reliability. To date, Briant has composed the (to my knowledge) only extensive critique of the Greek Thesis in the Bibliotheca, focusing most closely on the several Persian invasions of Egypt narrated in Diodorus 15 and 16. He remarked that in each event the Greek Thesis is “illustrated by the same arguments and the same stereotypes”,\textsuperscript{3} namely:

a. The King and the Pharaoh always employ Greek mercenaries.

b. The Greeks always take the lead in battle. The best example of this is the campaign in 343-342, which is “reduced to fights between Greek mercenaries from the two sides.”

c. Greek soldiers and leaders are always positively contrasted with their employers. For example, the Greeks are described as decisive and courageous (e.g., 15.43.1-2, 5-6, 44.2) while their employers are hesitant, cowardly, and inexperienced (e.g., 15.43.102; 16.40.4).

d. The Greeks are always numerically inferior to their allies and opponents, making their own contributions even more commendable.

e. “The superiority of the Greeks was recognized by the Persians themselves.”

While several other Achaemenid specialists echo Briant’s doubts about the validity of the Greek Thesis,\textsuperscript{4} support for it remains prevalent in Classical scholarship.\textsuperscript{5}

Recently, Thomas Harrison has criticized historians of ancient Persia for misinterpreting


\textsuperscript{3} The following summary and quotes are from Briant 2002: 783-789.


Classical sources in their zeal to rehabilitate the Achaemenid Empire. More specifically, he argues that Briant and others have overstated the anti-Persian biases of Greek authors in order to dismiss information that negatively depicts the Achaemenid Empire.

Harrison’s criticism has some merit, and Briant does at times exaggerate the coherence of the Greek Thesis in Diodorus. Diodorus’ account of the failed Persian invasion of Egypt in 373, for example, does not fit within Briant’s schema. Credit for the Egyptian victory does not, in fact, go to Egypt’s Greek mercenaries, who had been hired earlier but are unmentioned in the campaign narrative. Diodorus actually attributes the failure of the Persian invasion of Egypt in 373 both to the incompetence of Pharnabazus – who failed to heed the advice of his Athenian general, Iphicrates (15.43.1-2) – and to the bravery of the Egyptians themselves (15.43.3-4). The account thus fails to match two of Briant’s criteria: the Pharaoh either does not employ Greek mercenaries or does not place them in the midst of battle, and Pharnabazus does not recognize the superiority of his Greeks, preferring to wait for Persian reinforcements rather than following the advice of Iphicrates to allow the Greeks to take the lead in an assault on Memphis.

By overstating the uniformity of Diodorus’ presentation of the Greek Thesis, Briant’s critique of the Greek Thesis in the Bibliotheca ultimately leads to a historical dead end. In his judgment, Diodorus’ stereotypical portrayals of Greeks and Persians is clearly suspicious, but, since “the ideological decryption of the Greek sources cannot take the place of proof: Achaemenid reality is not the mirror image of Greek portrayals”, an

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7 It is possible that all of the Greek mercenaries in Egypt had left with Chabrias in 380/379, but, in that case, Briant’s scheme is even further undermined by the victory of a purely Egyptian army over a Persian army employing Greek mercenaries.
8 Briant 2002: 788.
accurate assessment of the contributions of Greek mercenaries in Near Eastern armies is not possible. This conclusion echoes his discussion of the exploits of the Greeks in Cyrus the Younger’s army, where he noted that the “Greek foot soldiers seemed to exhibit clear superiority over the infantrymen they faced,” but did not consider it possible – contra the analysis in the previous chapter – to confirm his doubts through closer analysis of Xenophon’s account.9

Another problem with Briant’s analysis is its failure to incorporate book 17 of the Bibliotheca, which relates the Macedonian conquest of the Achaemenid Empire.10 This issue, however, will be addressed in the following chapter. In the current chapter, I restrict myself to the accounts of Greek mercenary service for Near Eastern employers provided by Diodorus and, when possible, other Classical sources in the sixty years before the invasion of Alexander.

Here, I concentrate on books 14-16 of the Bibliotheca, the only continuous extant narrative covering the period following the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger to the Persian reconquest of Egypt in 343-342. I argue that Diodorus’ portrayal of Persian and Egyptian reliance upon Greek mercenaries is a literary fabrication and that, as a result, the Greek Thesis is a poor explanation for the presence of Greek mercenaries in the fourth century Near East. At the same time, however, I demonstrate that Diodorus’ depictions are not all

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10 To be fair, this is more a consequence of the fact that Briant’s work is not dedicated solely to the study of Greek mercenaries. He does include discussion of Diodorus’ later narrative elsewhere, and its exclusion here is likely due to the fact that Ephorus, from whom Briant argues Diodorus adopted the Greek Thesis, ended his history in 340 (Diodorus 16.76.5) and therefore was not a source for book 17 of the Bibliotheca. In fact, as I will demonstrate in the following chapter, the accounts of Alexander’s conquest in Arrian, Plutarch, and Curtius often more closely adhere to the Greek Thesis than Diodorus.
as stereotypical or uniform as Briant argued, and that there is sufficient evidence within both the *Bibliotheca* and other scattered sources to accurately determine the military contributions made by Greek mercenaries in fourth century Persian and Egyptian armies.

Consequently, the analysis below is divided into two sections. In the first section, I examine the recurrence of a specific literary trope, the “tragic advisor,” which Diodorus and other authors use in order to absolve Greek mercenaries from blame in defeat while in the service of Persian and Egyptian employers. In the second section, I review the ancient accounts of Greek mercenary service in the fourth century Near East before the Macedonian conquest, identifying another literary trope, the “energetic subordinate,” Diodorus and other ancient authors use in order to exaggerate the military contributions made by Greek mercenaries. In doing so, I demonstrate that neither the Persians nor the Egyptians were reliant upon Greek mercenaries in the fourth century, but that their military contributions were more limited in scope and the roles they occupied more circumscribed than ancient authors and modern scholars have often imagined.\(^{11}\)

**The Tragic Advisor**

Richmond Lattimore identified two literary motifs often used by Herodotus, which he called the “tragic warner” and “practical adviser”. Lattimore defined the tragic warner as “the sage elder who tries to halt headstrong action in a chief; he is in general pessimistic, negative, unheeded, and right,” while the practical adviser offers advice

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\(^{11}\) The purpose of this chapter is to examine the military contributions of Greek mercenaries in the fourth century between the Battle of Cunaxa and the conflict between Macedon and Persia. My analysis here is literary in nature; for full discussion of the political and social implications of Greek mercenary service during this period, see the discussions in Chapters 5 and 6.
which is followed with positive results. Generally speaking, the tragic warner attempts to prevent an act born of hubris, such as when Sandanis advised Croesus against attacking Persia, advice that Croesus ignored to his own detriment (Herodotus 1.71). The practical adviser presents a solution to a specific problem, such as Harpagus’ suggestion that Cyrus employ camels to defeat Croesus’ cavalry, which Cyrus adopted and, as a result, was victorious (Herodotus 1.80).

The distinction between these two tropes is not always clear, and at times practical advice is tragically ignored: for example, both Demaratus and Artemisia advise Xerxes to detach the Spartans from the rest of the Greeks by attacking the Peloponnese with a part of his force (Herodotus 7.235-237; 8.67-70); the King’s decision to ignore them led to his defeat at Salamis. This blending of the tragic warner and practical advisor tropes is what I have called the tragic advisor. While the tragic advisor motif is relatively rare in Herodotus, it is used frequently in the narratives of Greek mercenary service in the fourth century Near East. In each case, the trope’s inclusion has the effect of shifting the blame for failure away from a Greek mercenary commander and toward his Persian or Egyptian employer.

In total, the tragic advisor appears in the descriptions of three separate events in which Greek mercenaries served Near Easterners during the fourth century BCE prior to Alexander’s conquest of the Achaemenid Empire. The first is during the Persian invasion of Egypt of 373. Diodorus is our lone source for this invasion (15.41-43), which was led by the Persian general and satrap Pharnabazus and included a Greek mercenary

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12 Lattimore 1939: 24-25.
13 The tragic advisor trope appears in several of the accounts of the Battles of Granicus and Issus during Alexander’s campaign, which are discussed in the following chapter.
contingent under the command of the Athenian Iphicrates. According to Diodorus, during the course of the campaign Iphicrates devised a bold plan of attack on the undefended Egyptian capital at Memphis, offering to lead it himself. Pharnabazus rejected the advice, however, deciding instead to await reinforcements so that the strategy would be more likely to succeed (15.43.1).

When Iphicrates pressed Pharnabazus to go ahead with the plan immediately, arguing that to delay would prevent the plan from being a success, Diodorus reports that the Persian then became suspicious of his motivations, fearing that he would take control of Egypt himself. This jealousy was also shared by other commanders, who began to make accusations against the Athenian (ἐφθόνουν αὐτῷ καὶ διαβολάς ὁδίκους προσήπτων 15.43.2). As a result of the delay, the Egyptians were able to shore up their defenses (15.43.3), and the entire campaign was unsuccessful. In order to further absolve Iphicrates, Diodorus concludes his narrative of the campaign with a note that Pharnabazus complained to Athens that Iphicrates was at fault for the campaign’s failure. The Athenians not only refused to punish Iphicrates, but also responded by giving him command of their fleet (15.43.6).14

The second appearance of the trope is in reports of the Egyptian offensive against Persia in the Levant ca. 359 BCE. There are several different accounts of this campaign, each of which focuses on the role played by the Spartan king Agesilaus, who had hired himself out to the Egyptian pharaoh Tachos. Xenophon’s discussion in the Agesilaus is

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14 In addition, it should be noted that the lone success of the entire campaign – the capture of a fortress on the Mendesian mouth of the Nile delta, is attributed to Iphicrates and his Greek mercenaries (15.42.5): οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἰφικράτην συνεισπεσόντες τοῖς φρουροῦσιν ἐντὸς τῶν τείχων, καὶ κρατήσαντες τὸν φρουρίον, τοῦτο μὲν κατέσκαψαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐνοικοῦντας ἐξηνδραποδίσαντο.
brief and offers little detail about the Spartan king’s activities, but Diodorus (15.92-94) and Plutarch (Agesilaus 36) go into greater depth, even as these two narratives differ significantly. Nepos’ Agesilaus, like Xenophon’s, gives little information about the Spartan king’s time in Egypt, but his account supports Plutarch’s version of events.

According to Diodorus, prior to the offensive Agesilaus had advised Tachos to give command of his invasion force over to one of his generals rather than leading it himself, advice which Diodorus explicitly states was good (καλῶς συμβουλεύοντι 15.92.3). Ignoring Agesilaus, the Egyptian King led his army into Phoenicia himself, with predictable results. The unnamed general left in control of Egypt rebelled, convincing Nectanebos, the son of Tachos, to usurp the throne. Tachos was then forced to flee to King Artaxerxes II and plead for his life. Having been pardoned, the Egyptian eventually returned to Egypt with an army and rejoined Agesilaus and his mercenaries. Despite again ignoring the advice of the Spartan (οὐ προσέχοντος δ’ αὐτοῦ συνηναγκάσθη μετ’ αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τινα πόλιν εὐμεγέθη 15.93.2), Tachos eventually relinquished command and Agesilaus was able to win the crown for him (15.92-93).15

Whereas Diodorus’ version focuses on the interaction between Agesilaus and Tachos, Plutarch concentrates on Agesilaus’ relationship with Nectanebos, whom he identifies as Tachos’ cousin. Still, the beginning of his account matches Diodorus’ in an important aspect, namely that the failure of Tachos is explained by his refusal to give full command over to the Spartan king and his disrespectful treatment of Agesilaus (ἡγεμόν δὲ συμπάντων αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ Τάχως, καὶ τούτο πρῶτον ἤνιασε τὸν Ἀγγασίλαον 37.1). As a

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15 These events are discussed further below.
result, Plutarch records that Agesilaus ultimately chose to join Nectanebos’ rebellion. So important was the loss of his mercenary support that Agesilaus’ defection caused Tachos to flee from Egypt (Ὁ μὲν οὖν Τάχως ἔφυγεν 38.1).

Despite his instrumental role in the success of Nectanebos’ victory over Tachos, Agesilaus’ new employer committed the same error as his predecessor. When a new, unnamed rival for the throne appeared from Mendes, Nectanebos ignored the advice of Agesilaus to fight immediately. Suspecting that the Spartan would betray him just as he had Tachos, he instead decided to withdraw into his fortified city (38.2-3). Plutarch makes clear that this was an unwise decision but, breaking from the typical pattern, informs us that Nectanebos recognized it in time (Ἐπελθόντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ περιταφρεύων τὴν πόλιν, αὕτης αὖ δείσας τὴν πολιορκίαν ὁ Αἰγύπτιος ἐβούλετο μάχεσθαι 39.1). The remainder of the account (39.1-40.1) details his success, as he finally allowed Agesilaus to lead his army (discussed further below).16

Both Plutarch and Diodorus end with Agesilaus’ employer ultimately listening to the Spartan and, as a result, retaining control of Egypt. However, in both narratives the original object of Agesilaus’ service was to aid the Egyptian conquest of the Levant, a project that utterly failed. By presenting Agesilaus in the role of tragic advisor, however, he is absolved from any responsibility for the failure, and the success he had once put in control only highlights this point.

The third instance of the tragic advisor trope occurs during Diodorus’ narrative of the Persian conquest of Egypt in 343 B.C.E. (16.46.4-51.3). Here, Diodorus mentions that

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16 Unlike in the above account of Diodorus, where Tachos regains his throne, Plutarch reports that Nectanebos is ultimately successful in his rebellion. Diodorus appears mistaken here; see Briant 2002: 664.
Pharaoh Nectanebos had fended off an earlier invasion only with the help of two Greek mercenary commanders, Diophantus and Lamius. His defeat in 343 BCE is caused by his refusal to again employ more experienced Greek commanders. Admittedly, this brief reference does not exactly fit the mold of the trope since there is no tragic advisor figure. Instead of ignoring the advice of Greek commanders, Nectanebos simply refuses their aid. Nevertheless, the incident serves a similar purpose by framing the successful Persian reconquest in the context of a hubristic decision to refuse the aid of Greek commanders.

These three events represent every occasion in which Greek mercenaries are on the losing side of a battle or campaign after the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, and in every case the tragic advisor is Greek and the advisee Persian or Egyptian. In each of these defeats, Diodorus includes the trope in some form, while Plutarch also incorporates it into his narrative of Agesilaus’ service in Egypt. For the most part, any sources that do not include the trope contain only a brief mention of the event under discussion.

The tragic advisor trope serves three purposes. First, its inclusion allows the authors to structure their stories in a typical dramatic fashion, with the Near Eastern employers displaying hubris in rejecting wise advice and subsequently experiencing a

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17 Diodorus does not provide a narrative account of this invasion. Parke 1933: 165 suggests it took place between 353 and 351.
18 16.48.2: ἐσχήκως γὰρ τοὺς τότε στρατηγοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρας καὶ διαφέροντας ἀρετῆς τε καὶ ἀγχιονία στρατηγικῆ, Διόφαντον τὸν Ἀθηναίον καὶ Λάμιον τὸν Σπαρτιάτην, διὰ τούτων ἀπαντᾷ κατώρθωσε.
19 In the Anabasis, Xenophon portrays Cyrus the Younger as a sort of tragic advisor, since his unheeded command to Clearchus is implied to be the cause of Cyrus’ defeat (1.8.12-13). Plutarch follows Xenophon in faulting Clearchus (Artaxerxes 8.5), but Ctesias turns Clearchus into the tragic advisor by blaming Cyrus’ death on his decision to ignore Clearchus’ advice to command his army from the rear (F16.64). Interestingly, Diodorus does not include a tragic advisor in his account of Cunaxa, even as his subsequent narrative consistently includes the trope.
deserved and foreshadowed fall. Second, it a counter-factual device used for historical interpretation, allowing the author to explain the course of action that should have been followed without directly stating it in the voice of the narrator. By placing this explanation in the mouth of an experienced military commander, the explanation also appears to be more credible than if it were presented simply as the opinion of the historian himself. Third, it is a technique of assigning and absolving blame. In the narratives under discussion here, it is the evidence Diodorus and others use to show that certain Greek commanders are not responsible for the defeat of their troops and of the larger barbarian army in which they served.

The insertion of a tragic advisor figure, much like Xenophon’s insertion of Cyrus’ command to Clearchus before Cunaxa in the Anabasis, fundamentally changes the way subsequent events in the narrative are interpreted. Yet, as with Cyrus’ command, there are reasons to doubt the historical veracity of the tragic advice given and, therefore, the positive portrayals of the Greeks who give it. Lattimore concluded with respect to Herodotus, “the regular occurrence of the wise adviser is illuminating to the student of Herodotus as a writer; but, by reason of this regularity, at his appearance the historian must proceed with great care”. The consistency with which Greek leaders are positively contrasted with their employers should immediately cast suspicion on these reports, as Briant noted, especially given that they come from Classical authors writing for Classical

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20 See Grene 1961 for a discussion of similar dramatic elements in Herodotus’ Histories. Mossman 1988 elaborates on tragic and epic elements in Plutarch’s portrayal of Alexander, where strict historical accuracy is less of a concern than the development of Alexander as a literary character.

21 Lattimore 1939: 34-35. Fehling 1989: 203 goes further, “our immediate assumption must always be that a warner comes from Herodotus, whether he has invented the person altogether or has assigned the role to an already established figure.”
audiences and, ultimately, derive either from apologetically minded Greek participants or from the imagination of the authors themselves.\textsuperscript{22}

**The Energetic Subordinate**

The second trope, a recurring figure that I have called the energetic subordinate, serves as the able companion to the tragic advisor. Where the tragic advisor appears only in defeat narratives, the energetic subordinate is generally reserved for campaigns in which the Greek side is victorious. The energetic subordinate figure is the product of inordinate narrative focus on the activities of a Greek commander or his Greek mercenaries, with the result that the success of the larger Persian or Egyptian army as a whole is implicitly or explicitly assigned solely to the Greek contingent.

In contrast to accounts in which the tragic advisor is present, appearances of the energetic subordinate often do not include any mention of a strategy session prior to or during the campaign. Instead, the specific tactics and strategies employed to achieve victory are also credited to the Greeks and their commanders. The Greek energetic subordinate thus receives acclaim for all victories in both concept and execution, while the tragic advisor is always absolved from blame for any defeat. The selective insertion of these two tropes means that Greeks serving in fourth century Near Eastern armies are

\textsuperscript{22} As the first chapter noted, the fabrication of minor anecdotes and the invention of speeches (direct or reported) was, in the ancient world, within the limits of legitimate authorial intervention. It is also plausible that these anecdotes stem ultimately from Greek commanders and mercenaries themselves. Upon returning to Greece, these men had plenty of motivation to present their own service to other Greeks in the best possible light, assigning blame for their defeats on the foreigners whom they served and who would not have been present to dispute the charges laid against them.
never to blame for any defeat, but are the reason for nearly every victory in which they participate.

While many of the features of Briant’s analysis of Diodorus fit under the rubric of the energetic subordinate, the use of this trope is neither limited to Diodorus nor is it always present in the Bibliotheca. Though it does appear most often in the fourth-century narrative of Diodorus, Plutarch, Nepos, and others also utilize this trope when depicting victories in which Greek mercenaries took part. Additionally, Diodorus does not mechanically include Greek energetic subordinates in every one of his fourth century Near Eastern campaign narratives, but on several occasions passes over Greeks while concentrating positively on Egyptian and Persian soldiers and generals.

Unlike the tragic advisor, the actions of the energetic subordinate are not necessarily authorial inventions. Instead, the energetic subordinates may have genuinely performed the deeds ascribed to them, but the omission of or limited attention given to Persian and Egyptian contributions results in a distorted and exaggerated portrayal of the Greek involvement, as was the case with the Cyrean Greeks in the Anabasis. A realistic assessment of the role various Greek commanders and mercenaries played in fourth century Near Eastern armies is thus possible only after carefully considering the degree to which the energetic subordinate trope affects the historical accuracy of each individual campaign and battle. In what follows, I closely examine the accounts of fourth century campaigns in which Greek mercenaries served in Near Eastern armies, identifying the appearance of the energetic subordinate trope and demonstrating that the military role of the Greeks in each case was more limited than is often imagined.
The first appearance of an energetic subordinate figure appears at the Battle of Cnidus in 394 BCE and in the naval campaign which followed. Here, the energetic subordinate is the Athenian Conon, who had been in exile since the Spartan victory at the Battle of Aegispotami in 405. In the aftermath of the Battle of Cunaxa, the alliance between Persia and Sparta disintegrated and in 397 the satrap Pharnabazus appointed Conon to a position of command in the Persian fleet, which the satrap himself commanded. For the next several years the fleet languished without proper funding, but by 394 the King and Pharnabazus had committed the resources required to challenge the Spartans for supremacy of the Aegean, which they did successfully at Cnidus.

Several Classical sources emphasize the accomplishments of Conon while, at the same time, depriving Pharnabazus of any significant role at Cnidus and in the naval campaign after the battle. Of these, Diodorus provides the most complete and consistent narrative. In his version, Pharnabazus’ role is nearly complete after securing the blessing of the King, paying to outfit one hundred triremes, and naming Conon commander at sea (ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἡγεμόνα; 14.39.1-2). Once Pharnabazus and Artaphernes relieve him from the Spartan blockade at Caunus (14.79.5), Conon begins to campaign on his own. Without the satrap, he sails to the Chersonese and aids the Rhodians in their rebellion from Sparta (14.79.6-7); he appoints two Athenians to command positions while he himself travels to the King, who agrees to his plans, provides him with the financial support he requested, and allows him to choose an associate commander (14.81.4-6). Conon selected Pharnabazus, who is from here on depicted as, at best, an equal partner in the relationship – a significant change from before, when Pharnabazus had appointed
Conon (14.39.2). Diodorus emphasizes Conon’s status as the highest naval authority several times, referring to him as the Persian admiral (14.79.7, 81.4) and, later, the commander of the King’s fleet (14.85.2); when the two lead the fleet against the Spartans at Cnidus, they do so as equals (14.83.4).

In the battle itself, Conon alone is credited with pursuit of the Spartans and the capture of fifty triremes (14.39.1-4, 83.5-7). Following their victory, the two admirals sail throughout the Aegean, expelling Spartan garrisons and winning over various Greek cities to their cause. In doing so, Diodorus presents Conon as the primary actor while largely excluding Pharnabazus from the narrative altogether. The Chians, for instance, “expelled their garrison and joined Conon” (14.84.3); some Greeks expelled the Spartans and maintained their own independence, “while others attached themselves to Conon.” It is Conon who decided to conquer Cythera and the Cyclades, and Diodorus credits him with sailing to Corinth, forming an alliance against Sparta with other Greek states, and providing them with Persian money (14.84.4-5). Conon’s prominent role ended only when another Persian satrap, Tiribazus, became envious of his – not Pharnabazus’ – success and, after luring him to Sardis, arrested and jailed him (14.85.4).

Diodorus’ depiction of Conon’s preeminence echoes two contemporary, though less detailed accounts. While the Oxyrhynchus historian’s narrative of Cnidus does not survive, in other respects he presents Conon in a highly favorable light, as one commentary remarked, “Conon is shown as the new Cyrus, the King’s brightest general, the one whose force of personality can mediate between the monolith of Persian power and the frailties of the people who are ‘the royal army’…without resort to rhetorical

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23 DS 14.83.7: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κόνωνα μέχρι τῆς γῆς καταδιώξαντες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πεντήκοντα μὲν τριήροιν ἐκμετάλλευσαν.
pleading, the author shapes his account to lead the reader to admire Conon”. Isocrates ignored the role played by Pharnabazus and other Persians when he referenced the campaign. Instead, he credited Evagoras with conceiving and funding the expedition against the Spartan navy, praising Conon alone for its successful execution (Evagororos 9.56).

In his Conon, Nepos goes so far as to write that the general conducted the land war against Agesilaus in Asia Minor (9.2.3), a claim unsubstantiated by any other source. Here Nepos perfectly encapsulates the idea behind the energetic subordinate trope, stating that “Pharnabazus was nominally commander-in-chief, but in reality Conon headed the army and everything was done as he directed”. Likewise, Nepos dubiously credits Conon with convincing Artaxerxes to execute Tissaphernes (9.3-4.1), and explicitly states that Conon was responsible for the Persian victory at Cnidus (hos Conon apud Cnidum adortus, magno proelio fugat, multas naves capiti, complures deprimit) and the success of the subsequent campaign (9.4).

At a glance, Xenophon’s Hellenica appears to present Conon in the standard role of energetic subordinate. His description of Cnidus places Pharnabazus behind Conon in the battle order and does not mention him playing any role in the fighting, perhaps implying that it was Conon who actually commanded the fleet during the battle (Hellenica 4.3.10-12). He also portrays Conon as the mastermind behind the successful

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25 Pharmabazus habitus est imperator, re quidem vera exercitui praefuit Conon eiusque omnia arbitrio gesta sunt.
26 Specifically, see 4.3.12: ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ πολὺ ἐλαττώνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεόν φανερῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος [τοῦ] Ἑλληνικοῦ, τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐσωμίου συμμάχους εὐθὺς αὐτῷ φεύγειν, αὐτὸν δὲ συμμείζαντα τοῖς πολέμιοις ἐμβολίας ἔχοισθησάς τῇ τριήρει πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἐξοσθῆναι.
naval campaign following the battle. The satrap, following the advice of Conon, drove out Spartan governors and garrisons from many of the cities throughout the Aegean (4.8.1-2). At Conon’s request, Pharnabazus later gave the Athenian control of the fleet and allowed him to return to Athens, where he rebuilt the long walls and brought a number of islands and coastal cities in alliance with Athens, so that by 392 Conon’s activities had caused the Spartans to sue Persia for peace (4.8.9-14).

Yet Xenophon’s account does not rigidly follow the energetic subordinate motif. He ultimately credits both Pharnabazus and Conon with the victory at Cnidus (4.8.1) and acknowledges that Pharnabazus conceived of and carried out the subsequent naval campaign against the Peloponnese (4.8.6-7). Furthermore, he notes that the satrap conquered Cythera and recognizes that he provided the anti-Spartan alliance with encouragement and funds at Corinth (4.8.8).

Duane March convincingly argued that Xenophon’s portrayal of the relationship between Conon and Pharnabazus is the more plausible: “Conon’s role was carefully defined: his command was limited in scope and hindered by poverty, and when the fleet was finally activated, Conon was made subordinate to Pharnabazus. Conon thenceforth acted in accordance with his experience as a naval tactician and undoubtedly planned the decisive battle”.27 Indeed, it makes sense that Conon, who undoubtedly had more naval experience than Pharnabazus, played a considerable role in the sea battle at Cnidus and advised the satrap on several strategic issues, but that the Persian himself was ultimately responsible for making decisions. In the end, Pharnabazus formulated and executed his own plan, which succeeded in depriving Sparta of its hegemony in the Aegean.

Egypt in Rebellion (386-373)

Two potential energetic subordinate figures appear in Diodorus’ account of the failed Persian invasion of Egypt, ca. 373. The first is Chabrias, who served with Pharaoh Acoris in the prelude to the invasion between 386 and 380. According to Diodorus, our lone narrative source for these events, Acoris hired a number of Greek mercenaries into his army but, “having no capable general,” recruited Chabrias. The Athenian “accepted the appointment and took command of the forces in Egypt,” and directed the “preparations to fight the Persians” in earnest (15.29.2).28

Chabrias did not participate in the defense of Egypt during the Persian invasion, however, since the Athenians recalled him at the complaint of Pharnabazus (15.92.3-4). Still, it might be argued that credit for the success of the Egyptian resistance belongs to Chabrias, based on his reputation as a master of defensive fortifications. In this view, the intricate network of fortifications must have been constructed while Chabrias was in Egypt.

However, there are several reasons to think otherwise. First, this position implausibly assumes that the Egyptians did nothing significant to improve their defenses during the six years that passed between the departure of Chabrias and the invasion itself, an assumption which Diodorus directly contradicts (15.42.2-3). Second, Diodorus himself makes no such connection, and instead explicitly credits Pharaoh Nectanebos (who had succeeded Acoris in 380) with a number of defensive improvements which stymied the

28 οὐκ ἔχων δὲ στρατηγὸν ἀξιόχρεων, μετεπέμψατο Χαβρίαν τὸν Ἀθηναίον, ἀνδρὰ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ συνέσει στρατηγικῆ διάφορον καὶ δόξαι ἐπ’ ἄρετὴ μεγάλην περιπεποιημένον. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ δήμου γνώμης προσδεξάμενος τὴν στρατηγίαν ἀφηγεῖτο τὸν κατ’ Ἀἰγυπτὸν δυνάμεως, καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς παρεσκευάζετο πολεμεῖν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας.
Persian advance (15.42.2-4). Third, while the impressive fortifications of the Nile slowed the Persians, Diodorus actually attributes the Egyptian victory to other factors: the Egyptians garrison Memphis adequately, gain confidence in their own combat strength after winning successive engagements with the Persians, and are fortuitously aided by the flooding of the Nile, which made campaigning more difficult for the Persians (15.43.3-4).

Finally, Chabrias’ reputation for outstanding defensive fortifications was established on his contributions after returning to Greece from Egypt, when he participated in fortification projects in Boeotia and Attica during the early stages of the Boeotian War. It seems more likely that, rather than going to Egypt to teach the Egyptians how to construct their defense network, Chabrias himself learned from the Egyptians and imported their knowledge of fortifications to Greece upon his return. After all, the decision to heavily fortify Pelusium had also been made a century earlier, albeit with less success, by Psammeticus when faced with the invasion of Cambyses (Herodotus 3.10).

The second potential energetic subordinate is Iphicrates, discussed above in his role as a tragic advisor on the Persian side of the campaign. Diodorus notes that the King had specifically requested Iphicrates for command of the 20,000 Greek mercenaries due to his “strategic skill” (15.41.1). In the early stages of the campaign, Iphicrates and Pharnabazus, along with 3,000 men, successfully attacked the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, and “Iphicrates’ men (οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἰφικράτην)” are credited with breaching the walls of the fortress there and capturing its defenders (15.42.5).

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29 Munn 1987: 114 n. 28.
30 ὁ δὲ ἀνὴρ οὗτος μετάπεμπτος ἐπὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐτάχθη διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ στρατηγεῖν ἀρετήν.
The report that Iphicrates and his men were responsible for the capture of the Mendesian fortress is exaggerated but not completely untrue. The use of Greeks as an advance force is not explicitly attributed to their superiority, though that may be taken as implied, but could also be understood to suggest that, as foreigners, they were most expendable and therefore fit for the front lines. Moreover, it is significant that this initial success was not the brainchild of Iphicrates, but of Pharnabazus and his generals, who decided to forego attacking the closer and better-defended Pelusian mouth in favor of the Mendesian (15.42.4). Finally, as the discussion of account of the Persian conquest of Egypt in 343-342 below makes clear, Diodorus is not unwilling to omit or significantly underrepresent Persian soldiers when they conduct joint operations with Greek mercenaries. The personal participation of Pharnabazus indicates, in fact, the participation of Persian soldiers as well, with the result that the advance assault narrated here was likely not carried out by Greeks alone.

Overall, Diodorus’ portrayal of Chabrias and Iphicrates as energetic subordinates is limited in scope, and his misrepresentation of the importance of the Greek mercenaries in this campaign is likewise overstated in Briant’s analysis. He exaggerates the authority of Chabrias by depicting him as in charge of early Egyptian defense efforts, but Diodorus ultimately credits the Egyptians themselves with the defense of their territory. Notably, the Greeks hired earlier by Acoris, some of whom may have remained after the recall of Chabrias, do not even receive mention in the invasion narrative. Likewise, Iphicrates and his fellow Greeks participated in the invasion, but their contributions – serving alongside Persians and, at best, capturing a single fortress (15.42.5) – were not enough to turn defeat into victory.
References to this campaign in other sources similarly reflect the small part played by Greeks on either side. Nepos merely notes that Iphicrates was hired at the request of Artaxerxes and that, while commanding the Greek mercenaries, he instilled in them a strong sense of discipline (11.2). With respect to Chabrias, Nepos, whose account suffers from chronological confusion, reports only that the general was recalled to Athens after Pharnabazus’ complaint (12.3). In his Artaxerxes, Plutarch only gives the campaign one line, though he does present the expedition as jointly led by Pharnabazus and Iphicrates (24.1). For his part, Isocrates fails to even mention the participation of Greeks or Iphicrates in the failed Persian campaign, despite identifying three Persian commanders (4.140), although this is unsurprising given the Panhellenic context in which his references occur.

As with the earlier collaboration between Conon and Pharnabazus, Chabrias and Iphicrates were each hired for a specific, defined role, namely to command the Greek mercenary divisions in the Persian and Egyptian armies. They were not hired for their superior wisdom, and the performance of the Greek soldiers themselves does not suggest either that they were superior to their Near Eastern counterparts or that their employers believed them to be. Instead, they appear to have played a minor role in the invasion and in the defense of Egypt, if indeed Nectanebos retained some of the Greeks his predecessor had hired.

**Agesilaus in Egypt (361-360)**

The next energetic subordinate figure is Agesilaus, who ventured to Egypt in support of Pharaoh Tachos in 361-360. Like Iphicrates earlier, Agesilaus is depicted by
our sources as both a tragic advisor and an energetic subordinate. Our sources disagree on several aspects of the campaign; most notably, Diodorus erroneously reports that Agesilaus eventually helped Tachos reclaim his throne after the revolt of part of his army, whereas other sources make clear that Agesilaus in fact betrayed Tachos, choosing to aid Nectanebos II against another pretender from Mendes. More importantly, they all agree that Agesilaus played the decisive role in settling the Egyptian civil war.

Diodorus and Plutarch provide the most detailed narratives of Agesilaus’ time in Egypt. Throughout his account, Diodorus stresses the critical role played by the Spartan. He describes Agesilaus as “a man capable of leading troops and highly regarded for his courage and for his shrewdness in the art of war” (15.92.2), describes how he saved the entire Egyptian and Greek force in a daring night attack, carried out of his own initiative (15.93.3), credits Agesilaus with overcoming the numerical superiority of the enemy by selecting a narrow battlefield, where his Greeks “who surpassed them in courage (ταῖς ἀρεταῖς προέχοντες οἱ Ἕλληνες)” held the advantage (15.93.4-5), and concludes with the rewards Tachos bestowed upon Agesilaus, “the one who single-handed had restored his kingdom (ὡς μόνος κατωρθωκὼς τὴν βασιλείαν)” (15.93.6).

Although some of his details differ from Diodorus, Plutarch’s narrative largely follows the same pattern: Agesilaus rescued the army of Nectanebos by leading a surprise attack, forcing battle in a narrow passage where the superiority of the Greeks easily

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31 See discussion by Stylianou 1998: 545-548. Another disagreement among our sources is the motivation behind Agesilaus’ service: Xenophon reports that he chose to aid Egypt out of Panhellenic sentiments (Agesilaus 2.28-29), Diodorus that he was dispatched by Sparta as an ally (15.92.2), and Plutarch that his decision was driven purely by financial considerations (Agesilaus 36)
32 δυναμένῳ δ’ ἠγείσθαι στρατιωτῶν καὶ δι’ ἀνδρείαν καὶ στρατηγικὴν σύνεσιν τεθαυμασμένῳ.
overcame the numerical advantage held by their opponents, and ultimately establishing Nectanebos on the throne (39.2-40.1). Though it provides no details, Xenophon’s Agesilaus also records that the Spartan “inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy of the Greeks” and “helped establish his rival” (τὸν μὲν μισέλληνα μάχη νικήσας χειροῦται, τὸν δ’ ἔτερον συγκαθίστησι 2.31).

It is difficult to judge the nature of the Greek contributions in this campaign, since none of our sources provide information about the accomplishments of the Egyptians under Nectanebos. It is clear that Agesilaus did not command the entire force of Nectanebos or Tachos, but instead was in charge only of the Greek mercenaries. Each author portrays Agesilaus as solely responsible for the decisive engagement in the war, but it is unclear how decisive his purported victory was. Diodorus reports that Nectanebos was securely established on the throne soon after, implying that the fighting was not immediately concluded after this battle (15.93.6). Furthermore, none of our sources mention the fate of the rival of Nectanebos, and from their silence it is clear that Agesilaus’ victory did not result in his death, capture, or exile, suggesting that the civil war was not settled by Agesilaus.

Certainty on this matter is impossible, of course, given the limited focus of our sources on activities related to Agesilaus and his Greek mercenaries, but it seems reasonable to question the depiction of Agesilaus as kingmaker. As commander of the Greek mercenaries, his role was well defined and limited in scale. While it cannot be

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33 Xenophon and Plutarch both mention that Agesilaus had expected to be commander-in-chief of the Egyptian war effort, but was in fact only given charge of the Greek mercenaries (Xenophon Agesilaus 2.28-30; Plutarch Agesilaus 37.1-2). For his part, Diodorus agrees that Agesilaus only held command of the Greeks (15.92.2-3) 34 Diodorus errs by stating that Agesilaus ultimately placed Tachos on the throne (15.93.1-6); in fact, it was Nectanebos.
denied that Agesilaus participated in the Egyptian civil war and even perhaps played a significant part in one of the major engagements therein, the nature and scope of our sources do not permit more grandiose reconstructions. This is especially the case when the portrayal of Agesilaus fits so well within the confines of the energetic subordinate trope, which has been shown to be historically inaccurate in other, more documented instances of Greek military service in the fourth century Near East.

**In Artabazus’ Service (356-353)**

The next two energetic subordinate figures appear in Diodorus’ brief accounts of war between the satrap Artabazus and his Persian colleagues. The first is Chares of Athens who, having been placed in charge of the Athenian fleet and short of funds, hired himself and his entire force out to the satrap in 356-355. Diodorus reports that Chares and his Athenians participated in one battle with Artabazus “and defeated the King’s army,” for which the rebel satrap compensated them handsomely (16.22.1). Chares’ service ended after the King’s ambassadors denounced him in Athens, threatening to raise a fleet and wage war on the *polis* (16.22.2). Diodorus later comments that Artabazus resisted the King and his loyal satraps courageously only “at first when Chares the Athenian general was fighting with him” (16.34.1). With Chares gone, Artabauzs turned to Thebes for support. In 354, the Thebans sent Pammenes who, “by the support he gave to Artabazus

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35 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον συμμαχοῦντος αὐτῷ Χάρητος τοῦ Αθηναίων στρατηγοῦ ἐρρωμένως ἀντιτάττετο τοῖς σατράπαις.
and by defeating the satraps in two great battles, won great glory for himself and the Boeotians” (16.34.1-2). 36

Diodorus certainly exaggerates the degree to which Artabazus’ relied on Chares and Pammenes. In each instance, the satrap is portrayed as completely dependent upon his Greek mercenary generals, whose victories are related to us briefly but glowingly. Given the brevity of the account and the lack of alternative sources, precise reconstruction of the military contributions made by Chares and Pammenes is not possible.

Still, there is reason to doubt Diodorus’ one-sided portrayal. The narrative misrepresents the chronology of the revolt, making it appear as if Pammenes arrived shortly after Chares’ recall (ἐκείνου δ’ ἀπελθόντος μονοθείς ἔπεισε τοὺς Θηβαίους συμμαχίαν αὐτῷ πέμψας 16.34.1). In fact, Chares had departed by the end of the Social War in 355 and Pammenes did not arrive at least a year later, meaning that Artabazus survived for some time without his Greek mercenaries. In light of this discrepancy and Diodorus’ consistent exaggeration of the military contributions made by Greek mercenaries in Persian armies, it seems reasonable to suggest that here, too, the apparent reliance of Artabazus upon his Greeks is more a creation of Diodorus’ narrative than of historical reality.

36 ὁ δὲ Παμμένης βοηθήσας Ἀρταβάζῳ καὶ τοὺς σατράπας μεγάλας μάχας δυσὶ νικήσας περειποιήσατο μεγάλην δόξαν ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς.
The Revolts of Cyprus and Phoenicia (351-345)

Following a failed Persian invasion against Egypt in 351, \(^{37}\) Phoenicia and Cyprus rose in revolt at the instigation of Pharaoh Nectanebos. Several Greeks appear prominently in Diodorus’ narration of these events, but his presentation is less stereotypical than usual. While 4,000 Greek mercenaries under Mentor the Rhodian aid an early Sidonian victory over a satrapal coalition, Diodorus actually credits Tennes, the king of Sidon, with leading the expedition. Furthermore, Diodorus’ summary of the engagement does not privilege the Greek contributions, but instead acknowledges the Sidonians and the mercenaries equally (15.42.1-2).

Later, Diodorus reports that Mentor and the mercenaries played an important role in Tennes’ betrayal of Sidon to the King, opening the gate for the Persians and allowing the city to be taken (16.45.1-4). The significance attributed to the Greeks is believable in this instance, since it is based on their liminal political status – Tennes could hardly have conspired with his own citizens to betray the city – rather than the standard military superiority trope. Mentor and his fellow Greeks followed the orders of their employer, and in the aftermath were rewarded for their faithful service with a place in the army of the Persians (16.47.4).

Diodorus’ depiction of the Persian reconquest of Cyprus is similarly plausible. With Artaxerxes occupied by Phoenicia and his preparations for an invasion of Egypt, responsibility for putting down the rebellion fell to Idrieus, satrap of Caria (16.42.6). Outfitting forty triremes and hiring 8,000 mercenaries, Idrieus put Evagoras II, whose father (Nicocles) and grandfather (Evagoras) had been kings of Salamis, and Phocion of

\(^{37}\) The second of Artaxerxes III’s three invasions, the first coming between 361 and 351. Few details are known about either of these first two attempts. See Briant 2002: 682.
Athens in charge of the expedition (16.42.7). The two immediately besieged Salamis, the largest and most powerful Cypriot city, and, because of the wealth of the island as a whole, were able to double the size of their mercenary force (16.42.9). Once the Sidonian revolt failed, however, it appears that most of the kings of Cyprus – including, eventually, Pnytagoras, king of Salamis – surrendered (16.46.1-3).

Like Mentor at Sidon, the depiction of Evagoras and Phocion is believable because it does not rest on their military superiority as Greeks – or, in the case of the former, as a Greek-speaking Cypriot – presented in the manner of a stereotypical literary trope.\textsuperscript{38} The two appear to have done little besides militarily pressure Salamis, perhaps preventing the Cypriot kings from aiding the ongoing rebellion in Sidon, and it is noteworthy that Diodorus does not credit them with ending the rebellion. Their role as leaders of the expedition makes sense within the political context of the revolt: Evagoras was a former king of Salamis and therefore a perfect figure to lead the army, reconquer the city, and become a loyal vassal of Persia. Phocion likewise had political reasons for being chosen co-commander: establishing Evagoras on the throne in Salamis likely would have been in the interests of Athens, which had been a supporter of his father and grandfather when they were kings in Salamis. Cooperating with Idrieus, a member in the line of philhellenic Hecatomnid dynasty of Caria, could have also paid dividends for the polis; during the rebellion, Isocrates tantalizingly suggested that Idrieus himself may have been opening to turning against the King (5.103-104), although this ultimately never happened.

\textsuperscript{38} Unlike many other Greek generals, Nepos commented that Phocion, though often holding important commands, was not remembered for doing anything of note in the military arena; rather, his fame was for the ethical way in which he lived his life (\textit{Phocion 19.1}).
The Persian Recovery of Egypt (344-342)

Diodorus’ narrative of the Persian reconquest of Egypt is the most fully developed expression of the energetic subordinate trope and, by extension, of the Greek Thesis itself. Greeks appear to play the critical role on each side; Greek generals take the lead during the invasion for the Persians, and only they are capable of overcoming, by force or persuasion, the Greeks hired by the Egyptians (16.46.4-51.3). Closer inspection of the text, however, makes it clear that the Greek role in the historical campaign was far less impressive than it first appears.\(^{39}\)

Diodorus uses several techniques in order to exaggerate the Greek contributions on both sides during the Persian invasion. First, he frames the account with statements that indicate the importance of the Greeks to King Artaxerxes III, introducing the campaign with the remark that: “The Persian King, accounting it a matter of great importance, in view of his former defeat, to overthrow Egypt, dispatched envoys to the greatest cities of Greece requesting them to join the Persians in the campaign against the Egyptians” (16.44.1).\(^{40}\) Likewise, he concludes by concentrating again on the Greeks: “when he had rewarded the Greeks who had accompanied him on the campaign with lavish gifts, each according to his deserts, he dismissed them to their native lands” (16.51.3).\(^{41}\) In contrast to the King’s recognition of Greek superiority, Nectanebos failed to realize that his previous successes had been due to his Greek mercenaries and instead

\(^{39}\) Ruzicka 2012: 177-198 recently published a detailed account of this campaign. Although he continues to see Greek mercenaries as the key to Persian success, Ruzicka suggests a structure and chronology to the expedition similar to that which appears here.

\(^{40}\) ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθέμενος τὸ κρατήσαι τῆς Αἰγύπτου διὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλάττωμα πρεσβευτὰς ἀπέστειλε πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων, ἀξίων συστατεύσαι τοὺς Πέρσαις ἐπ’ Ἀιγυπτίους.

\(^{41}\) τοὺς δὲ συστρατευσαμένους τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκαστὸν δωρεᾶς ἀξιολόγους τιμῆσαι ἀπέλυσεν εἰς τὰς πατρίδας.
“supposed that he himself was a competent general, he would not share the command with anyone and so, because of his inexperience, was unable to execute any of the moves that would have been useful in this war” (16.48.2).42

The second technique is a familiar one: by focusing his narrative almost solely on the actions of the Greeks, Diodorus gives the impression that they alone are responsible for the success of the Persians. The exclusion of Persians and Egyptians intensifies the effect of Diodorus’ introduction and conclusion by omitting any mention of the King’s collection of and rewards for his barbaroi and extends to his narration of the campaign itself. Accordingly, the first, intense but inconclusive engagement of the invasion is fought outside between the Greek defenders of Pelusium, led by the Spartan Philophron, and the King’s Theban mercenaries, led by Lacrates (16.46.8-9). The second battle of the campaign sees Nicostratus and his Argives defeat a division of Greek mercenaries fighting for the Egyptians, leading Nectanebos to retreat to Memphis in a panic (16.48.3-6). Diodorus credits the surrender of Pelusium, Bubastis, and other cities throughout the Delta solely to Lacrates (16.49.1-6) and Mentor (16.49.7-50.6), the latter of whom saves the life of Bagoas, one of the King’s most trusted officials, in the process of achieving his success.

A third technique is the narration of events slightly out of order. Combined with Diodorus’ disinterest in the Persian contributions to the campaign, this technique obscures the fact that the invasion was carefully planned and deliberately executed by the King and his Persian officers. Instead, the deeds of Nicostratus, Lacrates, and Mentor are

42 τότε δ’ ὑπολαμβάνον ἑαυτὸν ἰκανὸν εἶναι στρατηγὸν οὐδὲν τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεδίδοι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν οὐδὲν ἠδύνατο πράττειν τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ χρησίμων.
presented in succession and portrayed as if they were undertaken upon the initiative of
each individual Greek commander, rather than as part of a larger strategic plan.

Diodorus’ narrative techniques, particularly his omission of Persian and Egyptian
actions, make reconstructing the course of the Persian campaign, and thereby assessing
the true significance of the Greek contributions, difficult, but not, as Briant implied,
impossible. Previous campaigns against Egypt appear to have been undone by an
inability to capture Memphis for one of two reasons: either insufficient force was brought
against the city’s defenses, as was the case during the Athenian campaign from 459-454
(Thucydides 1.104), or the invasion force was unable to even reach the city before the
flood season made penetration of the Delta defense network impossible, as was the case
during Pharnabazus’ expedition in 373 (15.43.4). My own reading of the text
demonstrates that Artaxerxes was aware of these issues and formulated a plan that
allowed him to rapidly bring overwhelming force against Memphis.

In order to strike at the Egyptian capital, the Persians would need to gain control
of one of the main branches of the Nile. Artaxerxes chose to concentrate on the
easternmost Pelusiac branch, which offered one significant advantage to attackers over all
of the more western branches, namely that it could be assaulted from both land and sea
since, whereas every other entrance to the Nile would have required an entirely naval
campaign. Yet for this very reason the mouth of the Pelusiac was also the most well
fortified of all, so much so in 373 Pharnabazus and his generals chose to bypass it
totally (15.42.4).

It was no surprise to Artaxerxes, then, when the initial assault of Pelusium, which
included Lacrates and his fellow Thebans, failed to take the fortress. Likewise, that the
siege which followed did not directly overcome the fortress was not unexpected (16.49.1-2), but rather served as a diversionary tactic. While the siege was being undertaken, Artaxerxes detached from his army a strike force, commanded by the Persian Aristazanes and including Nicostratus and his Argives (16.47.3). Of the three divisions of the King’s army, Nicostratus’ was the smallest and of the highest quality, including only 5,000 “elite (ἐπίλεκτοι)” Persian soldiers, eighty triremes, and, according to Diodorus, the best of the Greeks (16.44.2-3, 47.3).43

This small force, taking advantage of the distraction caused by the ongoing siege operations, slipped by the fortress and sailed “through a canal into a hidden district,” where they set up a fortified camp (16.48.3). Once there, they defeated an Egyptian counterattack, which included a substantial Greek mercenary force led by Cleinius of Cos (16.48.4-5). Diodorus does not identify the location of the raid or the fortified encampment, but the base must have been established along the Pelusiac branch, effectively cutting the fortress at Pelusium off from the remainder of the Egyptian positions. That the raid involved Persians as well as Nicostratus and his Greeks is indicated not only by Diodorus’ description of his division, which included the Persians under Aristazanes, but also by the reality that the amphibious assault would have been impossible without the Persian triremes which conducted them down the river.

With Pelusium isolated and the Persians able to directly threaten Memphis from their forward base, Nectanebos, justifiably terror-stricken, made the sensible decision to

43 Diodorus does not give specific numbers for any of the other divisions, but his description indicates that they were larger. He notes that the first division, which included Lacrates, was composed of “a large force of cavalry and no small body of infantry” (16.47.2). The third division was made up of Mentor’s mercenaries, the “King’s Greeks (βασιλέως Ἑλλήνως)” from within the Empire, and “an ample force of barbarians and not a few ships” (16.47.4).
withdraw his forces to Memphis (16.48.5-6). Likewise, the garrison at Pelusium recognized the hopelessness of their situation, cut off from resupply and reinforcement, and surrendered. Diodorus depicts the surrender negotiations as taking place between Lacrates and the Greek defenders, but the report that Bagoas and his Persians took control of the citadel – and the confusion over the terms of the Greek surrender – indicates that separate negotiations between the Egyptians and Persians also occurred (16.49.3-5).

The first phase of Artaxerxes’ strategy was a resounding success, and the way to Memphis was open. Artaxerxes proceeded toward the capital with the largest part of his army, and at this point detached a division, which included Mentor of Rhodes and his Greek mercenaries, under his trusted general Bagoas to defend his rear and capture Bubastis (16.50.1-4), apparently the last major fortress along this branch of the Nile. With Nectanebos under siege in Memphis and unable to project force elsewhere (16.51.1), Bagoas and Mentor were able to induce the surrender of Bubastis and a number of other Egyptian cities throughout the Delta.

Mentor was ultimately responsible for the capture of Bubastis and all of these other cities, according to Diodorus, because he conceived of the idea to offer generous terms to those who first agreed to surrender their posts (16.49.7). The narrative of the surrender of Bubastis, however, belies Diodorus’ claim, since the Egyptian garrison approached Bagoas, not Mentor, in order to negotiate terms. It seems that Egyptians acted separately from the Greek mercenaries in the city, since these soldiers attacked Bagoas

44 Although Diodorus indicates that the division was made earlier in the campaign (16.47.1-4), the presence of Bagoas at Pelusium (16.49.4) reveals that the King did not separate this force from the rest of his army until the approach to Memphis.
and his soldiers when they entered, with Bagoas’ life being saved only through Mentor’s agreement with the Greeks (16.50.4-6).\textsuperscript{45}

As at Pelusium, the confusion during the surrender of Bubastis appears to be the result of two negotiation processes, with Bagoas coming to terms with the Egyptians in the city and Mentor with the Greek mercenaries, who only a few years prior had been his colleagues (16.42.2). Diodorus erroneously credits him with the “single strategic device (ἐνός στρατηγήματος)” (16.49.7) that undoubtedly came from Bagoas, the King’s second-in-command, or from the King himself, who had no reason not to bribe the Egyptians over to his side. Mentor himself did not have the authority to determine the conditions of surrender for any enemy soldiers, but instead was charged with negotiating the separate surrender of Nectanebos’ Greek mercenaries, who were apparently not considered important enough by their Egyptian employers to be consulted on the surrender of Bubastis.

Within a brief amount of time, then, Artaxerxes penetrated the Egyptian frontier defenses, won over the majority of the Delta by offering generous terms of surrender, and brought sufficient force to bear on Memphis that Nectanebos chose voluntary exile over direct confrontation outside his own capital. Although Greek mercenaries participated on each side of the conflict, they did not formulate the campaign’s strategy, take direct command in battle, or negotiate with any other forces besides their fellow Greeks. Greek generals commanded the Greek mercenaries they had brought on campaign and followed the instructions of the Persian officers placed in charge of them. At no point does

\textsuperscript{45} Through this deed, whether or not it was premeditated as Diodorus relates, Mentor gained influence with Bagoas and eventually an important posting in western Anatolia (16.50.7).
Diodorus reveal that Greeks held authority over Persians or Egyptians, and there is no evidence to support the idea that they were given equal status to the officers of their employers.

That being said, the Greek contributions were not insignificant, and they participated in every major action of the campaign. Nicostratus and his Argives in particular were selected to participate in the circumvention of Pelusium alongside the King’s elite soldiers, the most important advance of the campaign. Mentor’s former employment by Nectanebos must have made him an invaluable resource, both for his knowledge of Egyptian defenses and his connections with the Greek mercenaries on the Egyptian side. By hiring a substantial force of Greeks himself, Nectanebos was able to reduce the numerical advantage the King undoubtedly had, and, if their tardiness in surrendering at Bubastis is any indication, his mercenaries may actually have been more loyal to him than his fellow Egyptians.

Conclusion

It is readily apparent that Diodorus shaped his narrative in order to portray Greek mercenaries in a positive light vis-à-vis their Persian and Egyptian employers. As Briant noted, he often describes Greeks as wise, bold, and brave soldiers and commanders, while Persians and Egyptians are typically timid and cowardly. Using what I have called the energetic subordinate trope, he has a tendency to concentrate solely on Greek contributions to military campaigns. Accordingly, Conon himself wins the Battle of Cnidus in 394, Agesilaus decisively resolves the Egyptian civil war of 360-359, Chares and Pammenes are responsible for the successes of Artabazus’ revolt in the 350s, and
Mentor, Lacrates, and Nicostratus make the conquest of Egypt possible in 343-342. Even in the instances when Greek mercenaries fail to achieve victory for their employers, Diodorus absolves them from any blame by portraying their generals as tragic, unheeded advisors.

Still, it is possible to accurately reconstruct a more circumscribed military role for Greek mercenaries in four of the six campaigns narrated by Diodorus. In the first, Diodorus’ portrayal of Conon’s service as an admiral in the Persian navy during the 390s is stereotypical, but Xenophon’s narrative of the same events in the Hellenica offers a more plausible and narrowly defined alternative. There are no alternatives to accounts of the Persian invasion of Egypt in 373 and the revolts of Cyprus and Phoenicia from 351-345 in the Bibliotheca, but neither is presented in the homogenous and stereotypical manner that characterizes other episodes. In the former Diodorus acknowledges that the Egyptians themselves were responsible for successfully defending their own land, although he does present Iphicrates as a tragic advisor in order to absolve him from any fault in the Persian failure. In the latter he credits the King’s own preparations, which caused the voluntary submission of the rebel leaders, rather than military superiority of Greek mercenaries in his employ. Even the narrative of the Persian reconquest of Egypt, which Briant described as “reduced to fights between Greek mercenaries from the two sides”,46 includes enough detail to reveal that the Greek contributions were limited to joint action with Persian forces and separate negotiations with Egypt’s own Greek mercenaries, who were also clearly stationed alongside Egyptian soldiers and subordinate to Egyptian commanders.

46 Briant 2002: 785.
For the other two campaigns the same level of reconstruction is more difficult, but there are still reasons to believe that the Greeks were not the predominant force in either conflict. Diodorus’ narration of the revolt of Artabazus in the 350s is brief and lacks detail, but the fact that several years passed between the employment of Chares and Pammenes indicates his ability to survive without Greek support. In the case of Agesilaus’ service in Egypt, Diodorus, Xenophon, and Plutarch all depict the Spartan as responsible for establishing Nectanebos on the throne. Although it is plausible that the support of Agesilaus and his Greeks tipped the balance of power in the Egyptian civil war, Diodorus and Plutarch only discuss his participation in one battle. Furthermore, it is clear that Agesilaus’ authority was limited to only the Greek mercenaries in spite of the king’s desire to play a larger role, just as his fellow Greek Chabrias appears to have been responsible solely for naval operations, which are not a factor in any of the accounts.

Based on my analysis, it is possible to draw several general conclusions about the extent of military contributions by Greek mercenaries in the fourth century Near East. First, the success of military operations for neither the Persians nor the Egyptians was dependent upon the participation of Greek mercenaries or the strategic and tactical direction of Greek generals. Without the aid of Greek mercenaries, the King’s satraps successfully resisted the Spartan army for several years during the land war in western Anatolia in the years following Cyrus’ revolt,47 Greeks played little to no role in the Egyptian victory over Pharnabazus’ force in 373, despite the presence of Iphicrates and

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47 Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.2.15 mentions that the armies of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus included Greeks, but he does not specify whether they are mercenaries or Ionian conscripts. These Greeks are not mentioned again in the *Hellenica*, and they play no role in later engagements between the Spartans and the local Persian forces.
his Greek mercenaries; and, ultimately, Artabazus’ revolt failed even with the support of first Athenian and then Theban mercenaries.

Second, Greek mercenary leaders only commanded Greek mercenaries, were always subordinate to Persian generals, and did not dictate campaign strategy. Despite his significant naval experience, Conon was subordinate to Pharnabazus and ultimately followed the Persian’s campaign strategy. Iphicrates commanded only his Greeks and executed, under the direct supervision of Pharnabazus, the strategy conceived by Persian generals during their invasion of Egypt in 373. Similarly, in 343-342 Nicostratus, Lacrates, and Mentor were charged only with responsibility for their own Greek soldiers, were placed under the authority of the Persian generals Aristazanes, Rhosaces, and Bagoas respectively, and carried out the campaign according to the plan formulated by Artaxerxes.

Third, although Greek mercenaries served in Greek divisions and were directly commanded by their own Greek officers, they appear to have generally served alongside Persian and Egyptian soldiers and were not deployed separately.48 Again, the Egyptian campaigns are instructive: although Diodorus downplays Persian participation, the mercenaries under Iphicrates in 373 and Nicostratus in 343-342 were accompanied by elite Persian troops during their forays into enemy territory. Likewise, in the latter campaign the Greeks defending Pelusium, Bubastis, and other strategically important fortresses did not do so alone. Diodorus’ report that they conducted negotiations with the

48 An exception to this conclusion is the Cypriote campaign of Evagoras II, whose force was probably composed exclusively of Greek mercenaries under Phocion of Athens. In this case, the comparatively minor scale of the expedition, which was directed at the city of Salamis, did not require a large force. As discussed above, the specific use of Greek mercenaries here also makes sense given the political context.
Greeks on the Persian side indicates that the Greeks, while serving in ethnically segregated divisions under their own commanders, were also stationed alongside their Egyptian counterparts.

Finally, although our sources tend to exaggerate the importance of Greek mercenaries in Near Eastern armies, their military contributions were not altogether insignificant. It is undeniable that both Persian and Egyptian leaders consistently supplemented their own armies with Greeks. Like Cyrus the Younger, pharaohs and satraps undoubtedly used Greeks in an attempt to reduce their own numerical inferiority when confronted by larger forces. Greeks were also entrusted with important assignments in Near Eastern armies: Conon’s naval experience must have been a significant factor at Cnidus in 394; in 343-342 Nectanebos deployed Philophron and his soldiers alongside Egyptians at Pelusium, the most critical fortress in the Delta; and in 373 and 343-342, Greeks mercenaries were chosen to serve in the vanguard alongside elite Persian troops.

Nevertheless, the main premise of the Greek Thesis, that the armies of Persia and Egypt were dependent upon Greek mercenaries during the fourth century, is not tenable. In fact, the Persians do not appear to have treated Greek mercenaries much differently from their own imperial conscripts, which were also typically deployed according to ethnicity and directly commanded by their own officers, who were in turn subordinate to Persian generals.49 Although the military abilities of Geek mercenaries were not irrelevant, it is clear that they were not the only, or even the primary, reason Greeks were

49 See Herodotus’ description of the army of Xerxes (7.61-99, especially 7.96). At Cunaxa, Xenophon treats Cyrus’ barbaroi as an undifferentiated mass, but notes that the King’s army was divided in national units (Anabasis 1.8.9). Even in the Persian conquest of Egypt, Diodorus comments that the “King’s Greeks” were assigned as a whole to the army of Bagoas (16.47.4).
sought out by Near Eastern leaders throughout the fourth century, a subject which the second part of this project explores in detail.
Chapter 3

Alexander’s Counterpoise

Alexander III of Macedon’s conquest of the Achaemenid Empire brings to a close the period in which Greek mercenaries served in the armies of ancient Near Eastern powers. Although Alexander the Great, and his father Philip II before him, claimed to wage war on Persia for the benefit of Greece, Greeks appear on the Persian side in nearly every significant episode of the Persian-Macedonian conflict, from the outbreak of hostilities in 336 to the Battle of Gaugamela in 331. The Persians continued to resist after Issus, but Alexander’s consolidation of Anatolia prevented Darius III from obtaining a substantial force of Greeks for his final stand at Gaugamela in 331.

For many, the Macedonian conquest of the Achaemenid Empire provides the final confirmation of the validity of the Greek Thesis. From this perspective, the Greeks in service of Persia were Macedon’s “most dangerous opponents” and were hired because “the armies of the Great King required Greek heavily armed troops”. In the end, however, Greek mercenary support was not able to overcome Persian hubris and incompetence: the King’s satraps ignored the advice of Memnon of Rhodes before Granicus, the King himself ignored Greek admonitions before Issus and even, according to some sources, executed Charidemus, the Greeks’ “most famous, if not their greatest, general”, and the successes of the Greek phalanx at Issus were undone by the failure of the Persians to protect their flank.

2 Parke 1933: 183.
3 Parke 1933: 184.
Yet again, however, this depiction is based solely on Greco-Roman sources, since there is no extant Near Eastern narrative of Alexander’s conquest. Still, where much of the fourth century is recorded solely in the *Bibliotheca* of Diodorus, several narratives of the Macedonian conquest from Greek and Roman authors are available. For the purposes of this chapter, the works of Arrian, Quintus Curtius, and Diodorus are particularly important. These are the longest and most detailed accounts of Alexander’s campaign, and they include the most information about the role played by Greek mercenaries in the Persian resistance. Two other sources, Plutarch’s *Life of Alexander* and Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ *Historiae Philippicae*, pay little attention to Darius III’s Greeks and are of less consequence.

Each of these sources was written several centuries after the events they describe, but all make use of contemporary and eyewitness accounts. Of the extant narratives, Arrian’s *Anabasis Alexandri* is often considered the most reliable. In addition to being a soldier and administrator under Trajan and Hadrian, Arrian based his account on the testimony of Ptolemy and Aristobulus (1.1.1-3), who both participated in Alexander’s

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4 That is not to say that there is no Near Eastern evidence at all. For an overview of the Achaemenid Empire on the eve of Alexander’s conquest which makes use of such evidence, see Briant 2009.

5 There remains a great deal of controversy over the nature and background of the extant sources for Alexander’s conquest. I have limited my brief summary to those points which have a degree of consensus. This discussion, including the notes below, is based on a select number of works, primarily Hamilton 1974: 11-22; Atkinson 1980: 58-67; Bosworth 1980: 16-34 and 1988; Tonnet 1988: 105-219; Baynham 1998: 57-100 and 2003; Cartledge 2004: 267-294.

6 Although the information Arrian provides is often the most consistent and most detailed in many respects, the author’s reliance upon official sources has led him to incorporate Macedonian propaganda into his narrative. Compounding the interpretive issues raised by this fact is Arrian’s desire to celebrate – or exaggerate – the greatness of Alexander’s deeds (1.12.2-5). Likewise, Arrian omits or downplays the successes of Alexander’s officers other than Ptolemy, surely an artifact of Ptolemy’s own propaganda against the same individuals, who later became his Hellenistic rivals.
campaigns and who also made use of the work of Callisthenes, Alexander’s official court historian. Diodorus and Curtius belong to the so-called ‘vulgate’ tradition of the Macedonian conquest narrative. Both based their accounts on the popular history of Cleitarchus, who may have supplemented Callisthenes’ official account with stories from Macedonian and Greek veterans.⁷ While the vulgate tradition is generally considered inferior, there are times when Diodorus or Curtius offer a useful perspective contrary to that of the more official tradition represented by Arrian.⁸

Still, Arrian, Curtius, and Diodorus all agree that Greek mercenaries and exiles were the only forces on the Persian side capable of defeating Alexander. Collectively, their iteration of the Greek Thesis rests on three arguments: First, Memnon of Rhodes was the King’s best general and the lone match for Alexander’s military genius. Second, Greek mercenary hoplites were the King’s best soldiers and the lone match for the Macedonian phalanx in the field. Third, Greeks were also the Persians’ most capable garrison troops, as evidenced by their near-defeat of Alexander at Halicarnassus and the frequency with which they were hired by the Persians for this purpose. In this view, hubris and military incompetence largely prevented the King and his subordinates from

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⁷ Despite their common source material, the works of Diodorus and Curtius differ considerably in several respects: Curtius’ work is much longer and more detailed, given that the Historiae Alexandri Magni is devoted solely to the life of Alexander, whereas Diodorus, writing a universal history, summarized the same material in just one out of the forty chapters of the Bibliotheca. The first two books of Curtius’ work, covering the rise of Alexander to the death of Memnon of Rhodes in 333, are not extant. Curtius appears to have supplemented and revised Cleitarchus with Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Curtius chose to depict Alexander as a great conqueror unable to cope with his own success (e.g., 3.12.18-20; 6.2.1; 10.5.26-36), whereas Diodorus emphasized Alexander’s ability to resist the temptations his conquests brought (e.g., 17.38.4-7).

⁸ For example, they provide less contemptuous depictions of Parmenio (see below) and Darius III, whom Arrian portrays as incompetent and cowardly (e.g., at and before Issus 2.6.3-7, 11.4). On the same subject, Curtius (3.8.1-12, 11.7-12) and Diodorus (17.32.3-4, 34.5-7) are more sympathetic, though not entirely praiseworthy.
making proper use of their Greek mercenaries, thus denying the Persians their only chance at victory over Alexander.

In what follows, I demonstrate that these assumptions are not valid. Our sources overstate the military significance of Memnon and the other Greeks in Persian service by means of literary devices and bare assertion. Once again, however, the importance of Greek mercenaries becomes more limited and far less impressive after the embellishments provided by ancient sources are removed from consideration.

**Demythologizing Memnon of Rhodes**

In all ancient accounts of the Macedonian conquest of the Achaemenid Empire, Memnon of Rhodes represents one of, if not the most, formidable obstacles to Alexander’s success. The written reactions to Memnon’s untimely death reveal his importance. Diodorus writes that “with his death Darius’ fortunes collapsed” (τῇ τούτου τελευτῇ συνετρίβη καὶ τὰ τοῦ Δαρείου πράγματα 17.29.4), Arrian notes that it was “the severest blow during this period to the Persian cause” (εἴπερ τι ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ τότε ἔβλαψε τὰ βασιλέως πράγματα 2.1.3), and Curtius reports:

But Darius, when the death of Memnon was announced, being not less anxious than was natural, set aside all other hope, and decided to fight a decisive battle in person; for he condemned everything that had been done through his generals, believing that many of them had been lacking in care, and all in good fortune (3.2.1).\(^9\)

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\(^9\) At Dareus, nuntiata Memnonis morte haud secus quam par erat motus, omissa omni alia spe, statuit ipse decernere; quippe quae per duces suos acta erant cuncta damnabat, ratus curam, omnibus auisse fortunam.
Finally, Plutarch describes Alexander’s relief upon hearing of the death of Memnon, “one of the commanders of Darius on the sea-board, who was thought likely to give Alexander abundant trouble and infinite annoyance” (18.5).\textsuperscript{10}

Modern scholars have, by and large, accepted and adopted the judgment of ancient authors on this subject, primarily for two reasons: First, Memnon’s contributions to the satrapal council prior to the Battle of the Granicus in 334 demonstrate that his strategic understanding of the war was far greater than that of his Persian colleagues. Second, Memnon had a record of success against Macedon unmatched by any other contemporary general, Persian or Greek.\textsuperscript{11}

Neither of these reasons, however, withstands close scrutiny. Memnon’s sterling reputation is the product of two familiar literary tropes: the tragic advisor and the energetic subordinate. By means of the former, Memnon’s wisdom has been exaggerated and his culpability for any blame in the Persian defeat at Granicus absolved. By means of the latter, his contributions elsewhere – in the Troad and Aeolis prior to Alexander’s crossing of the Hellespont, at the siege of Halicarnassus, and during his Aegean naval campaign – have been exaggerated to the exclusion of other Persian generals. The historical Memnon was not, in fact, Alexander’s foil and Darius’ best hope, but a competent general with a checkered record who rose to a relatively high rank in the Persian military for reasons other than military brilliance.

\textsuperscript{10} ὃς τὸν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ Δαρείου στρατηγὸν ἐπίδοξος ἦν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πολλὰ πράγματα καὶ μορίας ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀσχολίας παρέξειν.
Memnon at the Granicus

Memnon’s reputation as a general “outstanding in courage and in strategic grasp” (διαφέρων ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ συνέσει στρατηγικῇ Diodorus 17.7.2) largely derives from one episode, a strategy session held by Darius’ western satraps before the Battle of Granicus in 334 BCE. According to Diodorus (17.18-19) and Arrian (1.12.8-16.7), Memnon advised the satraps to avoid doing battle with Alexander’s superior Greek and Macedonian infantry. Instead, he argued that they should pursue a scorched earth strategy in order to deny Alexander supplies while launching a naval counter-attack in the Aegean and Greece.

At a glance, Memnon’s counsel seems to be without fault. The swift Persian defeat at Granicus confirms his appraisal of Macedonian military superiority, as does the subsequent (if too late) enactment of an Aegean counter-attack (Diodorus 17.29.1-4; Arrian 2.1) and even scorched earth tactics (Curtius 3.4.3-5). Indeed, his suggestion of scorched earth tactics and a naval campaign is reasonably seen as a demonstration of his broader strategic grasp, considering the poor state of Alexander’s finances at the start of his campaign (Plutarch Alex. 15.1-7; Arrian 1.20.1), Persian naval superiority in the Aegean (Arrian 1.18.6-9, 20.1), and the unpopularity of Macedonian hegemony in Greece (Diodorus 17.29.3-4; Arrian 1.18.8), which made Alexander’s need for a quick and decisive victory for propaganda purposes all the more urgent.13 As one author recently

12 Although Curtius’ account of Granicus is not extant, it almost certainly included the trope as well. Later in his text, Curtius notes that Arsames, governor of Cilicia, “recalling what Memnon had advised at the beginning of the war,” began – too late – to conduct scorched-earth operations in and around Tarsus (3.4.3-5).
stated, “Memnon’s advice was sound and, if taken, would have almost guaranteed that the world would never have heard of Alexander the Great”.

The Persians, however, rejected Memnon’s advice. Our sources say they were motivated by pride (ἀνάξια σωμβουλεύων τῆς Περσῶν μεγαλοπρεπίας DS 17.18.3) and jealousy (ὅτι καὶ ὑποτόν τι αὐτοῖς ἦν ἐς τὸν Μέμνονα τριβάς ἐμποιεῖν ἐκόντα τῷ πολέμῳ τῆς ἐκ βασιλέως τιμῆς οὕνεκα Arrian 1.12.10). While some modern scholars have accepted this portrayal, others have sought military or political explanations for the Persian decision to fight.

Debate over the practicality of Memnon’s advice largely misses the mark, however, because it assumes that our sources accurately relate the discussion that took place at the strategy session prior to Granicus. In fact, the entire episode closely matches the standard pattern of the tragic advisor literary trope, which was discussed extensively in the previous chapter. Consequently, it is unlikely that the historical Memnon voiced the concerns attributed to him by our sources before the Battle of Granicus.

As the most prominent Greek in Persian service at the conflict, he was instead the obvious choice for transformation into tragic advisor, a stereotypical figure which served several literary, not historical purposes. The inclusion of Memnon’s advice at the strategy session adds dramatic tension to the encounter, showing both Alexander’s

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14 Freeman 2011: 78. See also n. 5 above.
17 The fact that Memnon’s advice appears in multiple accounts of the Battle of Granicus does not enhance its historical credibility. Instead, it simply indicates that the story entered the tradition at an early date and was perhaps a part of Alexander’s propaganda campaign, cited in order to demonstrate that the Persians, being proud and militarily incompetent, were unfit to rule Asia. Even Parke 1933: 182 casts doubt on Diodorus’ report that Memnon argued for a counter-offensive in the Aegean prior to Granicus.
vulnerability and Persian hubris, which then receives its comeuppance. The device absolves Memnon and the other Greeks at the battle from any blame for the defeat and concurrently denigrates the Persians. It also serves as a vehicle for historical counter-factual analysis by the authors, allowing them to suggest within the narrative the manner in which Alexander could have been defeated.

Memnon is not the only Greek who is portrayed as a tragic advisor in the narratives of Alexander’s conquests. In each of our main sources, at least one tragic advisor figure appears prior to the Battle of Issus. Diodorus (17.30) and Curtius (3.2.10-19) present the Athenian Charidemus in this role at a strategy session outside of Babylon, before the Achaemenid army set out for Cilicia. In each version, Charidemus insists that the Macedonian and Greek soldiers in Alexander’s army were superior to any in the Persian force, suggests that the King hire Greek mercenaries in place of his extravagantly equipped Near Easterners, and implies that he himself should lead the army instead of the King. Both sources report that Charidemus was executed on the spot for offending the King and insulting the Persians, and both tell us that Darius later regretted this punishment but still did not follow his advice.

Plutarch (Alexander 20) and Arrian (2.6-7.1) make no mention of Charidemus or of any Persian strategy session outside of Babylon. Instead, they tell us that the Macedonian deserter Amyntas advised Darius against entering the narrow plain Cilicia, where his superior numbers would be of no use against the Macedonians. Darius did not
listen (Plutarch 20.4; Arrian 2.6.6) and instead entered the Cilician plain in order to force a decisive battle, which he lost.\textsuperscript{18}

Likewise, Curtius immediately before the battle inserts a story (3.8.1-12) in which Darius is advised to withdraw from Cilicia and instead wait for Alexander in Mesopotamia. Here, it is the mercenary contingent of the Rhodian Thymondas who makes the suggestion to the Persian king, rather than the individual Macedonian defector Amyntas.\textsuperscript{19} Although Darius does not follow their advice, Curtius implies that he has learned from his brash punishment of Charidemus (\textit{neminem stolidum consilium capite luere debere}). The mercenaries are thanked for their suggestion, but ultimately overruled (3.8.4-7). Still, the decision to reject their advice ultimately proved detrimental to the King.

The effect of the tragic advisor trope in the Alexander narratives is intensified by the inclusion of other advisor figures. Where Darius and other Persian satraps often fail to recognize and follow wise advice given by their Greek subordinates, Alexander is able to distinguish good advice from bad:

1. Alexander launched his invasion of Persia over the objections of Parmenio and Antipater, who also advised that he treat the Greeks more leniently than his father (Diodorus 17.16.1-2; Plutarch 11.2-5).
2. He dismisses Parmenio’s counsel before Granicus and successfully assaults the Persian position (Arrian 1.13.3-7; Plutarch 16.1-5).
3. At Miletus, Alexander rejects Parmenio’s advice to engage the Persian fleet in battle at sea (Arrian 1.18.6-9).

\textsuperscript{18} Murison 1972 provides a sound tactical justification for Darius’ decision to enter Cilicia: namely that he intended to cut Alexander and the rest of the Macedonian army from Parmenio’s vanguard, which had gone ahead to secure the Belian Pass. Darius moved too slowly, however, arriving mere hours after Alexander had rejoined Parmenio.

\textsuperscript{19} Amyntas does appear in Curtius’ version of events (3.9.7). He is named as a commander of Darius’ Greek troops in the aftermath of the battle, but no mention of his role as an advisor to the king is ever made. Similar statements are made about him by Diodorus (17.48), who does not mention Thymondas.
4. When he falls ill, Alexander ignores Parmenio’s warning that the physician Philip would poison him (Arrian 2.4.7-11; Diodorus 17.31.4-6; Curtius 3.6.1-17; Plutarch 19.1-10).
5. Alexander chooses to reject Darius’ peace terms over the objections of Parmenio (Diodorus 17.54.3-5; Curtius 4.11.10-15; Plutarch 29.7-9).
6. At Gaugamela, Alexander does not follow Parmenio’s suggestion that he launch a night attack on Darius’ camp (Arrian 3.10.1-4; Curtius 4.13.4-10; Plutarch 31.10-12).

On each of these occasions, Alexander’s decision to ignore the advice proffered was validated by subsequent success.20

Likewise, on the few occasions when Alexander follows the advice given him, it is always shown to be the correct decision:

1. Alexander accepts Parmenio’s counsel to engage Darius on the narrow plain near Issus (Curtius 3.7.8-10).
2. In light of the questionable loyalties of the Greeks, Alexander follows Parmenio’s advice to keep secret a letter intercepted from Darius’s camp, which offered rewards to any Greek who would desert the Macedonian cause (Curtius 4.10.16-17).
3. Before Gaugamela, Alexander listens to Parmenio, choosing to proceed with caution toward the Persian camp rather than advance quickly, as his other officers advised (Arrian 3.9.3-4).

In the context of the Macedonian invasion, the advisor tropes appear as part of a larger demonstration of the superiority of Alexander’s judgment over that of his opponents, particularly Darius. While it would be difficult to argue that Alexander’s generalship was not superior to Darius’, his ability to discern good advice from bad, as revealed by his relationship to various advisor figures, is not evidence of this. Instead, proof that Alexander was a more capable general comes from the reality that his army defeated Darius on multiple occasions in battle.

Similarly, the portrayal of certain Greeks as tragic advisors is not firm evidence for their superiority as military commanders. All advisor figures, whether they are tragic,

20 An exception is his decision to burn the palace at Persepolis over the objections of Parmenio, a choice which Arrian judges negatively (3.18.11-12).
foolish, or wise, are inserted for thematic, not historical, reasons. To that end, the tragic advisor literary device is irrelevant for the purposes of understanding the military significance of the Greek contributions to the Persian resistance against Alexander.

Once Memnon’s advice is understood to be more literary creation than historical reality, his contributions at the Battle of Granicus take on a far less impressive note. Although some have placed him among the Greek mercenary infantry reserve, our sources directly state that he served among the Persian cavalry. This should not be surprising, given that he was no ordinary Greek mercenary commander, but in fact a member of the Persian aristocracy – thus his place was with the other Persian nobles. He, like many other Persians, fought bravely, but once the battle was decided he managed to retreat safely. In sum, there is no reliable evidence to show that Memnon was the Persians’ wisest general at Granicus.

Memnon against the Macedonians

In addition to his participation on the Persian side at the Granicus, Memnon fought against Macedonian forces on several occasions, namely:

1. From 336-335 he fought in the counter-offensive against the advance force sent to Asia by Philip in order to prepare the way for the main body of the Macedonian army.
2. In 334, he helped defend Halicarnassus while the city was under siege.
3. From 334 until his death in 333, he was in charge of the Persian counter-offensive in the Aegean, which succeeded in securing Chios and most of Lesbos.

These events represent most of the few successes Persian forces achieved during the early stages of Alexander’s invasion, and our sources give Memnon the bulk of the credit for them. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that Memnon’s own contributions to the Persian cause have been exaggerated. Using the energetic subordinate
trope, ancient authors misrepresent Memnon’s importance, concentrating their narrative on his actions while omitting those of his Persian colleagues. The strategic consequences of the Aegean campaign that he directed have been overstated using similar methods of concentration and omission. Likewise, the significance of Memnon’s personal leadership of the campaign is given too much weight: Diodorus, for example, cites his death as the reason Darius decided to curtail it, since there was no capable replacement for him (ἐξήτει στρατηγόν ἀξιόχρεων τὸν διαδεξόμενον τὴν τοῦ Μέμνονος ἰγκεμονίαν· οὐ δυνάμενος δ’ εὑρεῖν 17.30.7).

Memnon had already earned some renown for his military leadership prior to the Macedonian conquest of Persia (Polyaenus 5.44.1-3), but his most famous command began in 336. It was in this year that Philip, in preparation for a larger invasion of the Persian Empire, sent a force into Asia under the command of Parmenio and Attalus (Diodorus 16.91.2). After some initial success, the Macedonian advance was halted and pushed back, with the result that they were in control of only a small amount of territory along the coast when Alexander crossed the Hellespont in 334 (Diodorus 17.7.10).

Scholars generally assign credit to Memnon for the Persian success against the Macedonian vanguard,21 but Memnon actually accomplished little of note and, in fact, lost territory to the Macedonians. Although his own estates were in the Troad,22 Memnon’s base of operations during this campaign appears to have been in Aeolis and

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22 See McCoy 1989: 429 n. 49.
Ionia, where he was part of the Persian resistance to the Macedonian force led directly by Parmenio. Early in the campaign, he successfully ambushed Parmenio and Attalus outside of Magnesia ad Sipylum, but failed to take the city itself (Polyaenus 5.44.4). Diodorus, who omits from his narrative the events in Asia prior to Alexander’s accession, reports that Darius ordered Memnon to attack Cyzicus (17.7.3). Accordingly, Memnon left Aeolis and crossed the mountain range of Mt. Ida, but his surprise attack, in which disguised himself and his soldiers as Macedonians (Diodorus 17.7.3-8; Polyaenus 5.44.5), was a failure. After this, Memnon delayed his return to Aeolis by pillaging the countryside of Cyzicus (17.7.8). Meanwhile, Parmenio took advantage of Memnon’s absence, capturing Grynium and nearly Pitane, too (Diodorus 17.7.9).

Instead of acknowledging Memnon’s inconsistent record, Diodorus gives his actions a positive frame. Thus Memnon is not defeated at Cyzicus, but comes “within an ace of taking it (παρ’ ὀλίγον αὐτῆς ἐκυρίευσεν)” while plundering the countryside of when he should have returned to Aeolis to protect Grynium, Diodorus notes that he “collected much booty” (πολλῶν λαφύρων ἐκυρίευσεν 17.7.8); finally, his belated appearance at Pitane “frightened the Macedonians into breaking off the siege” (καταπληξάµενος τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἔλυσε τὴν πολιορκίαν 17.7.9). In reality, then, Memnon accomplished little and had nothing to do with the lone major success of the

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23 *Contra* Parke 1933: 178-179, for example, who assumes, perhaps because Memnon’s estates were in the Troad, that Memnon was restricted to that region. As the discussion below demonstrates, however, most of Memnon’s campaigning took place further south. 24 It is unclear which Magnesia Polyaenus means. According to Briant 2002: 817, it was Magnesia ad Sipylum; McCoy 1989: 424 suggests Magnesia on the Meander. 25 Pseudo-Aristotle *Economicus* 2.1351b reports that Memnon captured Lampsacus, but it is unclear whether this took place during his campaign against Macedon or during an earlier period – such as when he attacked Leucon’s territories in the Bosphorus (Polyaenus 5.44.1).
Persian counter-offensive, which saw Callas and his Macedonian force driven back to the sea at Rhoetium (17.7.10).

Still, Memnon receives undue credit for the Persian success for three reasons: First, as we have seen, because Diodorus portrays his activities apologetically. Second, Diodorus’ manufactured praise finds support in Polyænus’ similarly positive entry on Memnon, which contains a description of clever strategems the general used against the Macedonians at Cyzicus and Magnesia, although each failed to result in the capture of their intended target.

Third, and most importantly, there is no one else to whom acknowledgment can be given. Diodorus does not name a single other officer on the Persian side, but instead concentrates almost exclusively on Memnon. Although he reports that Darius assembled his “best commanders (ἡγεμόνας ἀρίστους),” only Memnon is referenced by name, and only he is assigned a specific task in the counter-offensive (17.7.2-3). Furthermore, Memnon’s operations alone are narrated in detail (17.7.3-9). The major Persian victory over Callas is briefly noted and appended at the end of Diodorus’ account of Memnon’s contributions. No individual Persian commanders are given credit for the success, which is instead attributed to the fact that the Persians had “a much larger (πολλαπλασίους) force” than Callas (17.7.10).

Despite Diodorus’ silence on the matter of Callas’ adversary, it is possible to identify several candidates from among the Persian nobility. The leader of the Persian force was most likely also present at the Battle of Granicus, since that engagement took place not long after and in the same region. Of the Persian leaders there, Spithridates can plausibly be excluded: as satrap of Lydia and Ionia (Arrian 1.12.8; Diodorus 17.19.4), he
would have been occupied with Parmenio’s force in his own territory. Likewise, Arsamenes, though present at the Granicus, was satrap of Cilicia (Arrian 2.4.5; Curtius 3.4.3-5) and unlikely to be in charge of a large military force in another satrap’s province.

The commander most likely responsible for the defeat of Callas was Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arrian 1.12.8). While several other high-ranking Persian nobles (e.g., Mithridates, Darius’ brother-in-law) participated at Granicus, their specific roles are not clear. The engagement took place within the confines of Arsites’ satrapy, where, if our accounts of the later Battle of Granicus are credible in this respect, he held supreme military authority. From Diodorus’ vague reference to the size of the Persian force (17.7.10), moreover, it would seem that the army was of large enough size to be led by a high-ranking official, rather than one of his lieutenants. Certainty on this issue is not possible, except to say that Memnon was neither responsible nor even present for the defeat of Callas.

With this conclusion in mind, the depiction of Memnon prior to the Granicus as the wise commander whose advice goes unheeded by jealous Persians becomes absurd. Not only does the scene in which Memnon counsels his superiors conform rigidly to a stereotypical literary trope, but the portrayal of Memnon as the superior military mind also does not match the reality of his situation. If we are to believe our sources, Memnon, a lesser Persian noble who had secured a few minor successes – alongside several equal or more prominent failures – advised a Persian general who had recently overwhelmed a

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26 Arrian 1.12.8 lists Theomithres, Petenes, and Niphates as commanders (alongside Arsames, Spithridates, and Arsites) prior to the battle, but they are not identified further. Several other Persian nobles are also listed among the dead in the aftermath of the battle but, again, their specific roles are not mentioned (1.16.3).

27 Arrian portrays him as in charge of the Persian war effort at Granicus, both in the council before the battle (1.12.10) and in his summary of the aftermath (1.16.3)
Macedonian army that his army was inferior to the Macedonians and that, rather than stand and fight again, he should lay waste to his own territory. By virtue of his prior record, Memnon was in no position to make such a suggestion and, as Briant has noted, his purported counsel was likely not even an option to the satraps, since the King himself had probably ordered a direct engagement.28

Following the disaster at the Granicus, our sources report that Memnon received a promotion from the King, the significance of which is drastically overstated by our sources. According to Diodorus, Darius initially placed Memnon in “supreme command” of “those who dwelt next to the sea” (δὲν ἦγεμονίαν...τούς κατὰ θάλατταν οἰκονόμας 17.23.6), and later upgraded his status to “commanding general of the whole war” (τοῦ πολέμου παντὸς ἄπεδειξε στρατηγόν 17.29.1). For his part, Arrian provides a more accurate, if also slightly embellished, description: Memnon was commanding general “of lower Asia and the whole fleet” (τῆς τε κάτω Ἀσίαςκαὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμόν 1.20.3). In this role, our sources portray Memnon as essential to the Persian cause: his sudden death signals the collapse of Darius’ fortunes and precipitates the King’s own personal involvement in the war effort (Diodorus 17.30.7; Curtius 3.2.1).

A number of scholars have accepted this understanding of Memnon’s importance,29 and not without justification. In the traditional telling of Alexander’s conquest, Memnon by this point has already proven himself worthy of becoming Darius’ primary general in the west, and so an elevation of his status seems perfectly reasonable.

29 Parke 1933: 182-183; Green 1991: 216-218 acknowledges that Darius was already gathering an army at Babylon, but argues that the King’s decision to lead it in person came only after Memnon’s death and the execution of Charidemus of Athens; Cartledge 2004: 174.
Yet, as we have seen above, Memnon’s record against the Macedonian vanguard from 336-335 was checkered, and there is good reason to doubt the historicity and insight of his advice prior to Granicus.\(^{30}\)

Much like he overstated the importance and role of Conon in the King’s fleet during the 390s,\(^{31}\) Diodorus misrepresents Memnon’s position here. First, his area of operations was far more limited than Diodorus and even Arrian suggest. He does not seem to have any influence or direct concerns with the war in the Anatolian interior, which was directed by Orontobates (Arrian 2.5.7). His activity as general, furthermore, was confined to Halicarnassus, Chios, and Lesbos. Given the fact that his successors restricted their own campaigning to the Anatolian coast and the Cyclades, there are no indications that he ever intended to campaign much further west, contrary to Arrian’s statement that he “sought to diver the war into Macedonia and Greece” (ὡς ἐς Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀποστρέψων τὸν πόλεμον 2.1.1).\(^{32}\)

Second, claims that Memnon was singularly important to the Persian cause are also undermined by the course of events. As we’ve seen, Memnon was not the only Persian general active in Anatolia after the Granicus, as his colleague Orontobates also required the attention of Alexander’s generals (2.5.7). The success of his replacements, Pharnabazus and Autophradates, capturing Mitylene (2.1.3-5) and Tenedos (2.2.2-3), demonstrates that the Persian Aegean offensive did not flag after Memnon’s death.

\(^{30}\) This, of course, raises the question: why did Darius promote Memnon, if not for his military acumen? The short answer is that Memnon was hired because of his unique political and social background, i.e., he was Greek by ethnicity but Persian by marriage. This issue receives further discussion in Chapter 7; here, however, my concern is with the military significance of Memnon’s new position and the degree to which, if any, he posed a singular threat to Alexander’s success.

\(^{31}\) See discussion in previous chapter and March 1997.

\(^{32}\) Notably, his successors campaigned in the Cyclades and the Hellespont (2.2.2-3).
Furthermore, it is clear that Memnon’s death did not spur Darius to take personal command and lead a large Persian army to the west. As Briant persuasively argued, Darius had begun mustering his army before word of Memnon’s passing reached him.\textsuperscript{33} The time between Memnon’s death and the Battle of Issus was relatively brief, and Darius must have already sent for Memnon’s mercenaries. Arrian’s narrative makes this clear: upon the surrender of Mitylene, Memnon’s nephew Pharnabazus immediately sailed to Lycia, where he turned over command of his Greek mercenaries to Thymondas, who in turn marched to join Darius’ for the confrontation at Issus (2.2.1). This sequence of events makes far more sense when understood as a pre-planned maneuver, rather than a response to the loss of Memnon alone.

Finally, Memnon’s military record after Granicus does not indicate that he was in any way a foil to Alexander or Darius’ best hope. Using the energetic subordinate trope, our sources give a misleading impression of the Rhodian’s contributions. For instance, Orontobates’ role at Halicarnassus as co-leader of the resistance is underreported – and even ignored by Diodorus – while Memnon’s is accordingly exaggerated (see discussion below). The fact remains, however, that in his one direct confrontation with Alexander, Memnon’s forces were defeated.\textsuperscript{34}

According to the Bibliotheca, Memnon’s campaign in the Aegean was nearly a major turning point in the war. As a result of his victories and generous bribes, a significant number of Greek citizens and states were on the verge of revolt (17.29.3-4). Arrian implies much the same, with his comments that Memnon had planned to attack

\textsuperscript{33} Briant 2002: 825-828.
\textsuperscript{34} The citadel at Halicarnassus remained in Persian hands, of course, but Alexander was able to continue on once the lower city had fallen.
Greece and that his death was the most significant setback to Darius’ cause (2.1.3; see quotes above).

Yet there is little evidence to support this, and in fact Memnon’s advances on Chios and Lesbos say little about his military prowess. Although he secured the former island in its entirety and most of the latter, he did so without a fight, as all of the cities went over willingly.\(^{35}\) In fact, the only city he did not capture, Mitylene, was also the lone city to resist him and, significantly, the largest and presumably most important on either island.\(^{36}\) Memnon’s replacements, who forced the capitulation of Mitylene, Tenedos, and threatened the Cyclades, actually achieved more than he did and appear to have spurred the reconstitution of the Macedonian fleet (Arrian 2.2.4-5).

Our sources consistently and comprehensively overrate the value of Memnon of Rhodes to the Persian cause. Perhaps this is because, as Briant suggested, the portrayal ultimately derives from a Greek tradition “originally concerned only with his and his family’s memory”.\(^{37}\) There are also other possible explanations for Memnon’s undeserved military reputation, one being that Alexander’s propagandists such as Callisthenes may have used Memnon’s own position in order to highlight the military deficiencies of the Persians, thus implying that the Persians were undeserving of their empire. Those Greek veterans and eyewitnesses who served as sources for Cleitarchus’ history may have also had reason to overstate Memnon’s – and, by proxy, their own –

\(^{35}\) Thus Arrian writes that he “captured Chios, delivered over by treachery” and “won over the remaining cities of Lesbos” (Χίον μὲν λαμβάνει προδόσια ἐνδοθέσαν... τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις τῆς Λέσβου προσηγάγετο 2.1.1).

\(^{36}\) Diodorus incorrectly credits Memnon with capturing Mitylene prior to his death (17.29.2), but Arrian makes it clear that this was not the case (2.1.3-5).

\(^{37}\) Briant 2002: 826-827 applies his comment specifically to Memnon’s advocacy of an offensive in Greece and Macedon, but it could just as easily be extended to the entirety of Memnon’s portrayal.
contributions, since many had probably served under the general and his relatives on the Persian side.

It is also likely that Greek and Roman writers exaggerated Memnon’s accomplishments and value for literary and dramatic reasons. Early in the war, Alexander had no clear rival on the battlefield. Memnon’s presence as the highest ranking Greek in Anatolia, and the particular timing of his death, made him the natural choice for Alexander’s dramatic foil before Darius’ direct participation in the conflict. The circumstances of his death, by illness rather than at the hands of Alexander, also fit into the popular portrayal of Alexander as an extraordinarily fortunate conqueror. In his literally elevated role Memnon allowed our sources to offer a compelling counter-factual scenario: if only he had lived or had his advice been heeded earlier, Alexander’s ultimate success would have been far from assured.

Stripped of literary embellishment, Memnon’s record is that of a competent general. His service against the Macedonians reveals several modest accomplishments: he ambushed Parmenio near Magnesia, broke the siege of Pitane, and secured Chios and most of Lesbos without resistance. Against these successes, however, are several failures: he did not capture Cyzicus, he failed to defend Grynyium, was unable to take Magnesia after his successful ambush, and lost both Miletus and the lower city of Halicarnassus.38

38 Memnon is described by Diodorus as “outstanding in courage” (17.7.2); however, it is interesting to note that he consistently escapes from situations in which other officers and soldiers bravely perish, namely Granicus (Arrian 1.16.3; Diodorus 17.20.1-21.3), Miletus (Arrian 1.19.3-4; Diodorus 17.22.1-4), Halicarnassus (Arrian 1.22.1-7; Diodorus 17.26.7-27.3). The Rhodian’s knack for survival may be taken as evidence for any of several character traits (e.g., his luck, his cowardice, his ability to recognize a hopeless situation), but it does not, in my mind, seem to be consistent with outstanding courage.
Tragic advisor trope aside, his presence at the Granicus does not seem to have significantly influenced the outcome of the battle.

Memnon’s promotion to command of the Persian fleet does not seem to have been made in recognition of his prior military accomplishments. Instead, it was due to other considerations: many, if not all, of his immediate superiors had been killed at the Granicus; he was a landed Persian noble in an area in which the campaign was to take place, making him an obvious candidate; and, as a Greek of Rhodian heritage, he was undoubtedly knowledgeable of the area in which he was to campaign and, as the apparently bloodless surrenders of the cities of Chios and Lesbos seem to indicate, was familiar with the local political and social dynamics at play in the eastern Aegean. In the final evaluation, there is no sound basis for claims that Memnon was Darius’ best, most trusted general or an exceptional obstacle to Alexander’s progress.

**Greeks at the Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela**

During the course of his conquest, Alexander faced the armies of Persia in the field on three separate occasions. In each battle, the Persians employed Greek mercenaries as heavy infantry. According to our ancient sources, these Greeks were the Persians’ “principle and almost sole hope” (*praecipua spes et propemodum unica* Curtius 3.8.1) and “the only troops capable of being a counterpoise” to the Macedonian phalanx (ὦς μόνοι δὴ ἀντίρροι τῇ φάλαγγι ἐτάχθησαν Arrian 3.11.7). A number of scholars have followed our sources in viewing the rank-and-file Greek mercenaries as the best

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39 Curiously, Diodorus does not mention the presence of any Greeks save Memnon and his sons at Granicus and also neglects to narrate Greek contributions at Issus and Gaugamela.
soldiers on the Persian side, with only the incompetence of Persian commanders and soldiers preventing them from saving the Empire.\textsuperscript{40}

In this section, I argue otherwise. Far from being essential to the Persian defense, the Greek hoplites actually did little to influence the outcome of any of the individual battles, which were in the main decided by the cavalry on each side.

The first major engagement of the Macedonian conquest was the Battle of the Granicus in 334. Of the three set-piece battles during the Macedonian invasion, the Granicus is the most controversial. Much of the confusion is due to the unsatisfactory and contradictory nature of the narratives provided by Arrian, Diodorus, and Plutarch.

In the accounts of Arrian and Plutarch, the battle takes place in the late afternoon (Arrian 1.13.3-14.1; Plutarch 16.3) and is portrayed as a struggle between the cavalry on either side. The Persians are said to have lined the banks of the Granicus with their cavalry, keeping 20,000 Greek mercenaries in the rear (Arrian 1.14.4).\textsuperscript{41} Alexander, after rejecting Parmenio’s advice, led the assault with his cavalry and a few infantry (Arrian 1.14.6-7). After breaking through and forcing the Persian horse to flee (Arrian 1.15.1-16.1), Alexander then surrounded the Greek phalanx and, refusing to accept their surrender, massacred all but 2,000 of them (Arrian 1.16.2; Plutarch 16.13-14).

Diodorus contradicts Arrian and Plutarch on several points. He reports that Alexander camped for one night before forcing his crossing in the dawn (17.19.1-3). The Persians react too slowly to engage the Macedonians while they are crossing, and instead the battle takes place on open ground (17.19.3). Diodorus does not mention the presence

\textsuperscript{41} Plutarch 16.12 seems to disagree on this point, noting that the two phalanges engaged after the cavalry battle had already begun.
of Greek mercenaries – apart from Memnon – at the battle, instead noting the presence of 100,000 Persian infantry (17.19.4-5). While his narrative also describes the early stages as being fought strictly between cavalry (17.19.6-21.4), he does note that the battle ended with the Macedonian phalanx making short work of the Persian infantry (17.21.5).

In neither account is the Persian resistance particularly competent. According to Diodorus, the Persians moved too slowly to prevent Alexander from crossing the Hellespont, and subsequently also fail to contest Alexander’s crossing of the Granicus itself, despite their early arrival and advantageous position (17.19.2). In Arrian and Plutarch, meanwhile, the Persians do contest the crossing of the Granicus, but with their cavalry rather than the Greek mercenaries who, according to most scholars, would have been more suited to the task.\(^{42}\)

My intention here is not to reconstruct the order of battle, but to discern the importance of the Greeks to the Persian cause. We have already seen that Memnon’s personal contributions at the Granicus were relatively inconsequential and, from the narratives provided by our sources, the Greek mercenary infantry also do not appear to have done anything to sway the outcome of the battle. Both Plutarch and Arrian report that their position was hopeless and that their final stand took place after Alexander’s victory had been assured (Plutarch 16.13; Arrian 1.16.2). Likewise, if we assume their presence among the rest of the Persian infantry in Diodorus’ account, their activity also comes after the main cavalry engagement has all but decided the entire affair (17.21.5).

To my knowledge, no scholar has argued that the Greeks played a decisive role at the Granicus, and yet this event is often held up as an example of Persian dependence

\(^{42}\) Parke 1933: 180;
upon Greek mercenary hoplites. From this perspective, the relative ease with which the Persians were defeated was largely due to their failure to properly utilize Greek mercenaries by placing them in sufficient force along their front line. The reasons for this failure vary: the Persians were taken by surprise and rushed to attack, leaving the slower Greek hoplites behind, or they were simply incompetent, or they did not have confidence in the loyalty of the Greeks, or there simply were not enough Greeks present to make a difference. The ultimate implication, however, is always the same: Greek mercenaries were the only soldiers capable of preventing the fall of Persia, and their misuse at Granicus made Alexander’s victory much easier than it should have been.

Yet there is little reason to think that a more forward deployment of Greek mercenaries would have altered the outcome of the battle. This is because, whether we follow Arrian and Plutarch or Diodorus, it is clear that the outcome was – and in nearly even conceivable scenario would have been – determined almost exclusively by the cavalry engagement. In both scenarios, the Persian infantry (Greek or not) is helpless

43 Parke 1933: 180.
46 As Devine 1986: 270-272 argues, the 20,000 Greek mercenaries cited by Arrian is certainly an exaggeration. More likely, the number of Greeks present was no more than 4,000 or 5,000, the numbers Diodorus and Polyaeus report serving under Memnon prior to Alexander’s crossing into Asia. See also Green 1991: 498-500.
47 While it does seem likely that hoplites could have held a fixed position on the riverbank more easily than cavalry, this argument assumes that Alexander would have attacked the hoplites directly. The more cumbersome hoplites, however, could not have responded in time had Alexander decided to cross the river at a different location, a maneuver which only the Persian cavalry would have been capable of preventing. In my view, the Persian disposition according to Arrian and Plutarch makes sense: by placing the cavalry along the bank opposite Alexander, the Persians ensured that they could mirror any movement the Macedonians made up or downstream and, in turn, contest the crossing. By placing their slow-moving infantry in reserve, the Persians then had a
once the cavalry is driven from the field. Arrian in particular focuses on the plight of the Greek mercenaries who, pressed in the front by the Macedonian phalanx and on all other sides by Alexander’s horse, are completely overwhelmed (1.16.2). In the event that the Macedonian horse had been driven from the field, it is likely that Alexander’s phalanx would have fared no better against the combined assault of the Persian cavalry and infantry.

In fact, Darius adopted exactly this disposition at the Battle of Issus. As at Granicus, the Persian line took up position along a riverbank (Arrian 2.10.1). Instead of keeping the infantry in the reserve, however, Darius placed his Greek mercenaries in the center of his line, opposite the Macedonian phalanx (2.8.6). The majority of the Persian cavalry was posted on Darius’ right wing (2.8.10-11), while his left was made up of the remaining cavalry (2.8.11) alongside the Cardaces, whom Arrian writes “were also hoplites” (ὀπλῖται δὲ ἦσαν καὶ οὖτοι 2.8.6). Thus at Issus Alexander’s charge across the river was, in large part, opposed by heavy infantry. Unlike at Granicus, furthermore, Alexander did not have the option of riding down or upstream in order to cross unopposed.

Although Arrian and Plutarch comment on the valor of the Greek mercenary resistance (Arrian 2.10.4-7; Curtius 3.9.2, 10.18) the cavalry ultimately decided the battle. It was a race to see which side’s cavalry would break first. Alexander appears position to which they could fall back. Ultimately, however, the rapidity and totality of Alexander’s initial victory caused the position to go unused, leaving the Greek mercenaries (and, probably, the rest of the Persian infantry) completely exposed.

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48 Discussion here closely follows Arrian’s narrative, which is the most detailed of the extant accounts.

49 Diodorus does not discuss the presence and position of the Persian infantry, including the Greek mercenaries. Plutarch mentions the presence of Amyntas in Darius’ army.
to have had the edge on his own right wing,\(^{51}\) while Darius held it on the Macedonian left (Arrian 2.11.2; Curtius 3.11.1-3). Alexander won first: his charge against the Persian left wing succeeded (Arrian 2.10.4; Curtius 3.11.9) before the Persian horse could drive his own cavalry on the opposite wing off the field (Arrian 2.11.2-3; Curtius 3.11.13-14). With that, the minor success the Greek mercenaries had against the Macedonian phalanx was for naught, as Alexander turned to attack Darius’ center with both his cavalry and his phalanx (Arrian 2.11.1; Curtius 3.11.18), forcing the King to retreat.

Although it took place on a wide, open plain rather than the bank of a river, Gaugamela saw a similar dynamic at play. Darius’ comparatively small Greek hoplite phalanx was stationed in the center, opposite the Macedonian heavy infantry because, according to Arrian (again), “they were considered the only troops capable of being a counterpoise to it” (3.11.7). Yet they receive no mention in the battle narrative itself, which focuses primarily on the cavalry engagements on each wing.\(^{52}\) Again, Alexander’s cavalry on the Macedonian right defeated the Persian horse opposite them (Arrian 3.14.1-4; Curtius 4.15.29) before Darius’ cavalry could break their counter-parts on the Macedonian left (Arrian 3.14.4-15.3; Curtius 4.16.1-3). This, in turn, allowed Alexander

\(^{50}\) Curtius 3.11.1 explicitly states so: “Darius chose to make it a contest of cavalry, in the belief that the phalanx was the main strength (*robur*) of the Macedonian army.” Diodorus 17.33.1-34.9 completely reduces the battle to a struggle between the cavalry on each side.

\(^{51}\) The exact composition of the Persian left is unclear. Arrian writes that most of the Persian cavalry were on the Persian right, implying that some remained on the left – probably extended just beyond the Persian heavy infantry also located there (2.8.10).

\(^{52}\) A fact noted already by Parke 1933: 185.
to strike at Darius’ position in the center and force the King from the battlefield (Arrian 3.14.2-3).\textsuperscript{53}

In none of the three major set piece battles between Alexander and Persia do Greek mercenaries play a decisive role. There is little evidence, furthermore, to suggest that they could have if used differently. The Macedonian advantage in cavalry largely rendered the Persian infantry irrelevant in each engagement, and in any event the hoplite phalanx had not shown itself capable of defeating the Macedonian phalanx at Chaeronea or necessary for the lone significant Persian victory over Callas prior to Alexander’s invasion. The Greeks were not Darius’ “principle and almost sole hope” (Curtius 3.8.1), nor were they “beyond question the flower of the army” (\textit{hoc erat haud dubie robur exercitus} 3.9.2). In fact, in each engagement the best hope and strongest element of the Persian army was the cavalry, which was justifiably entrusted with winning the war – and nearly did so, particularly at Issus and Gaugamela.

**Greek Garrisons and the Siege of Halicarnassus**

The Persians hired Greek mercenaries as garrison troops for a number of cities on the western edge of the Empire. This arrangement extended back at least as far as the reign of Cyrus the Younger (Xenophon \textit{Anabasis} 1.1.6, 2.1), but it is only during the invasion of Alexander that ancient authors record the service in any detail.\textsuperscript{54} Initially, it appears that the employment of Greek mercenaries on such a large scale supports the tenets of the Greek Thesis: lacking capable soldiers themselves, the Persians hired Greeks

\textsuperscript{53} Curtius places Darius on the left wing, so that Alexander’s first movement is directly at the King’s position (4.14.8).

\textsuperscript{54} So far as I am aware, Tuplin 1987 and 1988 contain the most extensive analysis of the evidence for Achaemenid garrisons prior to Alexander’s invasion.
to defend their strongholds. The performance of the Greek defenders of Halicarnassus in particular seems to support this thesis.

Once again, however, closer inspection reveals otherwise. Our sources, especially Diodorus, exaggerate the contributions of the Greeks at Halicarnassus while omitting those of their Persian counterparts. Similarly, the ubiquity of Greek mercenary garrisons is not so great as it seems, both in terms of the number of places Greeks were stationed and their numbers relative to other defenders in those places. The actual performance of these other Greek garrisons in the face of Macedonian attacks, furthermore, belies the notion that they were hired for their superior military abilities.

Prior to Tyre, no city resisted the Macedonian advance more stoutly than Halicarnassus. According to Diodorus and Arrian, Alexander’s main adversaries during the siege were Greek mercenaries, who nearly succeeded in handing the conqueror his first defeat. The traditional scholarly attitude is summarized succinctly by Parke, who generally followed the ancient sources on this point, crediting Memnon with leading the siege and an Athenian, Ephialtes, with commanding 2,000 Greek mercenaries at its most critical point.55

Yet both Arrian and Diodorus overstate the contributions and the status of Memnon, Ephialtes, and their Greek mercenaries at Halicarnassus. As I demonstrate, the Greeks, receiving the bulk of the attention in each narrative, are depicted as energetic subordinates. Consequently, they also receive the bulk of the credit for resisting Alexander, at the expense of the city’s Persian defenders.

Of the two accounts, Diodorus’ narrative is longer and more obviously biased. His narrative begins with notice of Memnon’s promotion to “supreme command” and states that the Rhodian “made all the necessary dispositions for a siege in the city of the Halicarnassians” (17.23.6). Throughout the siege, Diodorus treats Memnon as the official in charge and, therefore, as the man ultimately responsible for all of the Persian successes: “Memnon at first easily beat off the Macedonians assaulting the walls (Μέμνων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τοὺς προσβάλλοντας τοῖς τείχεσι Μακεδόνας ῥαδίως ἠµύνετο)” and that “where the siege engines were attacking, he issued from the city at night with numbers of soldiers and applied fire to the machines” (17.24.5); successes are had by “the commanders under Memnon” (ἡγεµόνων περὶ τὸν Μέµνονα 17.25.3) and “Memnon’s men” (οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μέµνονα 17.25.5); when the Macedonians ask for the bodies of their dead comrades, “Memnon granted the request” (ὁ δὲ Μέµνων συνεχόρησε 17.25.6); when Ephialtes offered to lead an assault, Memnon himself “allowed him to do as he wished” (ὁ δὲ Μέµνων... συνεχόρησεν αὐτῷ πράττειν ὁ βούλοιτο 17.26.2); after Ephialtes has some initial success, “Memnon threw himself into the battle with heavy reinforcements and even Alexander found himself quite helpless” (τοῦ τε Μέµνωνος πολλαπλασίοις στρατιώταις ἐπιβοηθοῦντος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰς πολλὴν ἀµηχανίαν ἐνέπιπτεν 17.26.7). By contrast, when the Macedonians gain entry into the city, it is Ephialtes, not Memnon, who is overcome (17.26.6), and subsequently it is not Memnon himself but his subordinates all together who make the decision to abandon the city (οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μέµνονα στρατηγοὶ καὶ σατράπαι συνελθόντες ἐγνωσαν τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐκλιπεῖν 17.27.5).

56 διόπερ οὗτος παραλαβὼν τὴν τὸν ὄλων ἤγεµονίαν παρεσκευάζετο πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιορκίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἀλικαρνασσέων.
Although Diodorus ultimately attributes the defeat of Halicarnassus to Ephialtes, the Athenian nevertheless also receives the energetic subordinate treatment for his valor in defeat. He proposes an aggressive defensive strategy (17.26.1), is recognized by Memnon as having “courage and bodily strength” (τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ρόμην 17.26.2), catches the Macedonians by surprise, sets fire to their siege engines, and personally leads the phalanx against their initial counter-attack (17.26.3-4). In the ensuing fight, he “who had far greater bodily strength than the rest, slew with his own hand many who traded blows with him” (οὗτος γὰρ πολὺ προέχων τῶν ἄλλων τῇ τοῦ σώματος ρόμη πολλοὺς ἀνήρει τῶν εἰς χείρας ἐρχομένων 17.26.6).

In some respects, Arrian’s account exposes Diodorus’ bias. Arrian mentions the presence of Orontobates, the satrap of Caria, and the aid given the defenders by the Persian navy (1.20.3). Like Diodorus (17.23.4), Arrian also mentions that the city was defended by Greeks and Persians alike (καὶ στρατιῶται πολλοὶ μὲν ξένου μισθοφόροι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐγκατελείφθησαν, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ Περσῶν αὐτῶν Arrian 1.20.3); unlike Diodorus, however, he does not attribute the actions of the defenders exclusively to the Greeks.57

Still, even Arrian’s account subtly embellishes the importance of Memnon. Like Diodorus, he reports that Memnon was in charge and credits him with making “all the necessary preparations” for the city’s defense (ἐκ πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει 1.20.3). And though he does mention Orontobates, he only brings him up in order to include the Persian in the decision to abandon the lower city (1.23.1). The result is that Memnon

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57 Arrian often does not identify the defenders by their ethnicity, e.g, 1.20.9: “the garrison of Halicarnassus, however, made a night sally” (οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἁλικαρνασσοῦ νυκτὸς ἐκδραμόντες). See also 1.21.2, 5.
receives full credit for the city’s defensive preparations and the initial successes in its
defense, but blame for the ultimate defeat of the garrison is shared between the Rhodian
and his Persian counterpart.

It seems unlikely that Memnon, whose authority in general is overrated (see
discussion above), held supreme command over Orontobates in the defense of the
satrap’s own capital city. Even less plausible are the reports that Memnon was
responsible for shoring up the city’s fortifications (Arrian 1.20.3; Diodorus 17.23.6),
considering that the Rhodian had only arrived after the fall of Miletus (Diodorus 17.22.1).
Orontobates, whose presence is not recorded at the Granicus, not only made
Halicarnassus his center of operations during the subsequent campaign (2.5.7), but also
had undoubtedly been in charge of the city during the earlier Macedonian offensive in
nearby Lydia and Aeolis from 336-335.

Given that Memnon later took control of the Persian Aegean campaign and
Orontobates led the Persian counter-offensive in Caria, it would seem appropriate that
Memnon’s authority was largely limited to the Persian fleet. The fact that he is portrayed
as the direct superior of Ephialtes (Diodorus 17.25.6-26.2), and had earlier commanded
4-5,000 (likely) Greek mercenaries (Diodorus 17.7.3), also indicates that he was in
charge of at least a portion of the Greek defenders of the city. Orontobates, however,
probably held command of his own capital, of the city’s Persian defenders, and of
Memnon and his Greeks while they were within the city walls. Although Diodorus
concentrates his narrative on the Greek defenders of the city, then, Arrian’s depiction of
an equal collaboration between all of the city’s defenders is more plausible.
In addition to Halicarnassus, Greek mercenaries garrisoned a number of Persian-controlled cities and fortresses. Arrian provides most of our information about the location of Greek mercenary garrisons, and at times Curtius supplements with useful details. He lists them at Ephesus (1.17.9), Miletus (1.19.1-6), Halicarnassus (1.20.2-23.5), Hyparna (1.24.4), Syllium (1.26.5), Celaenae (1.29.1-2), and the islands of Chios and Mitylene (3.2.3-7; Curtius 4.5.14-18, 22).

Only the garrisons at Ephesus and Hyparna are presented as being manned by Greek mercenaries alone, and it is in these locations where Alexander meets the least resistance. At the former, the mercenaries fled on the approach of Alexander (1.17.9). At the latter, they promptly surrendered to Alexander upon his arrival, despite the fact that the fortress was in a “strong place” (χωρίον ὁχυρόν 1.24.4).

All of the other garrisons include Persian soldiers, citizen defenders, or both, and in every case they resisted the Macedonians more effectively than the garrisons at Ephesus and Hyparna. We have already seen how Diodorus and Arrian minimize the sizeable contingent of Persians at Halicarnassus. It bears mentioning here that, after the capture of the lower city, Memnon and Orontobates left the acropolis in the hands of a garrison of Persians and Greeks (Arrian 1.23.5). At Miletus, Arrian narrates the resistance to Alexander as being equally borne by mercenaries and Milesian citizens, who are only defeated once cut off from naval support. Defended by both mercenaries and local barbaroi, Syllium alone of all places foiled Alexander’s assault and remained unconquered. Celaenae was protected by 100 Greek mercenaries and 1,000 Carians, who held out for some time, but eventually surrendered after no further support from the Persians arrived. The garrison of Chios, which included Persians and 3,000 hired Greeks,
was betrayed to Alexander’s generals by its citizens, while Mitylene was surrendered by
the Athenian Chares and 2,000 Persians after a brief siege.

Not all Persian-held cities were garrisoned with Greek mercenaries. Arrian does
not specify the ethnicity of the guards at Daseylium (1.17.2), but he does report that
Sardis (1.17.5) and, after Issus, Egypt were garrisoned by Persians (1.17.3-5). Other
cities, such as Phaselis (1.24.5-6), Aspendus (1.25.2-3, 26.5, 27.1-4), Side (1.25.4),
Telmissus (1.27.5), Sagalassus (1.28.2-8) and Tyre (2.16.7), do not seem to have had
garrisons at all, but were defended or surrendered by their own citizens alone. Finally, Arab rather than Greek mercenaries participated in the defense of Gaza (Arrian 2.25.4).

On the whole, the Persians drew upon a variety of soldiers for the garrisoning of
their cities. Only on rare occasions were Greek mercenaries alone entrusted with a city’s
defense, and more often they were hired to supplement local or Persian defenders.
Notably, Greek mercenaries cease to appear once Alexander’s forces moved outside of
typically Greek areas and into regions such as Lydia, Pisidia, and the Levant; instead,
other local groups were hired when necessary, such as the Arabs who fought at Gaza.
Geographical considerations thus ruled the hiring process: Greeks were employed in the
Aegean and near eastern Greek settlements because they were more easily obtained in
those areas, not because they were in any objective sense superior soldiers.

Conclusion

Despite the proclamations of our ancient sources, Greek mercenaries and generals
were not the most dangerous opponents Alexander of Macedon faced in his conquest of
the Achaemenid Empire. Using literary devices such as the tragic advisor and energetic
subordinate, ancient authors have exaggerated the strategic genius and military
ccontributions of Memnon of Rhodes. The significance of Greek mercenary soldiers on
the Persian side at Granicus, Issus, and – to a lesser extent – Gaugamela are similarly
overrated, when in fact the success or failure of Alexander’s endeavors often rested on
the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Persians. Likewise, the military importance
of Greek mercenaries as garrison troops is overstated, particularly at the siege of
Halicarnassus.

There are two reasons for the apparent prominence of Greek mercenaries on the
Persian side during the Macedonian conquest in our sources, neither of which is related to
their superiority, real or perceived, as soldiers and commanders. The first is familiar:
Classical sources, writing for Classical audiences, had a heightened interest in the actions
of Greek mercenaries, especially before Alexander’s primary antagonist, Darius,
personally entered the conflict. As a result, these authors tended to concentrate their
narrative attention on their Greek subjects, in many cases elevating their importance
while omitting the contributions of non-Greek combatants.

The second reason is that the initial stages of Alexander’s campaign took place
along the coast of Asia Minor, in or near Greek inhabited territory. Greeks thus figure
into the Persian defense because Alexander himself proceeded through areas where their
services were easy to procure, whether as mercenaries from nearby areas or as loyal, local
subjects of the King. Had our sources chosen to concentrate instead on Parmenio’s
expedition to the Anatolian interior (Arrian 1.24.3; Diodorus 17.27.6), it is likely that
Greeks would figure far less prominently in the Persian resistance, just as they do once
Alexander progressed beyond western Anatolia and into Pisidia, Cilicia (Issus excepted), and the Levant.

In fact, Alexander faced his fiercest resistance only after Darius’ forces had stopped employing Greeks in significant numbers. Tyre and Gaza resisted Alexander’s sieges longer than either Miletus or Halicarnassus. It was the Persian cavalry at Gaugamela, where at most 4,000 Greeks remained in Achaemenid service, who provided the Macedonians with their stiffest test on the battlefield (Arrian 3.14.4-15.3; Curtius 4.16.1-3). Finally, perhaps the most difficult of all Alexander’s campaigns took place against armies completely devoid of Greeks, such as on his approach to Persepolis (Diodorus 17.68) and in Bactria, where Persian remnants completely annihilated one division of his army (Arrian 4.5-6). The most substantial obstacle to Alexander’s success was the Persian military itself, not its Greek mercenaries.
Chapter 4

A New Paradigm

The first three chapters of this project examined the military value of Greek mercenaries serving in the armies of the fourth century Near East. Nearly all previous scholarship has held that the Persian and Egyptian militaries of this period had come to rely upon these Greek soldiers because of their superior abilities in warfare, particularly as heavy infantry hoplites. Closer inspection revealed that unambiguous evidence for this Greek military superiority is lacking. Greek mercenaries are depicted as superior warriors for literary, not historical, reasons, and there is little justification for believing that Persia and Egypt were dependent upon Greek soldiers or that their own troops were inferior to those of Greece. As a result of my analysis, a new explanation for why so many Greeks were employed by Persian and Egyptian rulers throughout the fourth century is required.

In this and the following chapters, I offer my own hypothesis. I begin here, as I began the first chapter, with the first book of Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, since it is the first large-scale and best documented case of Greek mercenary service in the Near East. I examine the ways in which Cyrus employed his Greek mercenaries, finding that their most important quality, paradoxically, appears to have been their loyalty to him. I then explore the reasons behind this loyalty, building in particular on Gabriel Herman and Matthew Trundle’s earlier examinations of the role played by xenia, or international, ritualized guest-friendship relationships in the recruitment of mercenaries.

I argue that the loyalty of Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries was also guaranteed by political considerations, the importance of which previous scholarship has underestimated. The Greek officers who served in the army of Cyrus were more than
soldiers for sale to the highest bidder. Instead, they were agents of their home poleis, or at least of prominent factions within their home poleis, who sought Cyrus’ patronage in order to enhance their personal and political position in Greece. In exchange, they themselves became agents of Cyrus’ influence in Greece and, when called upon, raised an army of soldiers to aid in his rebellion. Cyrus thus used patron-client xenia relationships to carve out a personal empire or sphere of influence in Greece, the extent of which can be identified by tracing the background and origins of his mercenaries. My analysis here provides an alternative means of understanding the Greek presence in Cyrus’ army and forms the basis of a new model for understanding the role of Greeks serving Near Eastern armies throughout the fourth century.

Loyalty and Cyrus’ Greek Mercenaries

As the first chapter noted, Xenophon spends most of the first book discussing Cyrus’ Greeks, to the exclusion of the rest of Cyrus’ forces. For all of this, Cyrus actually assigns his Greeks only a few tasks, and these are the key to understanding how Cyrus estimated their worth:

1. They fight for Cyrus at Cunaxa (1.8.18-27).
2. They act as bodyguards for Cyrus (1.1.2).
3. They escort the Cilician queen to Tarsus (1.2.20).
4. They stand guard for the trial of Orontas (1.6.4).
5. They garrison a number of cities through Cyrus’ satrapy (1.2.1).

The rationale behind employing Greeks for the first item on this list is rather obvious: Cyrus needed soldiers because his brother had far, far more. According to Xenophon (1.7.10-13), Cyrus had 10,400 hoplites, 2,500 peltasts, 100,000 barbarian troops, and 20 scythed chariots at Cunaxa. Excluding the army of Abrocomas, which
arrived after the battle was concluded, Artaxerxes had 900,000 soldiers and 150 scythed chariots. These numbers, apart from the enumeration of the Greeks, are certainly exaggerated, but two important aspects of Xenophon’s description remain true: Artaxerxes’ army outnumbered Cyrus’, and Cyrus was aware that this would be the case before he began his march, although the unexpectedly slow pace of his advance probably caused him to underestimate the degree to which Artaxerxes would be prepared.¹

In the course of planning his rebellion, Cyrus would naturally have looked to procure troops wherever possible in order to diminish the numerical superiority of his enemy. The more troops he had, the longer his battle line could be, and the better his chances at avoiding the inevitable attempt the King would make to outflank him (1.8.23). Since Artaxerxes II had deprived him of control over Caria and Hellespontine Phrygia in 404, he was forced to rely solely upon the soldiers he could raise in Lydia and through his connections in the Greek world. The inclusion of Greeks in his army was thus important in simple numerical terms and, in this respect, the Greeks provided him with much needed bodies, although not enough in the end.²

The rationale behind the second through fifth items on the above list is perhaps more surprising, since the assignment of these tasks seems to suggest that Cyrus valued the loyalty of his Greek mercenaries over that of his own Persian soldiers. In spite of this,

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² As my reconstruction of Cunaxa in Chapter One demonstrated, the Greeks neither played a particularly important role in the battle itself nor did Cyrus intend it otherwise. Although the far right side of a hoplite battle line in Greece connoted a position of honor, Xenophon himself points out that it was customary for Persian kings to hold the center of their own lines (Anabasis 1.8.21-22). By arranging the Greeks on his right flank, Cyrus knowingly positioned them furthest away from the King’s position, ensuring that the outcome would be decided in a struggle between his own and the King’s Persians.
scholars have long questioned the loyalties of Cyrus’ Greek soldiers. As Briant has noted, Cyrus was forced to deceive his Greeks about the ultimate objective of his expedition in order to retain their services (1.3.20-21); once he confessed that his intention was to march against the King, he then had to increase their pay and promise great rewards to keep their service (1.4.11-13). The presence of the army’s market in the barbarian camp (1.5.6), Briant adds, was another tool used to keep his Greeks in line, since they would be hard pressed to supply themselves without a market in the event that they left Cyrus’ army. Nonetheless, he still suffered the desertions of Xenias and Pasion (1.4.7), even though Cyrus held their wives as hostages at Tralles (1.4.8).

Yet whatever problems he had with his Greeks, the threat of disloyalty from Persians and other Achaemenid subjects posed a far greater danger to Cyrus. Not only did Cyrus execute two of his inner circle, Orontas and Megaphernes, along with some of the latter’s followers (1.2.20; 1.6.11), but he also failed to win the loyalty of several other high ranking imperial officials and subjects. Tissaphernes, despite initially being a member of Cyrus’ entourage, twice betrays him (1.1.3; 1.2.4-5). Other important Persians such as Pharnabazus and Tiribazus are absent from Cyrus’ entourage. Xenophon’s comment on the burning of the palace of Belesys demonstrates that the governor of Syria likewise sided with the King (1.4.10). No doubt Cyrus failed in his attempt to persuade Abrocomas to join him with his army in Phoenicia, although his tardiness for the battle...

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3 Already in 1920, Bonner argued that Xenophon’s account minimizes or even excludes evidence of Greek desertion Bonner. See also Briant 2002: 622-624.
4 Bassett 2002 demonstrates the Greeks’ dependence on the market provided by Tissaphernes following Cunaxa; it is reasonable to think that Cyrus, had he wished, could have used his own market similarly to control the Greeks. See also fn. 8 below, however.
5 The plundering of Lycaonia (1.2.19) and of Tarsus (1.2.26) before the syennesis of Cilicia agreed to terms with Cyrus suggests that pillaging and plundering was Cyrus’ response when local rulers or peoples did not acquiesce to him.
may suggest that Abrocomas did not choose the King, either, and was merely waiting to submit to whoever was the victor at Cunaxa. Even the allegiance of the syennesis of Cilicia was tenuous, forced by the arrival of Cyrus and Sparta’s combined fleet behind his own lines (1.2.21-27). Xenophon repeatedly asserts that Cyrus inspired great loyalty in his followers, and insists that, while few deserted to the King, many joined his own army (1.9.29). However, there is only one specific example of a desertion from the King in the Anabasis, namely the 400 Greeks from Abrocomas’ army (1.4.3).

There is an important distinction in the nature of the threat Cyrus faced from potential Greek and Asian desertions. On the one hand, the Persians who do not side with Cyrus tend to side with Artaxerxes, and the Persian nobles that Cyrus executes are convicted of treason by virtue of their suspected plans to aid the King (1.2.20; 1.6.1-4). Xenias and Pasion, on the other hand, set sail for Greece (1.4.7). No doubt the loss of these two commanders and whoever else followed them was a blow to Cyrus, but not nearly so much as if they had instead joined the King. Cyrus may have held their families as hostages, but this was probably not the case for the other Greek commanders. Xenias was in command of Cyrus’ mercenary garrisons (1.2.1), and Pasion had been in charge of Cyrus’ siege at Miletus (1.2.3). Unlike most of the officers, these two had been working in Ionia for some time and had reason to have their families there.

The Greek refusal to march from Tarsus is not predicated on suspicions that they would be marching against the King per se, but that they were not hired for such a

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6 Examples and anecdotes provided by Xenophon in order to demonstrate Cyrus’ charismatic leadership may be found at 1.1.5; 1.1.6-7; 1.2.2; 1.2.11-12; 1.3.12; 1.4.9; 1.5.8; 1.7.5-8; 1.8.28-29; 1.9.1-31.
dangerous mission and were not being compensated accordingly (1.3.1).\textsuperscript{7} The debate at Tarsus is framed with two options: whether they should continue on with Cyrus or march home (1.3.3-20). When Cyrus does reveal his intentions, the Greeks are placated with promises of higher pay and bonuses (1.4.11-13). There is never any statement or implication that they might join forces with the King until after Cyrus is dead.

Regarding the location of the market, we may, as Briant suggests, interpret its maintenance in the barbarian army as a sign that Cyrus did not trust the Greeks to stay with him, but this is not the only explanation. It is possible that the Greeks, being on service in foreign lands, simply did not bring along their own market. It is also likely that the market was provided by Cyrus to all of his soldiers, and in this case it would be more odd had the market been among the Greeks.\textsuperscript{8} It is relevant to keep in mind that, although Xenophon treats the barbarian army as one undifferentiated mass (1.2.1), it is far more likely that the rest of Cyrus’ army was also divided along ethnic lines, and that within the barbarian army were any number of separate contingents who would also have had no market of their own.\textsuperscript{9}

In spite of some defections, then, the Greek contingent in Cyrus’ army was easily his most loyal and were least likely to desert to the King’s side. This is why Greeks were

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\textsuperscript{7} See Roy 1976: 312-315 for discussion of how the Greeks renegotiated their compensation from Cyrus as the mission’s geographic and political terms changed in the course of the march.

\textsuperscript{8} Griffith 1935: 264-268 rightly notes that, although a market was present in the army, Cyrus also would have provided rations to the Greeks while they were on the march. The placement of the market in the barbarian army as a tool of enforcing compliance was not necessary, since Cyrus was already in control of the Greeks’ money and food. See also Trundle 2004: 80-103.

\textsuperscript{9} Note the Paphlagonian horsemen placed to the Greek right at Cunaxa (1.8.5), as well as the reference to the “Lydian” market in the “barbarian” army (1.5.6). Remember also the ethnic divisions in Xerxes’ earlier army reported by Herodotus (7.60-99).
chosen to escort the queen of Cilicia home (1.2.20): they had little cause to use this as a chance to desert or to take her to the King as a hostage. Their lack of connections with Orontas was also the critical factor in their selection as guards for the traitor’s trial, as it is clear from the text that Orontas had a number of supporters and clients in Cyrus’ barbarian army (1.6.4-10).

Similar reasons were also behind Cyrus’ choice to bring three hundred Greek soldiers with him to Susa in 405, where he must have suspected that his life would be in danger should Darius II die and anoint Artaxerxes instead of Cyrus, as indeed occurred (1.1.2-3). Notably, it was during this excursion that Tissaphernes, traveling in his entourage, betrayed Cyrus for the first time. In this situation, it must have been of the highest importance to have bodyguards outside the sphere of Artaxerxes’ influence and loyal only to Cyrus himself. The Greeks he brought could fill this role better than any soldier who was also a subject of the Achaemenid Empire and who therefore would have had competing loyalties to other members of the Persian nobility. Such considerations no doubt went into his selection of Greeks for the task of garrisoning his strongholds while his army was on the march (1.2.1).

Having a contingent of loyal Greeks in his army served as a means by which Cyrus was able to keep his other, less reliable soldiers in line. In this respect, the quote attributed to Cyrus by Xenophon may not have been far off from the truth: “for once let ill fortune overtake us, and all these barbarians whom you see will be more hostile to us than are those who stand with the King” (1.5.16). This is also why Cyrus’ deception about the objective of his campaign was probably directed more at his own Asian forces than the Greeks. When the Greeks suspected it at Tarsus and later learned of it for certain,
Cyrus simply paid (1.3.21) or promised to pay (1.4.13) them more to earn their compliance. To openly muster his own conscripts for rebellion, however, would not only have tipped off the King earlier than necessary, but also would have made the actual collection of soldiers far more difficult. It is one thing to summon subjects for a raid against the Pisidians, but quite another to do so for a rebellion against the King. Once these troops had been collected, however, the distance from home and the presence of a large, reliable group of Greek soldiers was enough to keep most of them from deserting.

Cyrus’ Greeks played an essential role in his rebellion because of their loyalty rather than any purportedly superior military abilities. Still, it is important to note that they were most valuable to Cyrus as outsiders. Cyrus’ royal pretensions required that he act the part of an Achaemenid king, which meant that his royal retinue had to be stocked with members of the Persian nobility.\(^\text{10}\) This is why Clearchus is only selectively invited to participate in his inner circle,\(^\text{11}\) why Cyrus consults separately with the Greeks instead of inviting them to join him with his other generals (1.7.1-4), and why Cyrus goes into battle with his own Persian retainers rather than placing himself in line with the Greeks (1.8.21-23). The Greeks were recruited to ensure that Cyrus made it to Cunaxa; once there, it was up to his elite Persian cavalry to win him the throne.

**Greek Clients and Persian Rebels**

It is apparent that Cyrus considered his Greeks to be the most trustworthy soldiers in his army, but it is not immediately clear why this was the case. According to

\(^{10}\) Briant 2002: 621-623.

\(^{11}\) Clearchus participates in the trial of Orontas, but Xenophon makes no remarks about his participation in Cyrus’ inner circle on other occasions.
conventional wisdom, mercenaries remain loyal only so long as another, higher bidder for their services cannot not be found.\(^{12}\) In Cyrus’ case the King could certainly have offered a higher rate of pay if he desired, and so it should have followed that Cyrus was suspicious of betrayal by his Greeks. Yet, as we have seen above, before his death the Greeks never consider leaving Cyrus for the King, and they certainly do not suggest that he might pay more if they did. While promises of increased pay factor into the Greeks’ decision to remain with Cyrus, Cyrus was still often pressed for money and behind in his payments to the troops. It is true that desertion meant the loss of any prospects of pay, but the rebel prince also offered estates and other politically powerful positions to his Greek followers (1.7.6-8). This itself suggests that the relationship between Cyrus and the Greeks was held together by more than mere financial bonds.

Indeed, although some ancient sources stressed that disloyalty was one of the drawbacks of hiring mercenary soldiers,\(^{13}\) Trundle notes that in the ancient world mercenaries were remarkably reliable so long as their employer was viewed as able to pay and competent in the field.\(^{14}\) Even more important was the personal relationship between the employer and the employee which, as Herman originally pointed out and Trundle elaborated upon, was founded upon the bonds of a specific form of ritualized friendship, namely *xenia*.\(^{15}\)

Herman defines ritualized friendship as “a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social

\(^{12}\) See Trundle 2004: 21-27 for discussion of modern and ancient definitions and perceptions of mercenaries.
\(^{13}\) See, for example, Demosthenes *First Philippic* 24, Isocrates *To Archidemus* 9 and *To Philip* 19.
\(^{14}\) Trundle 2004: 30-39, 146-147.
\(^{15}\) Herman 1987: 97-105; Trundle 2004: 159-163.
units”, adding that “transactions of ritualised friendship were supposed to be carried out in a non-mercantile spirit; from the point of view of the partners, they appeared not as an end in itself but as a means for creating moral obligation”.\(^\text{16}\) Xenia differed from other relationships with similar functions, particularly philia (“friendship”), in that each xenos necessarily came from a different socio-political unit which, in the fourth century, was identified with the polis or ethnos. Thus Athenians and Thebans could be xenoi, but two Athenians, one from Eleusis and one from Acharnae, would be philoi.\(^\text{17}\)

Xenia relationships were formalized by a ritual initiation process involving, according to Herman, “a declaration, an exchange of objects, feasting, and, again, the taking of oaths”.\(^\text{18}\) Once two individuals underwent this ritual, they were bound to one another according to established obligations and commitments not unlike those of kinship; in a way, becoming xenoi was like marrying into a foreign friend’s family.

It is therefore significant that Xenophon introduces several of Cyrus’ Greek officers as his xenoi. Proxeneus, Sophronetus, and Socrates are identified in this way (1.1.11), as is Aristippus, who provided Cyrus with Menon and his detachment (1.1.10). Although Clearchus is not initially described as a xenos of Cyrus (1.1.9), this becomes apparent later (1.3.3). Xenias and Pasion are not introduced as xenoi, either, but it is likely that both were, since each had served Cyrus for some time: the former was the commander of Cyrus’ mercenary garrison troops (1.2.1) and had accompanied Cyrus to the deathbed of Darius II before (1.1.2), and the latter was involved with the siege at Miletus before Cyrus summoned him to Sardis (1.2.3). In Herman’s estimation, all of

\(^{16}\) Herman 1987: 10.
\(^{18}\) Herman 1987: 59.
Cyrus’ officers were most likely his *xenoi*, even if Xenophon does not refer to them as such.\(^\text{19}\)

Consequently, the relationship between Cyrus and his Greek officers was far stronger than that of mere employer to employee. All of his Greek commanders were deeply in his debt: for example, as part of his own *xenia* obligations, Cyrus had given large sums of money to Clearchus, Aristippus, and Proxenus in order to advance their own political careers. In order to repay their debts, each brought or sent to Cyrus a large number of soldiers at his request in 401. Since their own positions depended upon the continuation of *xenia* with Cyrus, each was wholly committed to the success of his campaign.

The degree to which Cyrus’ Greek officers in particular were loyal to him is evident throughout the text, particularly in the episode at Tarsus. Xenophon makes it clear here that it is the soldiers (*stratiotaï*), not the officers (*strategoi* and *logachoi*), who refused to go on with the campaign, suspecting Cyrus has lied to them about his objective. Those officers that do appear in the narrative here all work to convince the soldiers to continue on. Among these, Clearchus is most prominent. He first tries to force the soldiers to continue (1.3.2). When that tactic does not work, he goes to great lengths to manipulate them into proceeding (1.3.3-21), showing all along that his true loyalty is to Cyrus, not his soldiers. Even the eventual deserters, Xenias and Pasion, must have supported Cyrus here, since the given reason for their soldiers going over to Clearchus is his disingenuous statement that he would not march with Cyrus on the King (1.3.7; 1.4.7).

\(^\text{19}\) Herman 1987: 98-100.
We do not know how the other Greek officers acted at Tarsus, but later, when Cyrus revealed that he did intend to march against the King, the *strategoi* do not object. Instead, they play a critical role in persuading the soldiers to accept more pay in exchange for their continued service (1.4.11-13). Xenophon tells us how Menon in particular managed to convince his soldiers to remain with Cyrus (1.4.13-17). He urged them to cross the Euphrates before the full Greek army had taken their vote, demonstrating to Cyrus their loyalty in the hope of future rewards from him. In this way he not only won his own soldiers completely over to Cyrus’ cause, but also helped convince the rest of the Greek army to continue by influencing the vote with their clear display of support (1.4.14-15).

One reason Cyrus’ Greek officers were able to convince their Greek soldiers to continue on under Cyrus is that, like the relationship between Cyrus and his commanders, the officers had used their own *xenia* and *philia* connections in Greece to recruit these troops. This is reflected in the fact that, once they joined Cyrus, each Greek officer retained control over the soldiers he had personally brought and recruited. Furthermore, when the Greek generals were arrested and killed, they were replaced by their own lieutenants, who were either their *philoi* or, in the case of Xenophon to Proxenus, *xenoi*.20

With respect to his Greeks, Cyrus stood at the top of vast hierarchy of patron-client relationships: through the mechanism of *xenia*, he patronized his *strategoi*, who were in turned indebted to him for advancements made in their career; in turn, these men used Cyrus’ gifts to patronize their own *xenoi* and *philoi* clients, the *logachoi*, who, in

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20 For detailed discussion of the command dynamics of the Cyrean force, see Roy 1967.
exchange for this patronage, used their connections elsewhere to recruit soldiers.  

While Cyrus had no direct relationship with most of his Greek soldiers, each Greek on his campaign was part of a chain of commitments and obligations that ended with Cyrus.

Similar to his Greek strategoi, Cyrus’ Persian officials were bound by the terms of personal, ritualized friendships with the prince; unlike his Greek strategoi, however, many these Persian officials were also philoi of Artaxerxes II who, like all Persian kings, reinforced his position atop the socio-political hierarchy through ritualized gift-exchange. As Mitchell describes it, the “King stood at the centre of this matrix of gift and counter-gift, and the function of the gifts was to fix the King in his position of regal superiority…the King always took care to pay his own debts and to give a gift in return that was of greater value than the gift given, thus putting the giver in a state of debt to the King”.  

In the Anabasis, Xenophon makes it clear that Cyrus went to great lengths to win the loyalty of the King’s subjects. He writes that Cyrus prepared for his rebellion by wooing visitors from the King, treating “them all in such a way that when he sent them back they were more devoted to him than to the King” (πάντας οὕτω διατιθεὶς ἀπεπέμπετο ὡστε αὐτῷ μᾶλλον φίλους εἶναι ἢ βασιλέι 1.1.5). In his obituary to Cyrus, Xenophon specifies this treatment further, citing as proof of his worthiness to be King the notion that he not only received more gifts than any man alive, but also that he gave more and better gifts than anyone else (1.9.20-28), a notion which he further connects to the superior loyalty the rebel prince supposedly inspired in his followers (1.9.29-31). Using

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22 Mitchell 1997: 113. For the Persian gift-giving economy and its impact in the Greek world, see Lewis 1989.
the gift-giving mechanism of *philia*, Cyrus sought to make it so that prominent Persians were more indebted to him than to Artaxerxes, in the process usurping the King’s place at the top of the Persian socio-political hierarchy.

Despite these efforts, Cyrus was not entirely successful. Although he brought Tissaphernes to Darius II’s deathbed as a *philos* (1.1.2), he was nevertheless betrayed by him at the accession of Artaxerxes II (1.1.3). As a result of this betrayal, Cyrus was nearly executed and, even when he was allowed to live and continue as satrap of Lydia, was demoted from his supreme command in the Persian West. Tissaphernes, by contrast, was rewarded by Cyrus’ demotion: he remained as satrap of Caria, but was now Cyrus’ equal in status rather than his subordinate.\(^{23}\) This was the danger of attempting to turn high-ranking Persians against the King: such men also had pre-existing *philia* with Artaxerxes, who was able, as King, to confer upon them greater benefits than could Cyrus. It is true that, in the event Cyrus became King himself, those who had chosen fidelity to him over Artaxerxes would have been rewarded most handsomely. Betting on this prospect, however, was a gamble with very long odds, as the King’s overwhelming victory at Cunaxa demonstrated.

As the example of Tissaphernes shows, Cyrus could never be certain that his subordinates would remain loyal to him over the King. After establishing *xenia* through the exchange of vows and gifts with the client-king of Cilicia, this new subordinate remained at least partially faithful to the King, secretly sending one of his sons to Artaxerxes as a sign that his fealty to Cyrus was made under duress (Diodorus 14.20.3). Similarly, Cyrus was not able to trust members of his own entourage: as the previous

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\(^{23}\) See Ruzicka 1985 for discussion of Tissaphernes’ relationship with Cyrus from 407-401.
section related, the rebel prince was compelled to put three high ranking subordinates to death when they, at separate times, were caught attempting to betray him to the King (1.2.20, 6.1-11). The tenuous loyalty of Cyrus’ Anatolian levies is further revealed by the fact that one of these traitors, Orontas, continued to receive obeisance from his own client soldiers even after he had been convicted of plotting against Cyrus (1.6.10).

The loyalty Cyrus’ Greek officers and soldiers displayed on the march to Cunaxa is thus explained by the network of personal xenia relationships the rebel prince had established with his Greek strategoi, and in turn with the close relationships his strategoi had created with their own subordinates. Cyrus’ efforts to build similarly strong bonds with his Persian entourage were undermined by their own connections with the King and his court. These Persians were left with a choice that Cyrus’ Greek clients did not face: namely, to remain loyal to the King, or to accept Cyrus as their ultimate patron and become rebels. While Cyrus was successful with many Persian officials and was able to win them over through his own charisma and benefactions, others, such as Orontas and Megaphernes, only feigned loyalty and awaited an opportunity to betray the prince. As a result, Cyrus chose to rely upon outsiders for sensitive duties: on the march to Cunaxa, this meant assigning Greeks to guard and escort duty, while another foreigner, the Egyptian Tamos, commanded his fleet (1.2.21). Unlike his Persian subordinates, these individuals lacked the means and the motivation to betray Cyrus, since they did not have their own personal connections to the King and his court and, as outsiders, were not rebels forsaking their obligations to the King by participating on the expedition.
Cyrus’ Greek Mercenaries as Political Agents

In addition to their personal *xenia* ties to Cyrus, the loyalty of his Greek commanders was also ensured by political connections between their home *poleis* and Cyrus. This is most evident in the fact that nearly all of the officers came from states which had allied with Cyrus against Athens during the Peloponnesian War.\(^{24}\) The Spartan connection in this regard is strongest, particularly among Cyrus’ officers. Not only is Clearchus Cyrus’ most trusted Greek commander, but he is also joined by another Spartiate exile, Dracontius, and two officers sent directly by the Spartan state, Cheirisophus (1.4.3) and Neon (5.3.4).

Roy argues that “the apparent importance of Spartans on the anabasis is accidental” and Xenophon, too, downplays Sparta’s official support for Cyrus in the *Anabasis*, never explicitly making mention of it.\(^{25}\) Still, there is a strong case to be made for official Spartan support of Cyrus’ rebellion, about which Xenophon is more open in his *Hellenica* (3.1.1-2). Plutarch (*Artaxerxes* 6) and Diodorus (14.19.2-9) also make revealing statements about the support Cyrus received from Sparta. Even in the *Anabasis*, we can see how Sparta offered both direct and indirect aid to Cyrus. The former is clearly revealed by the Spartan fleet’s joint maneuvers with Cyrus’ fleet and from the addition of 700 hoplites under the Spartan officer Cheirisophus at the same time (1.4.2-3), the arrival of which could not have happened without planning and preparation in advance between Cyrus and Sparta. The latter is implied by the pride of position in Cyrus’ retinue given to Clearchus (1.6.5). While Clearchus was an exile from Sparta, he nonetheless must have

\(^{24}\) Roy 1971, for instance, notes the preponderance of Arcadian soldiers and officers in particular.

\(^{25}\) Roy 1967: 308.
retained connections with his home *polis* and enjoyed support from certain factions. His position, furthermore, might be compared to that of Alcibiades in the court of Tissaphernes during the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 8.47-48). By working on Sparta’s behalf for Cyrus, Clearchus would have been in an enviable and powerful position had Cyrus succeeded, a position beneficial both to himself and to Sparta as well, and one which could have led to his restoration at home, should he have desired it, or, more likely, a powerful position in Cyrus’ own government.

Clearchus’ status as an exile, in fact, made him a more than suitable agent for Sparta, which stood to lose its close relationship to Achaemenid Empire in the event of Cyrus’ failure. After the decisive aid Sparta received from Cyrus in the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War, it would have been impossible for Sparta to avoid siding with and providing aid to Cyrus in his rebellion. By working through an exile and minimizing its official support for Cyrus, the Spartan state could attempt to hedge its bets on the outcome of the civil war. A victory for Cyrus would thus come at the cost of increased influence for Clearchus, yet overall would still place Sparta in a privileged position with the new King. In defeat, Sparta retained the ability to disown Clearchus further and deny its own involvement in the rebellion. Events in the Aegean following Cunaxa show that this strategy was not particularly successful, but Sparta’s lack of involvement with the Cyrean remnants upon their return to the Greek world until open war with Persia was declared in 399 is a sign that it was pursued (7.6.1).

The two other most important *strategoi* in the army, Proxenus and Menon, also come from areas with direct political connections to Cyrus. Menon serves as an agent for

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26 Plutarch *Artaxerxes* 6 even asserts that Clearchus was ordered by the Spartan state to assist Cyrus.
Aristippus the Thessalian (2.6.28), who, acting as a client of Cyrus in Thessaly, received financial support from Cyrus in order to raise mercenaries and pursue power locally (1.1.10). Proxenus arrives from Boeotia, Xenophon tells us, in search of wealth, fame, and power. He was already a xenos of Cyrus as well as with “the foremost men of his day”, reflecting the close ties the aristocracy in Boeotia had with Cyrus in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. Like Aristippus and Menon, he hoped to use his status as a client of Cyrus in order to become more influential in Boeotian politics (2.6.17).

Xenophon informs us that the other important officers, among them strategoi and lochagoi, came largely from the following territories: Arcadia, Achaea, Megara, Amphipolis, Syracuse, and Locris. Similar provenances are given for those non-officers mentioned in the text. These polities, by and large, shared close political connections with Sparta and, therefore, Cyrus in the latter years of the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath. Cyrus’ preference for soldiers from the Peloponnes (1.1.6), and the fact that most of his rank and file troops appear to have come from Arcadia and Achaea, further support this notion. Particularly relevant here is the reason Xenophon provides for Cyrus’ order to seek out Peloponnesians, namely he gave the order “on the plea that Tissaphernes had designs upon their cities” (1.1.6). This strongly hints at a close relationship and even overlap between the Spartan-supported oligarchies in Ionia and Cyrus’ own control over them.

As for the Athenian officers such as Xenophon, they likely came from the Athenian aristocracy and, as Roy remarks, likely “did not care for the restored

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democracy” in Athens. Like the other Greeks in Cyrus’ army, these men could have had reasonable hopes of gaining significant influence at home should Cyrus have gained the throne. Such arrangements are most prominently displayed in Cyrus’ relationship with the Milesian exiles, whom he took on as clients in an effort to restore them, as well as his own influence, to their home polis (1.1.7).

It is important to stress that the xenia relationships Cyrus had established with the various Greek states and individuals were not those between co-equal allies, but rather between patron and clients. He had provided the financial and political support to locally or regionally empower a number of Greek states and individuals, and as a result ensured that, when the time came, they owed him support in his war against the King. From his perspective he was not hiring mercenaries, but calling upon subordinates to raise soldiers for him.

How and where these clients raised their Greek contingents did not matter to Cyrus. For Sparta, supplying Cyrus with citizen-soldiers in the numbers he needed was not feasible. They were required in Greece and their presence in such quantities would have openly declared Spartan support for the rebel in a way that was not politically expedient. The Thessalian Aristippus, too, likely could not afford to provide a citizen-soldier levy, since his authority seems to have been founded upon the mercenaries he had raised with Cyrus’ money (1.1.10). Citizen-soldiers, who had responsibilities in their home poleis, were generally not well suited for the task of a long campaign abroad, as

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29 Roy 1967: 308.
30 On the hierarchical nature of most Persian relationships and the problems this caused for their Greek xenoi, see Mitchell 1997: 111-133.
events in the later Corinthian War would come to demonstrate.\textsuperscript{31} Each of the leaders and polities that Cyrus called upon for help, however, had the proper social and political connections to raise mercenary soldiers to fill their obligations, particularly since Cyrus himself would be financing their service in his army.

The political nature of the Greek relationship with Cyrus was also recognized by Artaxerxes, which explains his refusal to hire them himself after the death of Cyrus. This refusal of their offer of service is often seen as myopic, driven by emotion rather than reason.\textsuperscript{32} I would argue, however, that it was made in recognition of the fact that these Greeks were not mere mercenaries, but instead former allies of Cyrus from outside the Empire: from his perspective, to hire them would be to forgive Sparta and its allies for their support of Cyrus. Given the King’s attitude and policy toward Sparta in the years after the rebellion, this was obviously not what he desired.\textsuperscript{33} Cyrus’ Asian soldiers and their commanders, however, could be and were pardoned for their part in the rebellion, since Artaxerxes had a vested interest in reintegrating his rebel subjects so as to reestablish control over his imperial holdings in the west. The very outsider status that

\textsuperscript{31} Parke 1933: 49-54.

\textsuperscript{32} Following Plutarch Artaxerxes 22, Westlake 1986: 421 cites Artaxerxes II’s “obsessive detestation of the Spartans.” Accepting the testimony of Diodorus 14.26.5, Bassett 2002: 452, 456-457 likewise assumes that Artaxerxes’ anger with the Greeks precluded any possibility of their employment against Egypt. Parke 1933: 32 merely views his decision as unwise, implying that the King did not recognize the quality of the Greek soldiers. Briant 2002: 634 asks, “Did the Great King fear that mercenaries could be used by an ambitious man, as Cyrus had done?” Ruzicka 2012: 39 views the decision as a consequence of timing: he argues that Artaxerxes decided to secure his own position as King, considering Cyrus’ purported support in Persian noble circles, before launching the invasion of Egypt for which Clearchus offered the services of the Greeks. As I argued above, however, Xenophon greatly exaggerates the extent to which Cyrus was able to win support among the Persian nobility.

\textsuperscript{33} See Cawkwell 2005: 161-169, who explains the King’s reticence to make peace with Sparta in 392/391 as the result of his continuing resentment of Sparta’s support for Cyrus in 401.
had made the Greeks so important to Cyrus left them vulnerable and bereft of friends and allies once their patron was killed.

**Patron of Greece**

On his campaign against Artaxerxes, Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries proved to be his most reliably loyal soldiers. This loyalty was ensured by the personal *xenia* relationships Cyrus had established with the Greek *strategoi* in his army and, by proxy, with leading citizens in their home *poleis*. Does it follow, then, that Cyrus had the foresight to build his network of *xenoi* for just this purpose, so that he would have a strong, loyal force of soldiers from the Greek world available to him during his coming rebellion?

I will argue otherwise. From the moment of his arrival in western Anatolia in 407, the immediate purpose of Cyrus’ patronage network does not, in fact, seem to have been the recruitment of Greek mercenaries. Instead, it was to spread his own influence, taking advantage of his status as a satrap and representative of the King to build his own personal empire throughout Greece and the Aegean. In turn, he sought to use this as leverage against his brother, the future Artaxerxes II, in order to win the throne for himself. The ability to recruit an army of 13,000 loyal Greek soldiers in 401 was thus not the purpose of Cyrus’ foreign policy, but rather an indication of its near-complete success.

Although his ambitions may have aimed higher, Cyrus was not the first Persian satrap who attempted to expand Persian – and, by extension, his own – influence to the

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34 Notably, recent research has suggested that Spartan control of the Peloponnesian League throughout the fifth and fourth centuries relied similarly upon *xenia* relationships with leading figures in dependent *poleis*. See Hodkinson 2000: 335-353.
west through the personal patronage of prominent Greek citizens. In the aftermath of
Cambyses’ death in 521, the Lydian satrap Oroetes consolidated his own rule through the
assassinations of Mitrobates (Herodotus 3.126), satrap in Dascylium, and Polycrates, the
tyrant of Samos (3.125), whom he replaced with his own client, Maeandrius.35
Maeandrius only held power so long as Oroetes did; as soon as his patron was executed
for insubordination by Darius, his replacement, Otanes, installed a new tyrant on Samos,
Syloson, who was already a client of himself and Darius (3.140-149). In a similar way
Artaphernes, the satrap of Sardis, and Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, failed in their
attempts to gain favor with Darius and to expand their own personal influence in the
Aegean by returning to power several Naxian exiles (5.30-34).

The emergence of the Delian League and Athenian Empire curtailed, but did not
completely prohibit, similar Persian efforts following the Greco-Persian Wars. In the
470s, Pausanias appears to have become a Persian agent (Thucydides 1.128-135); in the
450s, Artaxerxes offered Sparta support in exchange for an invasion of Attica after
Athens had begun to aid the revolt of Inarus in Egypt (1.109); in the 440s, Pissuthnes,
satrap of Lydia, sponsored an aristocratic rebellion against Athens on Samos (1.115-
117),36 finally, the Persians and Spartans were often in contact during the early stages of

35 Admittedly, Herodotus does not identify Maeandrius as the client of Oroetes. However,
it is noteworthy that Maeandrius, whom Polycrates had sent as his ambassador in order to
inspect the satrap’s treasury in advance of the tyrant’s own journey to Asia (3.123),
succeeded Polycrates (3.142). In my view, then, Maeandrius was party to Oroetes’
conspiracy against Polycrates, exchanging Samian independence for his own political
advancement. This reconstruction matches the pattern of the typical relationship between
Persian rulers and Greek tyrants, established by Austin 1990.
36 In a similar vein, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the revolt on Naxos in
470/467 had the support of Persia, particularly in light of the gathering Achaemenid
forces which were defeated by Cimon at Eurymedon ca. 468 (1.98-100).
the Peloponnesian War (2.67; 3.31-34; 4.50), although little came of it before the failure of the Athenian expedition against Syracuse.

Cyrus was also not the first Persian official to attempt to leverage his connections in Greece against rival Persians, particularly by raising a Greek army to support open conflict against other satraps. The satrap of Syria, Megabyzus, reportedly employed Greek mercenaries during his revolt in the 440s (Ctesias F14.39-40). There are a few reasons to believe that these mercenaries were actually allied soldiers provided by Athens.\(^{37}\) Likewise, Athenian soldiers campaigned on behalf of Pissuthnes, and perhaps even his son Amorges, during his rebellion against Darius II during the Peloponnesian War (Ctesias F15.53; Thucydides 8.5).\(^{38}\)

In this respect, the budding rivalry between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes prior to Cyrus’ arrival in the West is most instructive. Rather than working together to aid Sparta upon the King’s decision to enter the Peloponnesian War openly against Athens in 411, each satrap sought to gain influence for himself by making a personal alliance with Sparta (Thucydides 8.6). Tissaphernes gained the upper hand thanks to his previously established connections with disaffected Athenian allies in Chios. As a result of his

\(^{37}\) Megabyzus had close interaction with Athenians on at least two previous occasions, having commanded the Persian campaigns in Egypt and on Cyprus in the 450s (Thucydides 1.109-110; Diodorus 11.74.6; 12.3), and he may have played an important role in the negotiating the controversial Peace of Callias (Diodorus 12.4.4-5). Further indication that the satrap had established a strong relationship with Athens in particular is the fact that, upon Megabyzus’ death, his son Zopyrus went into exile at Athens and later even participated on an Athenian expedition against Caunus (Ctesias F14.45).

\(^{38}\) Although both Megabyzus and Pissuthnes are described by ancient and modern sources as rebels, neither seems to have sought to overthrow the King. Instead, they appear to fight local conflicts with other satraps with varying degrees of success: Megabyzus ultimately made peace with and was pardoned by Artaxerxes, while Pissuthnes found his own position usurped by Tissaphernes, who then used his own Greek allies to capture Amorges (Thucydides 8.28).
alliance with Sparta, Tissaphernes was able to campaign with the Spartans himself and use their fleet to campaign against the enemies, Athenian and otherwise (8.28), in his own satrapy. This left Pharnabazus in a vastly inferior position to his rival: not only was he unable to leverage Spartan support against Athenian interests in his own sphere of influence, but he was denied a role in negotiations between the King and Sparta, as Tissaphernes gained influence by becoming the King’s liaison.39

Later, however, when the Spartans became dissatisfied with the level of support Tissaphernes provided, they turned to Pharnabazus (8.99). This change of course caused Tissaphernes anxiety, since it threatened his own position not only with Sparta, but also with the King himself (8.109). For some time after this, both satraps campaigned alongside Spartan forces against Athens (Xenophon Hellenica 1.1-3), but Alcibiades’ decisive victory over the Spartans at Calchedon gave Pharnabazus the excuse he needed to make overtures to the King on behalf of the Athenians (1.3.1-14). Specifically, he agreed to conduct Athenian ambassadors to Susa for the purpose of negotiations with Darius II; had those succeeded, Pharnabazus would then have been in position to manage the King’s relationship with Athens to his own benefit.

Cyrus’ arrival in Anatolia prevented the Athenian ambassadors from ever reaching the King (1.4.1-7). The appointment of Cyrus clearly signaled a change in the seriousness of the King’s stance toward Greece. By placing his son as supreme commander in the West and providing him with a larger war chest, the King demonstrated his commitment to undermining Athens. We hear little of Tissaphernes and

39 This is evidenced by the treaty agreements made between Sparta and Persia, each of which included Tissaphernes, but only the last of which included Pharnabazus, and even then only as one of the “sons of Pharnaces” (Thucydides 8.18, 37, 58).
Pharnabazus after Cyrus’ arrival, probably because his station and the King’s new policy reduced their ability to act independently: whereas before the King’s general directive to support Sparta had allowed them to vie with one another for influence, the new policy denied them this opportunity, since it placed Cyrus in supreme command of Achaemenid cooperation with Sparta (1.4.3).

Cyrus thus set about undermining Athens, building his own personal authority as the King’s agent in the western periphery. He managed this primarily through the patronage of Lysander (1.5.1-15), refusing to collaborate with Lysander’s successor, Callicratidas (1.6.1-8), with the result that he extended his own influence within Sparta – by enabling the prominence of his own client, Lysander – while also waging war on the Athenians (2.1.6-7). If we are to believe Plutarch’s suggestion that Cyrus had a plausible prospect of being named Darius II’s successor (Artaxerxes 2.2-3), the purpose of his activity in the west is clear: he intended to prove himself worthy of kingship through the conquest of the Athenian Empire, enabling his own client state, Sparta, to become hegemon of Greece and the Aegean.40

Officially, the Spartans – and Lysander in particular – were clients of the King. The Spartans did not, however, negotiate or collaborate with the King, but with Cyrus. In reality, then, they were xenoi of Cyrus, who personally funded their war effort and ensured that his preferred vassal, Lysander, was in charge of the Spartan navy.

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40 According to Diodorus 14.11.2, Cyrus planned his revolt in advance of Darius’ death. Xenophon is unclear on Cyrus’ exact intentions: Anabasis 1.1-6 indicates that his decision to rebel came only after Artaxerxes had mistreated him, but Hellenica 2.1.8-9 reveals Cyrus’ royal pretensions prior to Darius’ death. See Briant 2002: 615-616. In any case, it would seem that his goal in the west was to expand his own personal sphere of influence and, in doing so, build a case for legitimizing his rule since, as Briant 2002: 225-228 points out, Achaemenid royal ideology placed high value in the king as a successful warrior and commander-in-chief.
So long as Cyrus remained loyal to his father, this was a distinction without a difference. Once Darius II passed away and Cyrus’ bid for the throne failed, the Spartans found themselves in an untenable position. It would be impossible to remain loyal to both the King – who, technically, was their patron by virtue of being Cyrus’ own superior, but with whom they had no direct relationship or history of collaboration – and Cyrus, who remained their liaison with the King and their de facto patron.

Aware that Cyrus had become extremely influential in the west under Darius II, Artaxerxes sent him back to Sardis in 404 having drastically reduced his official authority. Cyrus was no longer the supreme commander of Persian forces in the West, but merely one of three Western satraps. While he controlled Lydia and much of Ionia, Tissaphernes was now of equal station and in command of Caria and parts of Ionia up to, at least, Miletus, and Pharnabazus was similarly his peer in Hellespontine Phrygia.

Because Cyrus had been the personal instrument by which the King’s favor allowed Sparta and her allies to defeat Athens, however, he retained an advantage over his rivals. Upon his return, he set about exploiting this advantage in two ways: by consolidating his influence in Greece, and by using that influence to expand his own domain in western Anatolia at the expense of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. So long as Lysander remained influential, Cyrus had access to the Peloponnese for soldiers and support from the Spartan state itself, both of which he used to gain control of Ionia and wage war on Tissaphernes and eventually, to launch his rebellion. As we have seen, Cyrus also had other xenoi in the Peloponnese and in Boeotia. At his request, these sent soldiers under the commands of Proxenus of Boeotia, Sophoentus of Stymphalos, and

41 Ruzicka 1985.
Socrates of Achaea, who each were or became *xenoi* of his as well, in order to wage war on Tissaphernes at Miletus.

Cyrus also sought to extend his control over several new territories. He regained all of the Ionian states with the help of Sparta, and he made war upon the lone exception, Miletus, with clients whom Tissaphernes had exiled (*Anabasis* 1.1.6-7). He also reinforced his *xenos* in Thessaly, Aristippus, by financing a mercenary army, with the hope that his client might use this army to gain control of Thessaly (1.1.10). As with his war on Tissaphernes at Miletus, Cyrus’ patronage of Clearchus’ tyranny in the Thracian Chersonese was an encroachment directed against Pharnabazus (1.1.9), since that territory was across the Hellespont from his satrapy. By installing his own client in the Chersonese, Cyrus thus aimed to contest Pharnabazus’ control of commercially and militarily important Hellespont.

While he was in the process of re-establishing his position in the Aegean and consolidating his influence in Greece, the opportunity to strike against Artaxerxes arose as a result of rebellion in Egypt – which, despite Xenophon’s silence on the matter, was probably planned in coordination with Cyrus. With a sudden need for soldiers, Cyrus was able to call upon his clients throughout the Greek world in order to supplement his own less trustworthy satrapal levies.

Rather than being a sign of the weakness of his Persian levies, Cyrus’ ability to supplement his satrapal army with 13,000 trustworthy Greek soldiers is an indication of

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42 This campaign does not appear to have been particularly successful. See Morrison and Wade-Gery 1942: 65-68.
43 The only reference to trouble in Egypt is when Xenophon records that Clearchus and the Greeks offered to help the King subdue the country (2.1.14). See Ruzicka 2012: 37-40.
his success in positioning himself as the patron of prominent Greeks in the most powerful Greek states of the time. The fact that these Greeks were loyal solely to him, and before his death never considered offering their services to Artaxerxes, demonstrates that Cyrus had created his own personal empire in Greece and the Aegean. The extent of Cyrus’ influence, furthermore, is traceable through the examination of the mercenaries he employed before and during his rebellion; in this way, study of the Cyrean Greeks reveals not the vulnerabilities of the Persian military and, in turn, the vulnerability of Persia to a potential Greek invasion, but instead demonstrates that Cyrus’ and – to the extent that Cyrus was until 401 a representative of the King – the King’s policy toward Greece was expansionist and had, to a large degree, succeeded in reducing most of Greece and the Aegean to client status.

Conclusion

The idea that Persians needed Greek troops for their superior fighting capabilities or to fill in the gap of their force for the need of heavy infantry is not among the lessons about Greek mercenary service to be taken from the Anabasis. If the Persians had envisioned a need for such troops, they could have developed such soldiers on their own or relied more heavily upon their Ionian and Carian levies. The actual reasons for the presence of the Greeks in Cyrus’ army are perhaps less glamorous, but no less vital. At Cunaxa itself, the Greeks were a means for Cyrus to increase the size of his force. On the march, in his bodyguard, and in his garrisons, they were the least likely to desert to the King or betray him, and they helped keep his less reliable soldiers in line. Their loyalty to

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44 As hypothesized by Briant 2002: 1037. For discussion of elite Achaemenid infantry forces, see Charles 2011.
Cyrus was assured in part by his ability to pay them, but even more so by the patron-client relationships Cyrus had with the powerful politicians and *poleis* who recruited them. Mercenaries were not the means by which Cyrus had extended his influence throughout much of mainland Greece, but his ability to summon them demonstrates the level to which he was able to incorporate several of the most powerful Greek states – or prominent citizens from these states – as subordinates into his own patronage network and, by extension, into the Achaemenid Empire.

The first book of the *Anabasis* provides a paradigm for the study of Greek mercenary service in the fourth century Near East, but the geo-political dimensions of this phenomenon have been relatively unexplored, particularly from a Persian and even an Egyptian perspective. While Cyrus was an exceptional satrap with extraordinary ambitions, his reasons and methods for employing Greek mercenaries would prove archetypical. The study of Greek mercenaries in the fourth century Near East provides a lens through which we are able to better understand the ever-shifting balance of power and politics in mainland Greece, the Achaemenid Empire, and Egypt, which the remainder of this project will explore.
Chapter 5

Mercenaries and Satraps under Artaxerxes II

Cyrus the Younger was an extraordinarily ambitious satrap, but the methods by which he extended his authority in the western periphery of the Achaemenid Empire were far from atypical. He was not the only satrap to increase his own influence by extending the King’s domain into the Greek world through the patronage of Greek xenoi, nor was he the first or last satrap to leverage connections in the Greek world against his rival satraps. Further, he was not the only satrap who was able to recruit mercenary soldiers thanks to the patronage of prominent Greek citizens in prominent Greek poleis.

In this chapter, I use the activities of Cyrus the Younger from 404 to 401 as a model for understanding the ever-changing, often-confusing relationships between Persia, Egypt, and the poleis of Greece during the reign of Artaxerxes II. As with Cyrus and his own strategoi, later Persian satraps and Greek mercenary commanders established relationships of a political nature, and so Greek mercenary service in the Near East provides a previously unused window through which the political history of the fourth century may be interpreted. My approach allows for a more detailed perspective on Persian interactions with the Greek world during this period, offering new insight into how Persian satraps competed with one another to enact the King’s policies and pursue royal interests in ways which benefitted themselves and undermined their rivals.

I begin with the period following the rebellion of Cyrus to the King’s Peace, or 400-387/6. Critical in this time are two relationships: one between Conon of Athens and Pharmabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and the other between Antalcidas of Sparta and Tiribazus, satrap of Lydia. Like Cyrus before them, each of these satraps exploited
xenia relationships in order to expand Persian authority in the Greek world and their own authority vis-à-vis their satrapal rivals. Like Lysander and many of Cyrus’ other Greek xenoi, Conon and Antalcidas in turn exploited Persian patronage in order to advance their own personal and patriotic causes.

Next I detail the rise of Ariobarzanes, Pharnabazus’ successor as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, revealing how the satrap used his connections in the Greek world to briefly establish himself as the most powerful individual in the Aegean world. Benefitting from the support of Pharnabazus, Ariobarzanes undermined the Spartan dominance established by the King’s Peace in Greece, forcing Sparta to acquiesce to his patronage and to Athenian hegemony of the sea in 375.

Finally, I examine the fall of Ariobarzanes and the subsequent war between the satraps in the western periphery of the Achaemenid Empire. I explain how Ariobarzanes’ Persian rivals used the Theban success at Leuctra to undermine both the satrap’s relationship with the King and his influence in the west, expanding their own authority in the process. Although this caused some instability in the western provinces, and in particular in Hellespontine Phrygia, it also led to the expansion of direct Persian rule in the Aegean and, when it suited the King, the dissolution of the second Athenian Empire. Further, this policy allowed Persian influence to remain strong in Greece even after the fall of Ariobarzanes’ Spartan and Athenian clients, since the satrap’s main rivals, Mausolus and Autophradates, were already in position to exploit their own xenia connections among the Theban elite.

Analyzing the relationships between Persian satraps and their Greek xenoi as a political phenomenon leads to a new understanding of the goals and effectiveness of
Artaxerxes II’s foreign policy on the western periphery of the Achaemenid Empire. What appeared to Greek sources as rebellion and increasing dependence upon Greek mercenaries was in fact royally sanctioned competition between satraps. This policy should be viewed as a success: it encouraged each member of his team of rival satraps to work to expand the King’s influence further westward, served to ensure that no individual satrap would ever grow strong enough to threaten the King as Cyrus had, provided the Empire flexibility in dealing with the unpredictable vicissitudes of mainland Greek politics, and allowed the King to concentrate the bulk of his attention and resources on the more important task of recovering Egypt.

Pharnabazus and Tiribazus

In the traditional literature on Greek mercenaries during the fourth century, neither Conon nor Antilcidas receives much attention.¹ The reason for this seems obvious: although each waged war against Greek rivals with the financial and material backing of the Persians, both clearly did so as official agents of their home poleis. Yet, as my reconstruction demonstrates, there is little difference between Conon and Antalcidas and those Greek commanders who are conventionally identified as mercenaries.

Like the xenoi of Cyrus, each sought personal advancement in their home poleis through their personal relationship with a Persian satrap, whose patronage they used to make war against the enemies of their home states. In turn, Pharnabazus and Tiribazus exploited their relationships with Conon and Antalcidas, respectively, to further their own

¹ For example, Parke 1933: 242-243 does not categorize Conon or Antalcidas as mercenary commanders or generals, but 50-51 does note that Conon at least raised a force of mercenaries in the 390s. Trundle 2004: 178 explicitly states that “Conon was not a mercenary.”
agenda in much the same way Cyrus employed Lysander and his other *xenoi*. Not only did they advance the King’s interests by waging war against his enemies, but in doing so they also positioned themselves as patrons of the King’s favored allies in the Greek world, ensuring themselves increased influence in the Aegean and in the eyes of the King. Each was rewarded for his successes on the Empire’s periphery with a prominent command elsewhere.

After the failure of Cyrus the Younger’s rebellion, Artaxerxes II restored Tissaphernes to his former position in Sardis (*Hellenica* 3.1.3).\(^2\) The satrap returned from Cunaxa in 400 with the intention of punishing those Greek states in Ionia which had supported the revolt. Tissaphernes demanded that the Ionians submit to him, but instead they appealed to Sparta for protection. Sparta responded by dispatching an army to Anatolia led by the general Thibron (3.1.4). Thibron began his campaign in 399, but accomplished little and was soon replaced by another general, Dercylidas (3.1.7-8). Upon his arrival, Dercylidas promptly made a truce with Tissaphernes, moving instead against the satrapy of Pharnabazus, Hellespontine Phrygia (3.1.9-8).

Pharnabazus, whose forces were not sufficient to defeat the Spartans on their own, took several steps to drive them from his territory. First, he bought time by making and then renewing a truce with Dercylidas (3.2.1, 9). Second, he sent to the King and requested that the fleet, which was already mustering for an invasion of Egypt,\(^3\) be diverted to the Aegean (*Diodorus* 14.39.1; Nepos *Conon* 2.2).\(^4\) Third, he began efforts to undermine Spartan hegemony in Greece by hiring Conon, an Athenian exile residing on

\(^{2}\) See Ruzicka 1985 for discussion of Tissaphernes’ various political appointments from 407-401.

\(^{3}\) Cawkwell 2005: 162-163; Ruzicka 2012: 43.

\(^{4}\) March 1997: 258.
Cyprus at the court of Evagoras, to a position in the Persian navy. Fourth, he made peace with Tissaphernes and, when the Spartans ordered Dercylidas to march against Tissaphernes’ satrapy in 397, the Spartan found himself arrayed against armies from both satrapies, with the result that the two sides agreed to a truce and sent ambassadors to the King (Hellenica 3.2.13-20).

Not long after, however, reports arrived in Sparta of the large Persian fleet gathering in Phoenicia, and the Spartans reacted by sending King Agesilaus to Asia with an even larger army (Hellenica 3.4.1-4). Pharnabazus responded by sending the Rhodian Timocrates to Greece with a large sum of money in order to encourage resistance to Sparta. Within months, the Athenian boule secretly sent ambassadors, ships, and crews to Conon in Cilicia and, by extension, to Persia.

In 395, the military situation in the Aegean and western Anatolia changed dramatically. Conon, Pharnabazus, and Artaphernes drove the Spartans from Caunus, helped remove the Spartan garrison from Rhodes, and intercepted a shipment of grain en route from Egypt to Sparta (Diodorus 14.79.4-8). Agesilaus won a victory at Sardis over the forces of Tissaphernes, whom the King then had executed and replaced by a new satrap, Tithraustes (Hellenica 3.4.20-25; Diodorus 14.80.1-8), but Thebes and Athens declared war on Sparta, forcing the recall of Agesilaus’ army to Greece (Hellenica 4.2.1-8; Diodorus 14.83.1).

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5 Although Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.1 and Pausanias 3.9.8 both place this mission in 395 under the direction of Tithraustes, March 1997: 266-267 convincingly argues that it is more likely to have been sent by Pharnabazus at the behest of Conon in 396, as H.Oxy 7.5 and Polyaenus 1.48.3 have it.
6 Strauss 1984: 38 implies that the mission was stopped before Demaenetus could embark, but March 1997: 262 (viz., n. 16) disagrees, correctly in my view (H.Oxy 8.1-2). H.Oxy 6.1, 7.1 indicates multiple missions were sent, even as the ekklesia in Athens was not yet prepared to openly oppose Sparta.
Although Sparta gained victories at Nemea and Coronea in 394, these were overshadowed by the success of the Persian-Athenian fleet in the Aegean. After destroying the Spartan navy at Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Conon spent much of 394 and 393 securing the Aegean for Persia and Athens. They then moved west together, raiding the Peloponnese and disbursing funds to the anti-Spartan allies at Corinth. Pharnabazus sailed back to Asia, leaving Conon in Athens with sufficient money to rebuild the Athenian Long Walls (*Hellenica* 4.8.1-11; Diodorus 14.84.3-5).

In this context, it is easy to understand the Persian decision to hire Conon in 397, at which point it was clear that the Spartans were not ready to concede Asia to the King. His experience as a naval commander, though clearly useful, was only a secondary consideration. If naval experience had been the most important qualification for the position, the Persians could have found a suitable admiral from within the Empire (i.e., Phoenicia). Instead, the overriding factor behind Pharnabazus’ choice of Conon was his Athenian background. The employment of Conon gave the satrap a direct connection to anti-Spartan politicians in Athens, a fact indicated by the dispatch of Demaenetus by the Athenian boule (*H.Oxy* 6.1). Along with the mission of Timocrates of Rhodes, Conon’s employment was part of Pharnabazus’ strategy to force the withdrawal of Spartan forces from Asia Minor by provoking what would come to be known as the Corinthian War.

Once Athens entered the conflict on the side of Persia, Conon’s connections served to expand Pharnabazus’ own influence in Greece and the Aegean. As satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Pharnabazus was obviously a well-known and influential actor in the Aegean; still, the addition of Conon to his staff undoubtedly helped convince a number of Greek states to expel their Spartan garrisons (*Hellenica* 4.8.1-3), since the
Athenian must have had his own *xenoi* scattered throughout the islands and Hellespont from his time as an admiral during the Peloponnesian War. Furthermore, it is likely that Conon’s connections in Athens arranged Pharnabazus’ meeting with the allies at Corinth, and it was at this meeting that the satrap cemented himself as the patron of the anti-Spartan alliance, providing the funds which allowed the war to be pursued even after the Spartan victories at Nemea and Coronea.

At his departure from Corinth, then, Pharnabazus was the most influential western Persian satrap. The Spartan fleet was nonexistent, and the Thebans, Corinthians, and Athenians, whose war efforts to this point depended upon Persian resources supplied by Pharnabazus, appeared to have the upper hand in their war against Sparta. In particular, Conon, whose leadership in Athens virtually guaranteed cooperation between Persia and the leading state in the anti-Spartan alliance, was specifically indebted to Pharnabazus.

Not long after his return from Greece, Artaxerxes appointed Pharnabazus as one of three commanders for an upcoming invasion of Egypt, which began in 391/390 and lasted for three years.\(^7\) It is possible that the assignment was motivated by the desire to prevent the rise of another Cyrus, removing the satrap from his realm before he could use his influence against the King’s own interests.\(^8\) More likely, Pharnabazus’ promotion was made for reasons of convenience and competence, and merely reflects the reality that the

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7 For the date of this invasion, which is only mentioned by Isocrates 4.140, see Cawkwell 2005: 162-163; Ruzicka 2012: 66-67. Others, e.g., Shrimpton 1991: 15 argue that the date of this invasion must be later (ca. 385-383) because, due to a misreading of *Hellenica* 4.8.33, they place Pharnabazus in Aeolia in 389. The passage, however, merely records that the Spartan Anaxibius captured several cities from Pharnabazus – i.e., from his domain – and there is no indication that the satrap was present for this himself.

8 Weiskopf 1989: 98 argues that Artaxerxes wished to avoid allowing one satrap from appropriating too much power, since he “appears to have been concerned lest a second Cyrus the Younger emerge out of the far west.”
King had prioritized the recovery of Egypt above all else. Not only was Pharnabazus already familiar with and in command of the fleet that would be used in the Egyptian campaign, but, he had also demonstrated his abilities as a naval commander in the Aegean.

One of Pharnabazus’ co-commanders was Tithraustes, who had removed Tissaphernes from office in 395 and ruled in Sardis for two years. Like Pharnabazus, he had shown himself capable of command, having dealt with the threat of Agesilaus more competently than his predecessor, Tissaphernes (Diodorus 14.80.7-8). Given the nature of his experience in Anatolia, Tithraustes probably held command of part of the land forces under Abrocomas, who had already in the time of Cyrus’ revolt been preparing for an invasion of Egypt (Anabasis 1.7.12) and, as such, was likely commander-in-chief of the expedition. 9

In 392/391, then, new satraps took office in both Hellespontine Phrygia and Lydia. In the former, Pharnabazus was replaced by Ariobarzanes, either his younger brother or eldest son, 10 but in the latter, Tithraustes was succeeded by an unrelated unofficial, Tiribazus, who had formerly been satrap of Western Armenia (Anabasis 4.4.4). Sparta hoping to parlay this change of leadership into a renewal of the King’s favor, sent an embassy led by Antalcidas to Tiribazus at Sardis in order to sue for peace (Hellenica 4.8.12). Conon, upon learning of Antalcidas’ mission, also went to Sardis for

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9 For Abrocomas’ activity during Cyrus’ rebellion, see Briant 2002: 619. Understanding Abrocomas as the leader of the expedition, having Pharnabazus and Tithraustes as his subordinates on sea and land, helps explains how Pharnabazus could have escaped blame for the invasion’s failure. With his record unblemished, he was then a logical choice for overall command of a subsequent invasion in the 370s, about which more later. See also Ruzicka 2012: 72-73.
10 Weiskopf 1989: 27 identifies him as eldest brother, but see the reservations expressed by Hornblower 1990: 365.
the purpose of confirming Persian support of Athens (4.8.13). Tiribazus forsook the
King’s pro-Athenian policy: he arrested Conon, provided the Spartan delegation with
substantial money for the rebuilding of the Spartan fleet, and escorted Antalcidas to Susa
for a meeting with Artaxerxes himself (4.8.16). The King, however, rejected Antalcidas
and replaced Tiribazus with a pro-Athenian satrap, Struthas (4.8.17).

On the surface, it would seem that Artaxerxes’ decision was justified: Persian
cooperation with Athens had been fruitful, while Sparta had supported Cyrus’ rebellion in
401 and subsequently waged war on the King’s territory. In spite of this, the rejection of
Tiribazus’ actions is often viewed as irrational: motivated by his hatred of Sparta ever
since the polis supported Cyrus’ rebellion, the King was either unable to see the benefits
of a renewed alliance between Persia and Sparta or, somewhat more generously, unable
to trust the Spartans to remain faithful to any alliance.11 By contrast, many scholars have
viewed Tiribazus’ actions as insightful, arguing that Athenian imperial ambitions in the
Aegean were bound to bring Athens into conflict with Persia eventually, which in fact
happened not much later when Thrasybulus led an Athenian fleet into Persian waters.12
From this perspective, Sparta appears as a more suitable ally for the King, since her
ambitions were largely restricted to mainland Greece.

In fact, the notion that Spartan ambitions were more complementary to Persia is
incongruent with the reality of the previous decade. At the time of Conon’s arrest, Athens
had done nothing to offend the King or his satraps, and had shown no desire to do so.
Thrasybulus’ campaigns against Persian interests occurred only after Tiribazus had

11 Olmstead 1948: 388-389; Cawkwell 2005: 167-168; Ruzicka 2012: 62-64. See also
Chapter 4 n. 32.
12 For the expeditions of Thrasybulus, see Cawkwell 1976 and 2005: 167-168; Strauss
1984; Burke 1990: 5-6; Pascual 2009: 76; Ruzicka 2012: 71-72.
imprisoned Conon and thrown his support behind Sparta, decisions which must have clearly indicated to the Athenians that Persia was no longer a reliable ally.

Meanwhile, Sparta had clearly revealed that its imperial ambitions extended beyond Greece. From 401-495, a period during which Spartan hegemony was largely unchallenged in Greece, the polis had been actively hostile to the King, supporting Cyrus’ rebellion and launching military campaigns under Thibron, Dercylidas, and Agesilaus in Asia itself. There is little reason to believe that Sparta was in general a more preferable ally to the King, then, or that Artaxerxes allowed his hatred of Sparta to hinder a course of action that was, ultimately, to his own benefit.¹³

Tiribazus’ decision, and Artaxerxes’ rejection of that decision, makes sense only when the personalized nature of Persian foreign relations is taken into consideration. In particular, it is important to emphasize that the alliance between Athens and Persia was predicated upon the xenia of Conon and Pharnabazus. The cooperation was successful because it benefitted each state and it benefitted Conon and Pharnabazus personally: Athenian independence from Sparta was restored, Spartan armies were withdrawn from Persian territory, and Conon was welcomed back to Athens and given political power.¹⁴ Pharnabazus, in addition to no longer having Spartan armies ravage his satrapy, had become the benefactor and patron of Conon and, by extension, Athens. As the mediator

¹³ This idea is further belied by the fact that, upon receiving Tiribazus’ aid in 392, the Spartans immediately began constructing a navy and launched a campaign in the Aegean (Hellenica 4.16-17, 21-22).
¹⁴ The Athenians were so grateful to Conon that they commissioned a statue of him in the Ceramicus at public expense (Pausanias 1.3; Nepos Timotheus 2); Demosthenes 20.68-70 later praised his service effusively, noting, among other things, that the citizenry granted him immunity from taxation. See Strauss 1984: 39-48 for discussion of how Conon used his personal alliance with Pharnabazus in order to expand his own influence in Athens at the expense of his main political rival, Thrasybulus.
between the King and Athens, Pharnabazus held a great deal of influence with the King, especially relative to his junior colleague in Sardis, Tithraustes.

The removal of Pharnabazus and Tithraustes from western Anatolia did not change the strategic benefits of the alliance between Athens and Persia for the polis or the King. The Athenians, led by Conon, continued to benefit from the King’s support, and the King continued to benefit from the removal of Spartan forces from his Empire. Likewise, Pharnabazus’ replacement in Hellespontine Phrygia, Ariobarzanes, continued to benefit from the arrangement. By virtue of his prominent position and his kinship with Pharnabazus, Ariobarzanes was probably already a xenos of Conon and was therefore able to step into his predecessor’s role without difficulty.15

Tiribazus and Sparta did not benefit from the maintenance of this status quo. As the satrap of Lydia, Tiribazus’ appointment was to the larger and wealthier of the two western satrapies,16 and the one that had traditionally been accorded more authority in that region of the Empire.17 In reality, however, his position was inferior to Ariobarzanes, whose inherited political and xenia connections in Greece generally and in Athens in

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15 Xenophon Hellenica 1.4.7 reports that in 404 Ariobarzanes conducted to the coast several Athenian ambassadors whom Pharnabazus, at the behest of Cyrus the Younger, had detained for three years.
16 He was also likely named karanos of the region – see Ruzicka 2012: 61-62 – and so held official authority which did not match his authority in practice, since the Athenians were dominant in the Aegean and more closely aligned with Ariobarzanes.
17 Not only was Cyrus the Younger based at Sardis during his time as karanos, but, prior to Cyrus’ arrival and after his rebellion, Tissaphernes also ruled from Sardis as a more influential satrap than Pharnabazus at Dascylium. Largely to the exclusion of Pharnabazus, he negotiated the first treaty of alliance between the King and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 8.6, 17-18, 36-37, 57-58); likewise, he not only controlled Lydia and Caria from 400-395 (Hellenica 3.1.3), but was also the superior of Pharnabazus in the following war against Sparta during that period (Hellenica 3.2.13).
particular made him the *de facto* Persian patron of Conon and, by extension, Athens and her allies in Greece.\(^{18}\)

While this state of affairs had apparently been acceptable to Tithraustes,\(^{19}\) the same was not true for Tiribazus, who could not expect to match the influence of his rival to the north so long as the Persian alliance with Athens remained intact. The logical means of correcting this power imbalance was to undermine the Athenian relationship with Persia and shift the King’s patronage to Sparta, and there would be no better time to make the attempt than with Pharnabazus absent. In doing so, he would diminish Ariobarzanes’ influence in the Aegean, while at the same time dramatically increase his own by becoming the champion of the King’s preferred client state in Greece.

Tiribazus’ decision to arrest Conon and conduct Antalcidas to Susa makes sense within the context of Persian satrapal rivalry and competition. The satrap could even reasonably have expected the King to approve his plan: he might have reminded the King of the hostile imperialism of Athens during the reign of Darius II, argued that the Spartans were the stronger partner, given their recent gains in the Corinthia despite Persian support of their opponents,\(^{20}\) and put faith in the good favor he held with the King, considering that his recent promotion from satrap of Western Armenia to what must have been one of the more prestigious satrapies in the Empire.

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\(^{18}\) On the inheritance of *xenia*, see Herman 1987 :16-17.

\(^{19}\) He was only in the region for two or three years, and his position may not have ever been intended to be permanent. Both Diodorus 14.80 and Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.4.25-26, 5.1 indicate that his main purpose was to remove Tissaphernes from command and end the war with Sparta, not necessarily to become the permanent satrap of Lydia and Caria himself.

Events beyond his control interfered, however. The Persian invasion of Egypt failed, apparently in a catastrophic manner (Isocrates 4.140), leaving the King bereft of a fleet in the Levant and his dominion vulnerable to counter-attack. As if to highlight this vulnerability, Evagoras of Salamis rebelled from Persia with the support of Pharaoh Acoris of Egypt (Diodorus 15.3.3-4).\(^{21}\) The prospect of Athens joining that same alliance, given its close ties to Evagoras, must have concerned the King greatly and caused him to value his Athenian clients even more. As a result, the King attempted to prevent the defection of Athens by immediately replacing Tiribazus with Struthas, who reinforced the Athenian alliance and made war on Sparta (*Hellenica* 4.17-18).

Despite the appointment of Struthas, the relationship between Persia and Athens, which had been founded upon the relationship between Conon and Pharnabazus/Ariobazanes, was damaged irreparably. Other factors contributed to the Athenian decision to abandon their alliance with Persia: the rebellion of Evagoras, the complete failure of the Persian invasion of Egypt and, presumably, the loss of the formerly formidable Persian fleet. Forced to choose between Evagoras, who had sheltered Conon, promoted Athenian interests following the Peloponnesian War, and now allied himself with Egypt, and the Persians, who had arrested Conon and recently suffered a significant defeat, the Athenians sensibly chose the former, although they still took care to minimize direct conflict with the King.\(^{22}\)

\(^{21}\) Diodorus does not indicate when the collaboration between Evagoras and Acoris began, only that it was already ongoing by the Battle of Citium ca. 386; given the obvious benefits of this alliance for both parties, it is not unreasonable to speculate that it dated back to the beginning of Evagoras’ rebellion. See Zournatzi 2005 for an overview of the nature of Persian rule in Cyprus.

The decision makes even more sense considering that the prospects for a revival of Athenian dominion without the need for Persian patronage must have seemed strong, particularly with Persia occupied by a still-independent Egypt. Consequently, under the leadership of Thrasybulus, in 391/390 and 390/389 Athens sent fleets throughout the Aegean and to the Hellespont (Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.25-31; Diodorus 14.94.2-4, 99.4-5). They also sent ten triremes to Evagoras three separate times: in 390 under Aristophanes, in 389 under Philocrates, and in 388 under Chabrias (*Hellenica* 4.8.24, 5.1.10).

In the meantime, the Spartans persevered following the King’s rejection of their embassy in 391. Even while occupied with the Corinthian War in Greece, they sent several forces, the first under Thibron, to Anatolia (*Hellenica* 4.8.17). They also used the funds given by Tiribazus to rebuild their navy, so that by the end of the 391 they had regained control of the Corinthian Gulf. They then sent a fleet to Rhodes under Teleutias, who captured eight of the ten triremes Philocrates was leading to Cyprus in 389 (4.8.11, 24).

As a result of this renewed Spartan military pressure and the Athenian decision to side with Evagoras, Antalcidas’ second peace mission in 388 found more success (*Hellenica* 5.1.25). He returned from Susa with an agreement from the King and with Tiribazus, newly restored to as satrap in Sardis. With this support, Antalcidas quickly took control of the Hellespont in 387 and forced the Athenians into accepting the King’s

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23 For further discussion of Thrasybulus’ campaigns, see n. 12 above.
24 Stylianou 1988 convincingly makes the case for three separate Athenian expeditions to Cyprus, although at first glance the ancient sources appear to describe only two.
Peace in 386 (5.1.26-31).\textsuperscript{25} Ariobarzanes was required to abide the King’s decision to support Sparta instead of Athens and to lend aid to Antalcidas in the Hellespont (5.1.28).\textsuperscript{26} Finally, Tiribazus held the influential position as the intermediary between Artaxerxes and his Greek client state, Sparta.\textsuperscript{27}

The decision to sponsor Antalcidas was also a boon for the King. By virtue of the agreement, the hostile Spartan army in Persian territory instantly became an ally (\textit{Hellenica} 4.8.21-22), the Athenian alliance with Evagoras and Egypt was severed, Athenian imperial ambitions in the Aegean were crushed, the Spartans gave up any claim to the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and the King became the guarantor and patron of the Spartan hegemony in Greece itself. In all, the King’s western territories were more extensive and more secure than ever, and the King was then able to draw military forces from Anatolia for invasions of Cyprus and Egypt (Diodorus 14.98.1-4, 110.5), which were weakened by the loss of their mutual ally, Athens.

Following the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, the King remained interested in securing Persian control over the Greek states of Asia Minor and in ensuring that Greece fell under the control of client states. Rather than working to avoid the rise of another

\textsuperscript{25} On the importance of the Hellespont for Athenian security, see Harding 1988: 66-68, who notes that “the harsh economic reality, of course, was that Athens was so heavily dependent upon food-supplies from overseas that she could not survive without them.” See also Munn 1993: 3-33.

\textsuperscript{26} Xenophon reports here that Antalcidas was a \textit{xenos} of Ariobarzanes (\textit{Hellenica} 5.1.28), a relationship which must have allowed the satrap to transfer his patronage from Athens to Sparta relatively smoothly. Nevertheless, the fact that Antalcidas and Sparta had previously sought the aid of Tiribazus rather than Ariobarzanes, in spite of the Spartan diplomat’s relationship with the latter, is further evidence of the strength of Ariobarzanes’ preference for Athens in this period.

\textsuperscript{27} Antalcidas was in a strong position with respect to Spartan relations with Persia, but he was constrained by the influence Agesilaus. Even so, the success of the King’s Peace in 387/386 represented a substantial victory for Antalcidas over his rival. See Rice 1974; DeVoto 1986; Cawkwell 2005: 165-168.
Cyrus, then, Artaxerxes encouraged his satraps to replicate Cyrus’ success, if not his rebellion. Although Tissaphernes failed in this regard, Pharnabazus was able to find his own Lysander in the Athenian Conon, and, subsequently, Tiribazus the same in the Spartan Antalcidas. Artaxerxes II’s policy of encouraging his satraps to compete with one another for influence in Greece was a resounding success, and resulted in formalizing the King’s patronage of Greece to a greater extent than ever before.

The Rise of Ariobarzanes

Much like Pharnabazus before him, Tiribazus’ success advancing the King’s interests in Greece and the Aegean was rewarded with an appointment elsewhere in the Empire. With Athens detached from the Cypriot-Egyptian alliance, Artaxerxes directed his newly prominent satrap to join Orontes in an attack on Evagoras’ territories on Cyprus (Diodorus 15.2.2). Despite the aid Evagoras received from Acoris of Egypt and Hecatomnus of Caria (Diodorus 15.2.3-4), the Persians decisively won the Battle of Citium and quickly laid siege against the rebel capital at Salamis (15.3.1-4.1). Dissent soon broke out between Orontes and Tiribazus (15.8), however, and the Persian siege of

28 Diodorus 14.98.1-4 reports that Hecatomnus was ordered by the King to make war on Evagoras ca. 390, but only a few years later Evagoras apparently controlled most of the island (110.5). Ruzicka 2012: 69-70 suggests instead that the mission was not intended against Evagoras, but instead only to “guard against Egyptian military activity.” This suggestion only works on the assumption that Evagoras was not in collusion with Acoris already, however, which seems unlikely (see n. 21 above). More plausibly, it appears that Hecatomnus genuinely attempted, but failed, to control Evagoras in 390. He then began to provide Evagoras aid in 387 when the King chose to appoint the recently ascendant Tiribazus to lead the expedition. Contrary to the insinuation made by Isocrates 4.162, Hecatomnus’ intent in this endeavor should be seen as an attempt to undermine satrapal rivals rather than to rebel from the King.
Salamis stalled, with the result that Evagoras’ surrender was not concluded until 380 (15.9.1-2).

With Cyprus secure and Greece relatively stable under the pro-Persian Spartan hegemony, the way to Egypt was now open. Leadership of the Egyptian expedition did not fall to either Tiribazus or Orontes, since accusations between the two required the recall of each for a trial in the King’s presence (15.8.4-5, 15.10-11).\(^29\) The King instead appointed an old favorite, Pharnabazus, to command the invasion (15.29.3).\(^30\)

Pharnabazus’ return to the eastern Mediterranean, concurrent with Tiribazus’ removal, precipitated an immediate shift in Greco-Persian relations. The former satrap quickly demanded that Athens recall Chabrias from Egypt, where the Athenian general presumably had fled after the terms of the King’s Peace made his presence on Cyprus

\(^29\) One of the accusations leveled against Tiribazus during the trial – that he conspired against the King’s interests by seeking a private alliance with the Spartans, being their philos – and Tiribazus’ defense against the charge – that he “formed the friendship (philia) not for any advantage of his own but for the profit of the King; and he pointed out that the Greeks of Asia were thereby detached from the Lacedaemonians and delivered captive to the King” – reveals the crucial but potentially insidious role played by xenia/philia (Diodorus, writing later, conflates the two terms) in Persian foreign policy during the fourth century. Here, it is clear that both the accusation and retort were true: Tiribazus did in fact form a private alliance for his own benefit, but this personal alliance was also a necessary component of any relationship between the King himself and Sparta, and so also worked to the King’s benefit. At the same time, however, this alignment contained the seeds of rebellion because the Spartans were, as they had previously been to Cyrus, dependent upon the xenia of Tiribazus, having no immediate relationship with the King himself. The satrap was thus in a position of strong influence as their intermediary with the King and, had he been so inclined, could have leveraged his position in order to revolt against Artaxerxes with the backing of Sparta. With Tiribazus removed to Cyprus, the Spartans were forced to deal instead with Ariobarzanes, who had previously shown a preference for Athens.

\(^30\) Pharnabazus apparently did not return to Dascylium after his marriage to the King’s daughter in ca. 388 (Hellenica 5.1.28; Plutarch Artaxerxes 27.4). Perhaps he remained at court or partook in the King’s campaign against the Cadusians (Plutarch Artaxerxes 24; Diodorus 15.8.5).
In addition, Pharnabazus also requested that Athens send a contingent under Iphicrates to assist in the invasion of Egypt (15.29.3-4). By these actions, Pharnabazus undermined Pharaoh Acoris, denying him the services of Chabrias, who had been unofficially advancing the Athenian cause in Egypt in much the same way Conon had done in Persia from 397-395. He also enhanced his own position in two ways: the inclusion of Iphicrates and Greek mercenaries increased the size of his army at the expense of Acoris’, and the reestablishment of his relationship with Athens served to increase his own position – both personally and in the form of his successor in Dascylium, Ariobarzanes – in the Aegean and Greece.

Whether Pharnabazus intended to return to Dascylium or to Susa upon completion of the Egyptian campaign, his interests would be served by the reemergence of Athens in the Aegean, under the patronage of both Pharnabazus himself and Ariobarzanes, who was likely his liaison with the Greek world. Additionally, the renewal of Athenian hegemony

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31 In this respect, Chabrias’ activity in Egypt from 386-380 mirrored that of Conon on Cyprus from 405-395, and in particular his unofficial Athenian support of Persia from 397-395.
32 Munn 1993: 134-136 rightly notes that the recall of Chabrias and the dispatch of Iphicrates must have also been motivated by Athenian concerns regarding the outbreak of the Boeotian War in Greece, even if Diodorus presents the exchange only from Pharnabazus’ perspective. The advantage of my reconstruction is a marriage of foreign and domestic factors: Pharnabazus’ return to the Levant and the concordant recall of Tiribazus to Susa meant that the situation was ripe for a renewal of the former Athenian-Persian alliance through Pharnabazus and Ariobarzanes. The return of Chabrias to Athens makes sense for both parties, since the Athenians would need him and his soldiers for their upcoming war against Sparta, for which they could now count on the support of Ariobarzanes, while Pharnabazus would benefit from his departure from Egypt.
Similarly, Pharnabazus recruited Iphicrates – last seen campaigning in the north Aegean prior to the King’s Peace (Hellenica 5.1.25) – into his invasion in order to enlarge his own army and to guarantee the agreement between himself and Athens. Munn 1993: 136 n. 11 puts the date of Iphicrates’ arrival in the Levant at 375, after the war between Athens and Sparta concluded. Since Iphicrates is not mentioned as a participant in the struggle from 378-375, it is plausible that he joined Pharnabazus earlier.
in the Aegean under the patronage of the house of Dascylium served another purpose. This was the prevention of the rise of a new player in western satrapal politics, Mausolus, the recently installed satrap of Caria, who in the early 370s shifted his capital from landlocked Mylasa to coastal Halicarnassus. Mausolus’ synoecism of Halicarnassus was undoubtedly aimed at extending his influence westward into the Aegean, where his growing influence would come at the expense of Dascylium.

Officially, Sparta was the King’s ally in the Aegean, and the polis likely had positive relationships with Dascylium, since Agesilaus and Antalcidas were both xenoi of Ariobarzanes (see below). Still, Spartan interest in the Aegean in the late 380s and early 370s was not significant, mostly because Agesilaus and his supporters were primarily concerned with extending the Spartan hegemony in mainland Greece. Athens, however, with its naval tradition and close ties to a number of island states, would make a far better bulwark against Mausolean expansion. Although our sources are silent upon the matter, the return of Pharnabazus and the concomitant renewal of his and Ariobarzanes’ relationship with Athens, indicated by the

33 In seeking to expand his influence beyond Caria, Mausolus was following in the footsteps of his father, Hecatomnus, who had already attempted to establish himself on Cyprus (discussed above). See Ruzicka 1992: 33-40.
34 Following the imposition of the King’s Peace, Sparta turned its attention toward the reduction of any potential rivals in Greece itself: at Mantinea (Hellenica 5.2.1-7), Phlius (5.2.8-10), Olynthus (5.2.12-24), and Thebes (5.2.25-36).
35 Also plausible is Hornblower’s 1982: 78-79 argument that Mausolus’ synoecism of Halicarnassus was in response to the foundation of the Athenian Confederacy in 377, in which case Ariobarzanes might simply be seen to support Athenian dominance of the Aegean for two reasons: first, with control of the Hellespont Ariobarzanes controlled Athens more easily than Sparta, since he could quickly cut off the grain trade from the Black Sea, which was far more vital to Athens than Sparta; second, as mentioned above, Athens was more naturally a sea power than Sparta, which had clearly concentrated on domestic Greek matters after the King’s Peace, and Ariobarzanes may have wanted a more ambitious partner in his play for influence in the Aegean.
deployment of Iphicrates, must have been a factor in Athens’ decision to declare for Thebes against Sparta in 378 (Hellenica 5.4.34; Diodorus 15.29.7).\textsuperscript{36} The founding of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378, the rebuilding of the Athenian fleet, and open opposition to Sparta would only have been possible with a guarantee of protection from Pharnabazus’ chosen successor in Dascylium, since Ariobarzanes controlled the Hellespont and thus had the ability to sever Athens from her Euxine grain supply at any moment.\textsuperscript{37} The Athenian decree of citizenship for Ariobarzanes and Philiscus of Abydus (Demosthenes 23.141, 202), though probably granted at a later date,\textsuperscript{38} provides clear evidence that Ariobarzanes had in fact given his blessing to Athens’ Aegean endeavors in this period, and the presence of Philiscus, Ariobarzanes’ chief subordinate, on the Chabrias monument in Athens further confirms the alliance between the polis and Dascylium.\textsuperscript{39}

The seaward expansion of Athens came at the expense of Sparta, but Ariobarzanes had not completely forsaken the Spartans. The terms of the renewal of the King’s Peace in 375 bear this out: while Athenian hegemony on the sea was acknowledged, the agreement nevertheless favored Spartan hegemony on the mainland,

\textsuperscript{36} The immediate cause was, of course, Sphodrias’ failed – and unpunished – attempt to capture Piraeus (Hellenica 5..20-34).
\textsuperscript{37} For the extent of Ariobarzanes’ control of the region, see Weiskopf 1989: 33-34.
\textsuperscript{38} Likely in 367, according to Burnett and Edmonson 1961: 84, although Weiskopf 1989: 34 n. 61 suggests it was earlier.
\textsuperscript{39} Demosthenes notes that these decrees of citizenship were in exchange for services performed on behalf of Athens. In particular, Philiscus appears to have occupied Greek settlements near the Hellespont – committing a number of atrocities in the process, as Demosthenes complains. That Ariobarzanes’ control of this area benefitted Athens at this time is implied the fact that the Spartan attempt to cut off the Euxine grain shipments in 375 took place near Naxos (Hellenica 5.4.61; Diodorus 15.34.3-4) rather than at the Hellespont, where Lysander (Hellenica 2.1.1-2) and Antalcidas (5.1.26-31) had successfully blocked Athens’ food supply with Persian support. See Burnett and Edmonson 1961: 84-85.
particularly because it forced the (momentary) disintegration of the Theban-dominated Boeotian League (*Hellenica* 6.2.1; Diodorus 15.38.4). It is hard not to see Ariobarzanes’ hand behind the Peace of 375, since these terms officially established both client-*poleis* of Daseylium in control of Greek affairs.

While he is likely accurate in identifying Persian involvement in the treaty, Diodorus’ assertion that the motivation behind the Peace of 375, namely that King desired peace in Greece so that he could hire mercenaries for the upcoming campaign against Egypt (15.38.1), is incorrect for two reasons. First, the assertion is simply a repetition of the stereotypical and inaccurate trope of Achaemenid military dependence upon Greek mercenaries, which previous chapters in this work have already dismissed. Second, it makes little sense in the context of this specific campaign, since Pharnabazus already had in his employ the Athenian Iphicrates and his own mercenaries (15.29.3-4). The Peace was instead instigated by Ariobarzanes and was the culmination of strategic maneuverings by the satrap and his patron, Pharnabazus, who used their respective positions and connections to extend their own, and in turn the King’s, influence in Greece and the Aegean, at the expense of Mausolus and Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia.

In 375, then, Ariobarzanes reached the acme of his authority. The peace he brokered in Greece settled affairs to the advantage of Athens and Sparta, the two *poleis* which he favored and sponsored. Spartan hegemony in Greece ensured Ariobarzanes’ own influence on the mainland, while Athenian hegemony in the Aegean did the same.

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40 Diodorus records Persian involvement in this treaty, but Xenophon, who often downplays or ignores Persian involvement when Sparta is the beneficiary, does not. See Cawkwell 2005: 176-181.

41 Nepos *Datames* 2 inaccurately identifies him as the satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and all of Phrygia, but this exaggeration in title may only serve to reflect the fact that Ariobarzanes’ influence had spread far beyond the official limits of his authority.
and checked the expansion of rival satraps, particularly Mausolus. Additionally, Arioabarzanes’ control of Hellespontine Phrygia was uncontested, and he had perhaps by this time already annexed territory on the European side of the Hellespont.\footnote{As Weiskopf 1989: 33 explains, “the bulk of the evidence for such comes in accounts of events in the 360s, thereby permitting us the [sic] examine the results, rather than the development, of Dascylium’s power. In sum, Arioabarzanes’ influence extended into the southern Troad and westward to encompass European portions of the Hellespontine region.”} Either way, he controlled the grain routes from the Black Sea to the Aegean, routes upon which Athens was almost completely reliant. His own patron and predecessor, Pharnabazus, was directing the Persian invasion of Egypt, indicating that he held the favor of King Artaxerxes II. The presence of Iphicrates of Athens in Pharnabazus’ army, furthermore, was not only a sign of continued Athenian cooperation, but also a hostage guaranteeing it.

While the imposition of the King’s Peace in 387/386 might be seen as the highest point of Persian policy in Greece during the fourth century, in light of the above discussion it is hard to deny that the agreement of 375 was not a more significant achievement. As Pharnabazus prepared to launch his invasion of Egypt, the Empire’s affairs on the western periphery were secure and settled. Sparta’s main concern in this period was the extension of its hegemony over the mainland of Greece, an ambition which held no threat whatsoever to Persia. Athenian activities in the Aegean were also not a danger to the King’s interests, since the polis was restrained by the symbiotic relationship the city enjoyed with Arioabarzanes and by the presence of Iphicrates in the army of Pharnabazus. Through the personal influence of Pharnabazus and Arioabarzanes, the King could count both Athens and Sparta as willing clients for the first time ever. Artaxerxes II’s success in the West was thus not gained by a strategy aimed at dividing
and weakening Greece, but by one which strengthened and united the interests of the two most powerful Greek states under Persian sponsorship.

**The Fall of Ariobarzanes and the War of the Satraps**

In the fall of 373, the strength of Ariobarzanes’ position began to falter. Pharnabazus’ invasion of Egypt failed when the Nile flood arrived before his force was able to reach Memphis (15.43.4). Iphicrates fled from Egypt to Athens and was blamed for the Persian defeat by Pharnabazus (Diodorus 15.43.5-6), who either died soon thereafter or fell out of favor with the King, for he is not heard from again in our sources. While Ariobarzanes’ relationship with Athens was by this point strong enough on its own merits to withstand the friction between Iphicrates and Pharnabazus, the loss of his sponsor at the court of Artaxerxes was undoubtedly a serious blow.

Still, the disappearance of Pharnabazus may not have been insurmountable had events in Greece gone differently. In late 373, war broke out once again between Athens and Sparta (*Hellenica* 6.2.2-3; Diodorus 15.45.1-2). Thebes used this distraction to reunite Boeotia under its control (Diodorus 15.46.4-6), eventually causing Athens and Sparta, probably with the support of Ariobarzanes, to attempt a renewal of the previous Peace in 371 (*Hellenica* 6.3.1-19; Diodorus 15.50.4). This time, however, Thebes refused to surrender Boeotia and remained apart from the treaty (*Hellenica* 6.3.18-20; Diodorus 15.50.4-6). Sparta responded by sending an army north under King Cleombrotus in order to force it upon them, but he was unexpectedly defeated and killed by the Theban army at Leuctra (*Hellenica* 6.4.2-15; Diodorus 15.51-56).

43 See Ruzicka 2012: 122-124 for the end of Pharnabazus’ career, and the likelihood that he hired Timotheus to replace Iphicrates for a brief period.
The consequences of the Theban victory at Leuctra are not obscure.\textsuperscript{44} Spartan authority in the Peloponnese was severely diminished, particularly by the detachment of Arcadia and Messenia from Spartan control (\textit{Hellenica} 6.5.3-22; Diodorus 15.66.1, 6; 59.1; 72.4). The Thebans became militarily ascendant on the mainland almost immediately, and as a result Ariobarzanes’ influence in Greece was weakened considerably.

As the sponsor of Spartan hegemony and, therefore, of two Peaces that sought to undermine Theban control of Boeotia, Ariobarzanes was in no position to shift his patronage from Sparta to Thebes. Instead, in 368 he sent his subordinate Philiscus to Greece on Sparta’s behalf. When negotiations with Thebes failed to secure acknowledgment of Spartan rights to Messenia, Philiscus gave money to Sparta for the hiring of mercenaries (\textit{Hellenica} 7.1.27; Diodorus 15.70.2).\textsuperscript{45}

Philiscus’ mercenaries were not enough to reestablish Sparta’s previous dominance in the Peloponnese, but that turned out to be the least of Ariobarzanes’ troubles. In 367, Pelopidas returned to Greece having won for Thebes the support of the King (\textit{Hellenica} 7.1.33-38; Diodorus 15.81.3). At the same time, the King declared Ariobarzanes a rebel – or, at least, authorized a punitive expedition against him (see below) – and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, and Mausolus, satrap of Caria, began preparations for a campaign against Hellespontine Phrygia.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} For Leuctra and its aftermath, see Munn 1996: 81-92.
\textsuperscript{45} Notably, Diodorus reports that Philiscus was sent by Artaxerxes himself, making the common error of assuming that all Persian representatives acted on direct orders from the King. Xenophon makes it clear that Philiscus was a subordinate of Ariobarzanes and was sent on the initiative of the satrap himself.
\textsuperscript{46} Weiskopf 1989: 45-46; Buckler and Beck 2008: 209.
As Weiskopf points out, the concurrence of these two events can hardly have been coincidental.\(^{47}\) Ariobarzanes overstepped his authority when he had dispatched Philiscus on behalf of Sparta, despite the clear shift in the balance of power in Greece to Thebes after Leuctra. This mistake opened the satrap to criticism from his rival in Sardis, Autophradates, who was able to convince Artaxerxes that Ariobarzanes had in fact campaigned against the King’s interests in Greece. Rather than bringing Greece’s new hegemonic polis into alignment with the King, Ariobarzanes had chosen to continue support for his personal but now-ineffectual ally, Sparta. In Weiskopf’s view, Autophradates’ move against Ariobarzanes was motivated in general by a desire to enhance his own influence in the Aegean at the expense of his rival, and in particular by a desire to take control of the Troad, which had traditionally been ruled from Sardis but in recent years had become the possession of Ariobarzanes.\(^{48}\)

Weiskopf’s interpretation of events accurately describes Autophradates’ motivations, but his reconstruction does not explore in detail the role of Mausolus in the affair or sufficiently, for my purposes here, connect it to simultaneous events in Greece. To begin, we return to the establishment of Halicarnassus as Mausolus’ new capital in Caria in the early 370s, by which act Mausolus had indicated his intentions on the western Aegean. He was temporarily stymied, however, by Ariobarzanes’ support of Athens and the subsequent establishment of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which, as discussed above, had received royal approval in 375.

Mausolus had been unable to openly pursue his Aegean ambitions for several years, but the Spartan defeat at Leuctra created an opening. Together with Autophradates,


Mausolus moved quickly to patronize the new dominant power in Greece, and with his aid the Thebans were able to gain the King’s support in 367. Likewise, he and Autophradas worked to have the King authorize an expedition against Ariobarzanes, striking a blow at Athens and her allies of their Persian patron’s protection.

In 366, Autophradas commenced operations against Ariobarzanes in the Troad, while Mausolus began to prepare a fleet for operations in the Hellespont. Meanwhile, the Thebans announced their Aegean ambitions by voting to build a fleet of 100 triremes (Diodorus 15.78.4-79.2). As Buckler and Beck noted, “the deployment of fleet was an enormous expense”, and the Thebans could not have carried out their plan without Persian financial support, likely provided by Mausolus.

The Athenians responded by dispatching Timotheus to aid Ariobarzanes, but instead of joining the rebel satrap Timotheus directed his fleet against Samos, which was held by a Persian garrison under Tigranes, likely a subordinate of Autophradas (Isocrates 15.111; Nepos Timotheus 1.2; Polyaenus 3.10.9; Diodorus 18.18.9). Timotheus’ actions are somewhat puzzling, and have been explained by the seemingly contradictory orders under which he operated, namely that he was to aid Ariobarzanes but refrain from breaking the King’s Peace (Demosthenes 15.9). This restriction has been taken to mean that he was not to directly campaign with Ariobarzanes because of his

49 Buckler and Beck 2008: 182.
50 Buckler and Beck 2008: 209 note that a “harmony of Persian and Theban interests” existed at this time, but do not identify Mausolus as the source of funding for the Theban fleet. Indeed, his sponsorship makes the most sense since, as the discussion below makes clear, his ambitions in the Aegean far outpaced those of Autophradas.
51 As the son of Conon, Timotheus was likely a xenos of Ariobarzanes (Nepos Timotheus 1). Furthermore, Ruzicka 2012: 122-124 notes that Timotheus was in the employ of Pharnabazus from 373-371.
purported (see below) rebel status,\textsuperscript{53} but I would suggest that Timotheus did not join Ariobazanes because the fighting in 366 was concentrated in the Troad, and the provision of the King’s Peace which claimed that “the cities in Asia should belong to [Artaxerxes]” at least implicitly forbade Greek armies from campaigning on Persian soil (\textit{Hellenica} 5.1.31; Diodorus 14.110.3 records “the Greek cities of Asia are subject to the King”).\textsuperscript{54} Attacking Samos did not constitute a violation of the Peace in this respect, but did allow Timotheus to aid Athens’ ally by striking at the territory of Autophradates and, so much the better, adding the island to Athens’ own possessions in the Aegean.

In 365, Mausolus and Autophradates transferred the war to Sestus and Assus (Xenophon \textit{Agesilaus} 2.26-27),\textsuperscript{55} striking at Ariobazanes’ control of the Athenian grain supply. After ten months, Timotheus’ siege of Samos was a success, and Athens dispatched cleruchs to take control of the island (Isocrates 15.111; Diodorus 18.18.9). Timotheus then sailed north to the Hellespont (Isocrates 14.112), where Agesilaus had also appeared on behalf of Ariobazanes (Xenophon \textit{Agesilaus} 2.26-27). The parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities: Autophradates and Mausolus withdrew their forces and no longer actively campaigned against Ariobazanes, Timotheus gained Sestus and

\textsuperscript{53} Weiskopf 1989: 47; Heskel 1997: 98-100; Cawkwell 2005: 188, 298 n. 9. A little over a decade later, Demosthenes 15.9-10 insisted that Timotheus had avoided aiding Ariobazanes because of his rebel status. There is good reason to believe that he is being revisionist, however, since his point is to stress that in the past Athens assiduously avoided conflict with the King, and had only come into the Social War because of Mausolus’ unprovoked aggression (15.3-8).

\textsuperscript{54} As argued by Hornblower 1982: 197-198. See the following paragraph for further discussion, but here it is worthwhile to note that the following year, when the war against Ariobazanes was waged primarily in Assus in the Troad and Sestus in the Chersonese, Timotheus did not move against former, which is closer to Samos, but instead concentrated his efforts on securing the latter for Athens. This, at least, is further evidence that Timotheus took care to avoid campaigning on the Asian mainland in order to avoid provoking the King.

\textsuperscript{55} Weiskopf 1989: 48.
Crithote for Athens, and Agesilaus returned to Sparta with money from all involved, including – according to Xenophon – Pharaoh Tachos.

Our sources for this event are scattered and lack detail, and consequently it is difficult to parse the significance of what happened at the Hellespont in 365. The main problem is explaining the withdrawal of Autophradates and Mausolus and their treaty/truce with Ariobarzanes, seemingly done in contravention of the King’s declaration that the satrap Hellespontine Phrygia was a rebel. Some have resorted to the explanation that the two satraps decided, for reasons that remain unclear, to align themselves against the King and join what is known as the Great Satraps’ Revolt, an event which has its origins in a confused and exaggerated section of Diodorus (15.90-91).

Weiskopf offered a more satisfactory solution to this difficulty, upon which I will elaborate. He suggested that “it should not be assumed that the military operation’s initial purpose was the absolute destruction of Ariobarzanes, but rather his punishment and humiliation, i.e. the reduction of his excessive strength and the offering to him of a chance to be co-opted”. Indeed, the campaign in the Hellespont makes far more sense when evaluated from this perspective and when the individual motivations of the main players present are considered.

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57 For discussion of the problems presented in Diodorus’ account, as well as the “minimalist” and “maximalist” positions regarding the nature and extent of the revolt, see Briant 2002: 656-675.
58 Weiskopf 1989: 42-43. In fact, the characterization of the operations as an effort to put down Ariobarzanes’ “rebellion” is misleading. Weiskopf rightly notes that the charges Autophradates brought against Ariobarzanes were trumped up, and I would argue that Artaxerxes’ policy shift in Greece to the favor of Thebes was part recognition of the reality of Theban military dominance in Greece post-Leuctra and part desire to decrease Ariobarzanes’ influence in the western regions of the Empire and beyond.
By the time Agesilaus and Timotheus arrived in the Hellespont, Autophradates had achieved his immediate goals of retaking territory in the Troad and reducing Ariobazanes’ position in the Aegean. He was not prepared for direct confrontation with the Athenian navy, which had already detached Samos from his control, and was therefore satisfied with consolidating his gains and making peace. Mausolus, whose aim was to undermine the Athenian position in the Aegean by cutting off Ariobazanes’ control of the Hellespont, had made less progress. He was similarly unprepared to make war on Athens – among other matters, the Theban fleet which he had sponsored was not yet operational – and so was content to retire, having sufficiently diminished Ariobazanes’ sphere of influence. Ariobazanes himself, hard pressed by his opponents and perhaps already dealing with dissent from within his own satrapy, would have been eager for a truce in order to reestablish his position in Hellespontine Phrygia. The immediate cost of Sestus and Crithote was not terribly significant: although they were key cities in the region, the satrap probably could not afford to maintain or defend them himself, and at any rate they remained in friendly Athenian hands.

The main concern for Timotheus and the Athenians was to keep the Hellespont in friendly hands – whether their own or those of Ariobazanes, their ally. This is why the fleet had chosen to attack Samos the previous year, when Autophradates’ forces were campaigning in the interior of the Troad and the Euxine trade routes were unthreatened,

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59 Weiskopf 1989: 51-54. Haskel 1997: 114-117 counts Philiscus among those who rebelled against Ariobazanes, although there is no explicit evidence for this. The rationale for this position is that Philiscus captured a number of Greek settlements in the Hellespont in the late 360s (Demosthenes 23.141-142), which subsequently were also attacked by Timotheus, who was operating as an ally of Ariobazanes; if Timotheus’ activity here was prior to Philiscus’ death, then Philiscus must be seen as a rebel. If, however, it occurred after Philiscus’ assassination, then there is no need to view him as a rebel. On this particular issue, see Weiskopf 1989: 52 n. 94.
but came directly to Ariobarzanes’ aid when Sestus and Assus were under siege. Removing the Persian garrison from Samos was one thing, but open conflict with two satraps was likewise not an attractive course for Timotheus.

All sides present with significant military forces thus had good reasons to make peace with one another, but the purpose of Agesilaus’ presence remains to be explained. While it has been suggested that he served Ariobarzanes as a mercenary commander,\(^{60}\) Xenophon’s emphasis on the diplomatic role played by the Spartan king indicates that he was there instead as a xenos of both Ariobarzanes and Mausolus.\(^{61}\) He was also likely there as an ally of Athens, Sparta’s lone significant friend in Greece as a result of recent Theban inroads into the Peloponnese.

Agesilaus was therefore well-situated as an arbiter of peace negotiations, and likely had two goals. First, he would want to protect Athenian interests and thereby maintain the strength of Sparta’s most important ally against Thebes. Second, he sought to use his personal connections with Ariobarzanes and Mausolus in order to gain the financial aid that Sparta desperately needed. Though he did not have an army with him, Xenophon’s account suggests that Agesilaus did have an alliance with Pharaoh Tachos of Egypt, which would have made Spartan threats to enter the conflict on the side of Ariobarzanes and Athens more credible. As a result, Agesilaus was able to return to Sparta with both of his goals achieved: Athens’ trade routes with the Black Sea were secure, and Sparta received funds both from Ariobarzanes out of gratitude for his role in

\(^{60}\) Parke 1933: 109.
\(^{61}\) Xenophon *Agesilaus* 2.27 refers to xenia between Agesilaus, Mausolus, and Tachos of Egypt. Agesilaus was also likely a xenos of Ariobarzanes, since 2.26 presents him acting as an envoy on his behalf of Ariobarzanes, a role which often fell to xenoi, and Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.1.29-40 makes clear that Agesilaus had xenia ties with the family of Pharnabazus.
the truce negotiations and from Mausolus out of a desire to prevent Egyptian intervention in the region.\textsuperscript{62}

In 364, the Theban fleet made its first and last voyage throughout the Aegean. Diodorus records that the fleet, commanded by Epaminondas, sailed to Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes in an effort to win these cities over from Athens (15.79.1). Although the arrival of the fleet did not immediately result in the deterioration of the Athenian Confederacy, it did perhaps pay dividends later, when Diodorus also reports that these three poleis, along with Cos, were the first to declare against Athens in the Social War of 357-355 (16.7.3). From this perspective, Epaminondas’ tour may be viewed as a success, establishing positive relations between the general himself, Thebes, the respective poleis visited, and Mausolus, the sponsor of the Theban fleet who would later play a role instigating the Social War.

Despite the withdrawal of Autophradates and Mausolus, 364 also saw the continued destabilization of Ariobarzanes’ position in Hellespontine Phrygia. The satrap’s control over the Hellespont disintegrated with the assassination of Philiscus, his most influential subordinate in the area (Demosthenes 23.142). By this year, if not during the previous, Ariobarzanes’ son Mithridates also turned against him, leading to civil war within the province (Xenophon \textit{Cyropaedia} 8.8.4; Aristotle \textit{Politics} 5.1312a). Several cities attempted to throw off Persian control entirely or were seized by tyrants hoping to establish their own fiefdoms in the chaos of the war, leading Timotheus to return from

\textsuperscript{62} Although Mausolus’ support for Sparta would seem to contradict his sponsorship of Thebes, the amount he gave was obviously not significant enough to alter the balance of power in Greece. The Carian satrap’s interest in Thebes was more tied to the extension of Theban power into the Aegean at the expense of Athens than the expansion of Theban hegemony in mainland Greece, which at this point must have seemed fairly secure, particularly vis-à-vis Sparta.
campaigning in the Chalcidice in order to try to secure at least one of these, Cyzicus, for Athens (Diodorus 15.81.5-6).\footnote{The chronology given by Diodorus here is controversial. Weiskopf 1989: 52 (following others, see n. 95) dates Timotheus’ relief of Cyzicus during the same campaign that involved his acquisitions of Sestus and Crithote, i.e., in 365. Heskel 1997: 115-117 places the expedition to Cyzicus in 364, rightly noting that Diodorus does not connect these campaigns, putting the relief of Cyzicus during Timotheus’ subsequent campaign in the Chalcidice (15.81.6); in my reconstruction, Timotheus gained Sestus and Crithote in 365, after helping resolve the conflict between Ariobarzanes, Mausolus, and Autophradates. With Timotheus and the Athenians securing the Thracian Chersonese, Ariobarzanes directed Philiscus to re-establish control on the Asian side of the Hellespont and the Propontis; it was during this campaign, which stretched into 364, that Philiscus was assassinated at Lampsacus. The death of Philiscus threw the gains of his entire campaign into doubt and further undermined Ariobarzanes, who was no longer able to maintain control in the region. As a result, Timotheus himself was obligated to prevent factions unfriendly to Athens from gaining control in the region, resulting in his foray at Cyzicus, which, as Diodorus reports, “was undergoing a siege” by unnamed, but obviously anti-Athenian, forces (15.81.6).}

This instability led Artaxerxes to send Artabazus, one of Pharnabazus’ sons and a nephew of the King, to take charge of Daseylium and to arrest Ariobarzanes.\footnote{Again, the chronology of Artabazus’ arrival in Hellespontine Phrygia and his replacement of Ariobarzanes is disputed. Diodorus’ brief summary provides little help (15.90-91); here, I follow Weiskopf 1989: 53-54, who places the decision to send Artabazus west in 364, after the disintegration of Ariobarzanes’ authority had led to, among other things, Greek incursions on the Asian mainland. Artabazus did not actually arrive and replace Ariobarzanes until 363, however.} While Artabazus was able to capture his predecessor, he was never able to completely secure his own satrapy. In the early years of his reign, he was forced to contend with harassment from Ariobarzanes’ son Mithridates, encroachment on his territory from another satrap, Datames, and was even arrested at one point by Autophradates.\footnote{See Weiskopf 1989: 58-63. Although Weiskopf suggests that tensions between Artabazus and Autophradates were short-lived, I would suggest that any peace established between the two satraps was likely to be tenuous, given their competing claims to territory in the Troad.} Pressured on all sides and with Sparta and Athens either unable or unwilling to help – though he was a relative of Pharnabazus, he had not lived in the region before and had replaced their former...
sponsor, Ariobarzanes – Artabazus found allies on Rhodes. His alliance, either with the *polis* itself or, more likely, with a prominent faction within the city-state, was confirmed by his marriage to the sister of two Rhodians (Demosthenes 23.157; Diodorus 16.52.3), Mentor and Memnon, who would come to play an increasingly important role in international affairs in the eastern Mediterranean over the next several decades.

At this point, Rhodes was still a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, and it is not unreasonable to view Mentor and Memnon as members of a pro-Athenian faction at Rhodes in the 360s. Their service with Artabazus came at a time when Athens was losing popularity in Rhodes, evidenced by the aforementioned welcome given to Epaminondas and his fleet, and Mausolus, along with Thebes, was gaining it. With Athens distracted by events in Greece, however, Mentor and Memnon struck up a mutually beneficial relationship with Artabazus, who was also in search of allies in the Aegean at this time. The two Rhodians were likely instrumental in aligning Athens with Artabazus, hiring the future Athenian citizen Charidemus (Demosthenes 23.157) in 362 and Chares during the Social War of 357-355 (discussed next chapter). Indeed, Athens memorialized their service as well as those of Artabazus and their descendents on an

66 In this context, it is worthwhile to point out that the Rhodian Timotheus had previously been employed by another satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Pharnabazus, as an envoy to Athens (see n. 5 above). This Timotheus was almost certainly a *xenos* of Conon, who was also in the service of Pharnabazus at that time, and may in fact have been the namesake for Conon’s son, Timotheus of Athens, since, as Herman 1987: 19-21 demonstrates, it was not uncommon for *xenoi* to name their children after one another. It would appear that Artabazus, upon his arrival in Dascyllium, exploited *xenia* relationships that his father had previously established on Rhodes in order to gain allies in the Aegean upon his arrival in the west; these allies also held *xenia* with prominent figures in Athens, and may have used their own connections to promote the satrap’s later collaboration with the *polis* (discussed below). This reconstruction, though speculative, is supported by the existence of a later Athenian inscription – Rhodes and Osborne 2003 (*GHI*: #98 – honoring Pharnabazus, Artabazus, Mentor, and Memnon.
inscription in 327/326, and, as the following chapters make clear, their careers illustrate the highly political nature of so-called mercenary service in the fourth century Near East.

In Greece, meanwhile, the Battle of Mantinea took place in 362 (Hellenica 7.5.15-25; Diodorus 15.84-87), resulting in a new Common Peace. The extent and nature of the Peace is not clear: Xenophon does not mention its existence at all, remarking instead that affairs in Greece remained unsettled after Mantinea (Hellenica 7.5.26-27). Diodorus reports that a Peace was concluded and that it involved all Greeks save Sparta (15.89.1-2). Diodorus and Xenophon need not be viewed as contradicting one another: the former is likely right in stating that most of the Greeks, except Sparta, agreed to a Peace after Mantinea, while the latter’s statement, that affairs in Greece remained in flux, is also true, as the existence of a Peace in fourth century Greece rarely prevented the outbreak of further conflict for long.

Still, an Attic inscription from Argos, usually dated to this period, supports Diodorus’ version of events more closely. It states that the Greeks have concluded a Common Peace and orders the “the man who has come from the satraps” to inform the King that he should remove himself from the affairs of Greece, warning that “if he makes war on any who have sworn the oath or provides money for the breaking-up of this peace…we shall all resist in common”.68

The inscription is often understood as a response on the part of the Greek states to representatives from the satraps under revolt, but there are two problems with this interpretation: first, it only makes sense in the context of a widespread, coordinated satrapal revolt, which, as discussed above, has probably been misrepresented by

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67 See previous note.
68 Rhodes and Osborne 2003 (GHI): #42.
Diodorus. Second, and more importantly, the text itself gives no indication that it is directed at the representative of rebellious satraps. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the inscription is ultimately directed at the King (e.g., the Greeks “are not aware that the King has any war against them…if he keeps quiet…and does not attempt to break up the peace”) and his representatives (“or any one else of those from his territory”).

Alternatively, I suggest that the inscription is a response to an envoy from the King and his satraps seeking aid either for military support in Asia Minor – at this point in 362/361, Artabazus was engaged in warfare with Datames and Autophradas with Orontes⁶⁹ – or for an upcoming Persian invasion of Egypt.⁷⁰ The inscription was found in Argos, but the dialect is Attic, leading some scholars to suggest that it was originally composed in Athens.⁷¹ While the text of the inscription refers to the current state of peace in Greece and warns the King and his agents not to meddle in Greek affairs, at no point does it actually state that it is the official response of all the signatories to the satrapal overtures.

Indeed, the position taken in the inscription clearly benefits Athens most: having lost its patron Ariobarzanes, Athens had little to gain from Persian interference – at least, from loyalist forces – in Greek affairs. It is hard to understand why Thebes, which at the time enjoyed favor with Autophradas and Mausolus and had most recently benefitted from the King’s meddling in Greek affairs, would consent to this text. Neutrality would, of course, undermine Thebes’ position in Greece the most, since Thebes actually had the

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⁷⁰ One which would be abandoned due to the death of Artaxerxes II in 360/359, but which his son and successor was in the process of preparing. See discussion in the following chapter.
⁷¹ See discussion in Rhodes and Osborne 2003 (GHI): 214-216.
support of the King. Athens, having no official Persian allies at the moment, would lose nothing by such a policy. The inscription thus appears to reflect an Athenian attempt to promulgate a self-serving interpretation of the recent Common Peace: namely, that by agreeing to peace with one another, the Greek states (read: Thebes) had resolved their disputes and therefore should neither give nor receive aid to the King or his subordinates.\footnote{It is less clear why the inscription should appear in Argos and, presumably, have the consent of the Argive state, which had fought alongside Thebes at Mantinea. The most plausible explanation, in my view, is that after Mantinea Argos no longer felt alliance with Thebes to be necessary. Argos’ primary rival in the Peloponnese, Sparta was now further weakened and surrounded by hostile states in Arcadia and Messenia. So long as the Peace and, according to the inscription, its guarantee of common defense held, Argive security was not threatened; if, then, the Argives agreed with Athens that the biggest threat to the Peace was the King, it makes sense that they would sign on to this Athenian response to the King’s representative.}

The disingenuity of this response is made clear by two simultaneous Athenian initiatives. First, the Athenians apparently were in contact with the satrapal rival of Autophradates, Orontes,\footnote{Moysey 1987 argues that this inscription, and thus collaboration between Athens and Orontes, should instead be dated to 349, but see Weiskopf 1989: 76–79 for reaffirmation of the 360s date.} who himself seems to have also been in collusion with Tachos of Egypt (Diodorus 15.92.1). Second, Athens sent Chabrias and, presumably, a force of mercenaries to Egypt, all the while claiming that Chabrias was acting as a private individual and not a representative of the state (15.92.3).\footnote{Similar to his earlier assertion that Chabrias’ service in Egypt during the 380s had not been approved by Athens, Diodorus (see also Plutarch Agesilaus 37.1–4, Nepos Chabrias 2–3, the latter of which conflates both periods of Chabrias’ service in Egypt into one expedition) obscures the reality that Chabrias was acting as an agent of his home polis, whose interests were clearly served at this time by an independent Egypt. Although Plutarch remarks that Chabrias and Agesilaus disagreed initially about which Egyptian king to support, he does not provide any information about what actions Chabrias took thereafter. I would suggest that this disagreement took place prior to Tachos’ alignment with Persia (Diodorus 15.92.5), and that once this took place Chabrias either withdrew or}
a policy of official neutrality in attempt to pressure Thebes into forsaking its advantageous relationship with the King and his loyal satraps, while attempting to gain an advantage for itself through collaboration with Egypt and Orontes.

The Spartans shared similar goals with the Athenians but, having not been a party to the Common Peace of 362/361, pursued them through other means. If Xenophon’s apologetic portrayal of Agesilaus’ service in Egypt is any indication, they proclaimed their opposition to Persia as a pan-Hellenic gesture (Xenophon *Agesilaus* 2.28-31). In this way, they sought to undermine Thebes’ advantage with Persia by painting their rivals as unpatriotic medizers, while at the same time receiving much needed financial support from their own allied *barbaroi*.

The failure of the joint hegemony of Ariobarzanes, Sparta, and Athens drove these two states into alliance with Egypt, and consequently illustrates some of the shortcomings of Artaxerxes II’s policy in the periphery of the Empire. Despite having the patronage the King’s most influential satrap in western Anatolia, the two traditionally most powerful *poleis* were able neither to refrain from conflict with one another nor to maintain their hegemony over mainland Greece. Ultimately, the resources available to Sparta through their relationship with Ariobarzanes were insufficient to overcome Thebes following Leuctra. Rather than providing support to their colleague in Dascylium, the satraps in Sardis and Halicarnassus chose to exploit these setbacks for their own personal gains, promoting Theban interests in Greece and the Aegean and even finding justification for launching an invasion of Hellespontine Phrygia.

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offered support to Nectanebos, whom the Athenians also aided in the late 350s (Diodorus 16.48.2).
The immediate consequences of this behavior were increased instability in western Anatolia and the cooperation of Athens and Sparta with Egypt. Even so, the King’s allowance of rivalry and competition between his satraps in western Anatolia meant that he also had representatives in a position to take advantage of Thebes’ military ascendancy in Greece. Without having to divert funds or resources from his planned invasion of Egypt, Artaxerxes was able to ensure that the most powerful state in Greece counted him as its patron.

**Conclusion**

Artaxerxes II died in 359 while his son Ochus, the soon-to-be-crowned Artaxerxes III, was preparing to launch an invasion of Egypt. To the end of his reign, Artaxerxes II’s policy toward Greece had remained the same: he demanded direct control of all the Greek states of Asia, and encouraged his satraps to compete with one another to gain indirect control of Greece through the patronage of leading politicians in the most prominent Greek *poleis*.

Despite scholarly assertions that certain Greek states made more natural allies for Persia than others, the King did not prefer one Greek *polis* over any other *per se*. Instead, his favor was conditional in two respects: first, he expected that his client Greeks refrain from attacking Persian territory. This is why Sparta lost his support following the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger and during the various Spartan campaigns into Asia Minor in the 390s and why the King ultimately gave up on Athens only after Thrasybulus’ raids along the Anatolian coast in 391/390 and 390/389.
Second, Artaxerxes II expected his Greek clients to be in a position to control Greece and the Aegean. This is why he favored Athens and Conon above the rest of the allies against Sparta in the early to mid 390s, why he chose to support Sparta and Antalcidas instead of some other Greek state once Athens had joined the ranks of Evagoras and Acoris at the end of the 390s, why he consented to Athenian hegemony over the Aegean in the renewal of the King’s Peace in 375, and why he punished Ariobarzanes for his continued support of Sparta following the Battle of Leuctra, when it had become clear that Thebes was in a better position to maintain the King’s interests on the Greek mainland.

The policy of encouraging satrapal competition had some drawbacks for the King. There was increased instability in Asia as Dascylium, Sardis, and Halicarnassus worked to maximize their own territory at the expense of their rivals, even at times entering into open warfare with one another. The policy also limited the King’s influence in Greece, since the hegemony of individual Greek states was close to a zero-sum game for his satraps. This meant that satraps at times went too far in their attempts to shift the balance of power in the Aegean to their own favor, harming the King’s interests in the process, such as when Tiribazus imprisoned Conon in 392 or when Ariobarzanes persisted in supporting Sparta in 368 even after it had become clear that the King was best served by a relationship with Thebes.

The benefits of this policy, however, were also significant. Throughout nearly the entire reign of Artaxerxes II, the most pressing issue appears to have been the recovery of Egypt, followed by the suppression of a Cadusian revolt in the 380s, which the King led
in person (Plutarch Artaxerxes 24; Diodorus 15.8.5). By allowing his satraps to control Greece through their own patronage and using only their own resources, the King was able to devote royal finances and armies to more important tasks.

The financial and military resources of the individual satraps were not always sufficient to ensure that the King’s favored polis or poleis maintained hegemony over Greece and the Aegean. The most obvious evidence of this is the failure of Spartan hegemony following Leuctra, even with the aid provided by Ariobazanes and Philiscus in 368. Still, the satraps were able to leverage the potential for royal intervention, which, as the successes of Conon and Antalcidas proved, was decisive, in order to settle Greek affairs to their own benefit, as Ariobazanes appears to have done in 375 with the revisions made to the second iteration of the King’s Peace.

Most importantly, however, the dynamics of satrapal competition for clients in Greece ensured that the King was always in a position to patronize the most powerful Greek state – or to replace whichever state was currently most powerful, should it suit him – via one or another of his satraps. Thus when participation in the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger dissolved the post-Peloponnesian War alliance between the King and Sparta, Artaxerxes was able to take advantage of Pharnabazus’ and Evagoras’ ties with Conon and Athens. When Athens later sided with Evagoras and Acoris against the King, he was able to call utilize the close relationship between Tiribazus and Antalcidas and Sparta. Similarly, Ariobazanes and Pharnabazus could to rely upon their connections with Iphicrates and Athens to strengthen the King’s position in Greece by the implementation of a joint Spartan-Athenian hegemony in the 370s. When the Battle of Leuctra radically

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75 On Persian priorities vis-à-vis Egypt and Greece, and on the Greek distortion of such, see Ruzicka 2012: xx-xxi.
altered the political landscape in Greece in 371, Artaxerxes simply turned to Mausolus and Autophradates, who utilized their own *xenia* with Pelopidas and Epaminondas to ensure that the Theban hegemony of the 360s was also friendly to the King’s interests.

This strategy was not merely defensive in nature, though it generally had the advantage of forestalling Greek attacks on Persian territory in Asia while the King’s attention was elsewhere. Through the *xenia*-based alliances with various Greek *poleis*, the King’s satraps were able to draw upon military resources from Greece when the need arose. Pharnabazus could levy mercenaries from Athens, led by Iphicrates, for his invasion of Egypt in the 370s, without having to conscript soldiers from Hellespontine Phrygia. Likewise, Ariobarzanes made use of Timotheus and the Athenian fleet in his war against the satraps of Caria and Lydia in the 360s; at the same time Mausolus undermined Athenian control in the Aegean through his subsidization of the short-lived Theban fleet in the same period.

It is perhaps true that the reputation of Artaxerxes II is stained by the failure of his several attempts to reconquer Egypt. Even so, it is hard to view his policies on the western periphery of the Empire as anything but a resounding success. Without expending significant royal resources, the King manipulated competition between the Greek *poleis* and his own satraps to ensure that the Greek mainland was, after the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, deeply dependent upon Persian authority. As a result, it is clear that Greek sources have inverted the significance of Greek mercenaries in the Near East during this period: rather than a sign of Persian reliance upon Greek military might, their presence is an indication of successful, though indirect, integration of Greece
into the Empire through the establishment of *xenia* alliances between the King’s satraps and leading figures in the most powerful Greek states.
Chapter 6
Greeks between Artaxerxes III and Egypt

Xenophon’s *Hellenica* ends shortly after the Battle of Mantinea in 362, leaving Diodorus’ *Bibliotheca* as the lone continuous narrative for the reign of Artaxerxes III. In this period, Diodorus focuses on events in Greece, particularly the Third Sacred War and the rise of Macedon under Philip (16.1.1-6). Persian interactions with Greek *poleis* receive only brief discussion and, outside of the relatively detailed narrative of Artaxerxes III’s conquest of Egypt in 343-342 (16.40.3-6, 44, 46.4-51.3), Diodorus’ main interest in the Achaemenid Empire is limited to describing rebellion in the Levant (16.41-43, 45) and instability in Hellespontine Phrygia (16.22.1-2, 34.1-2). As a result, 359-342 has been characterized as a period of waning Achaemenid influence in Greece, as Artaxerxes III instead concentrated on the consolidation of his rule and expansion into Egypt.¹

Once again, however, it is possible to reconstruct a more active Persian role in Greek affairs by understanding the relationships between mercenary commanders and foreign rulers as indicators of political alignment and collaboration. Like his father, Artaxerxes III prioritized the recovery of Egypt; still, his western satraps continued to maintain strong ties with Greek states through their *xenia* with prominent Greek

¹ Briant 2002: 690 notes that “Artaxerxes III, like his predecessors, followed a policy toward the Greek cities that involved sending fairly frequent royal embassies,” but in the foregoing discussion he does not discuss the King’s interest in Greek affairs, except to note that he had little interest in opposing Philip in Greece, even after the conflict at Perinthus in 341-340. Cawkwell 2005: 200 sees little room or desire for Persian influence in Greece during this period, implying that the King’s policy was defensive and that he was content merely that “there was no danger of Greece uniting against Persia as had been attempted by Agesilaus in the 390s.” See also Mildenberg 1999: 219-220; Buckler and Beck 2008: 233-238.
politicians. The growing rise of Macedon, furthermore, does not seem to have immediately become a problem for Persia, and the interests of the two powers did not come into conflict until 340.

In this chapter, I argue that, from his accession in 359/358 until the conquest of Egypt in 342, Artaxerxes III continued to assert his authority in Greece by employing the same policies of his predecessor. Through the agency of his satraps, the King was able to detach several states from the Second Athenian Confederacy, support Theban efforts during the Third Sacred War, extend Persian direct rule into the southeastern Aegean, and levy Greek soldiers for wars in Anatolia, the Levant, and Egypt. Likewise, Artaxerxes’ rival Nectanebos II used his own connections in Greece to raise soldiers, whose role in the defense of Egypt went beyond that which their numbers or purported military prowess would suggest. During the reign of Artaxerxes III, more Greek poleis provided more Greek soldiers to Persia and Egypt than ever before, a reality that should be interpreted as a sign of Greece’s increased dependence upon the political patronage of Near Eastern powers rather than an indication of Near Eastern military weakness.

The Accession of Artaxerxes III and the Fall of Artabazus

When Artaxerxes II died in 359/358, his son and heir Ochus was in command of an army in Syria. Ochus had been given two tasks by his father: to first secure Achaemenid control of the Levant in the wake of the Egyptian offensive into the region in 361-360, and then to launch an invasion into Egypt itself. News of his father’s death prevented the completion of the second task, and instead Ochus was forced to return to

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east in order to secure his claim to the throne and put down a rebellion of the Cadusians (Diodorus 17.6.1-2; Justin 10.3.2-5).³

With the new King occupied by more pressing matters, the satraps on the western periphery of the Empire were free to pursue their own initiatives towards Greece and the Aegean in the first years of his reign. The result was continued satrapal strife and maneuvering within the Greek and Aegean world. In 357, with the support of Mausolus, Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium openly revolted from Athens. They were joined by Cos, which had not been a member of the Athenian Confederacy, but which had reason to fear Athenian aggression (Diodorus 16.7.3; Demosthenes 15.3). Artabazus, facing pressure from rival satraps, and Athens, facing a rebellion supported by at least one of these same satraps, found their interests in close alignment, and by 356 the Athenian Chares was fighting in Asia alongside the satrap (Diodorus 16.22.1).

Artaxerxes III waited for two years after the outbreak of hostilities before he declared his support for Mausolus and against Artabazus in 355 (16.22.2). The decision was probably not difficult: on the one hand, Mausolus was extending Persian influence into the southern Aegean. Together with his clients, Chios, Rhodes, and Cos, he had already defeated one Athenian fleet, resisted defeat by another, and plundered Imbros, Lemnos, and Samos (16.7.3-4, 21.1-4). On the other hand, Artabazus had invited an army from Athens into Persian territory in order campaign against other satraps.⁴

⁴ Diodorus reports that Chares and Artabazus campaigned against the “King’s army,” but, as Artaxerxes himself was clearly not present, in reality it was an army led by rival satraps.
Once it became clear that Athenian control of the Aegean could be undermined, Artaxerxes ordered Artabazus to cut ties with Athens and his Greek army. At the same time, the King threatened to supply Athens’ enemies with a large fleet and make war on their side unless the polis ceased assisting Artabazus, withdrew from Persian territory, and ended the war with its former allies. Artabazus and Athens both complied, and so ended the Social War and Athenian involvement in Hellespontine Phrygia (Diodorus 16.22.2).

Artabazus was still pressed by his satrapal rivals, and this led him to enter into an alliance with Thebes. In exchange for a significant sum of money, in 354 the Thebans sent him 5,000 soldiers under Pammenes, recently victorious over Phocis at the Battle of Neon (16.34.1-2; Frontius 2.3.3). After contributing to two of Artabazus’ victories, however, Artabazus arrested the Theban and, it is often assumed, executed him (Polyaenus 7.33.2). By 352, Artabazus had fled with Memnon to the court of Philip in Macedon, and Mentor joined Nectanebos in Egypt shortly thereafter (Diodorus 16.52.3).

The Theban involvement with Artabazus provokes several questions. Why did Thebes, which had been since the 367 the Persians’ favored Greek polis, agree to send

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5 This order is only found in the report of a scholiast of Demosthenes (4.19), the reliability of which Briant 2002: 791-792 rightly questions. It is often understood to apply to all satraps in the west, and to have been circumvented by Artabazus when he made common cause with Chares and Athens. See Parke 1933: 122-123; Mildenberg 1999: 207-208; Cawkwell 2005: 179; Ruzicka 2012: 155-156. More likely the scholiast misunderstood the nature and timing of the King’s order, assuming it was similar to a later directive to disband mercenary armies given by Alexander to his own satraps and governors (Diodorus 17.106.3). I suggest a narrower interpretation: Artaxerxes ordered Artabazus to cut ties with Athens, since the King had decided to support Mausolus and his own Greek allies in the Social War. This command necessitated the departure of Chares and his Athenian soldiers from Hellespontine Phrygia, but was not a general command that all satraps cut ties with their mercenaries.

6 For Pammenes’ activity prior to service with Artabazus, see Buckler and Beck 2008: 224-230.
Pammenes to aid Artabazus’ rebellion? Why did Artabazus turn on Pammenes? Why did Artaxerxes III give Thebes a substantial amount of money in 351 (16.40.1-2), less than three years after Thebes had provided military aid to a rebel satrap?

Our sources do not offer any interpretation on the first and third questions. Diodorus simply narrates that in each case the Thebans were given money and, in return, dispatched soldiers (16.44.1-2). For the second, Polyainenus reports that Artabazus suspected him of preparing to desert to the King (7.33.2).

Buckler and Beck argue that the Theban decision to aid Artabazus stemmed from the failure of earlier Theban cooperation with the King. Not only did much of Greece reject the pro-Theban renewal of the King’s Peace in 367, but the failure of the Epaminondian naval program in 364 also led the polis to “doubt the usefulness of the closer relations with Persia”, and besides, the “direct advantages were obvious without entailing any great danger from the anger of the King”. Cawkwell suggests a simpler solution: the Thebans, financially exhausted from waging war for decades, were unable to pay their mercenaries and so joined Artabazus’ rebellion out of financial desperation. In both reconstructions, Artaxerxes III later brushes aside Theban disloyalty in his decision to renew friendly relations with Thebes in 351.

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7 The specific context of this gift is discussed in the following section; here, I am concerned with its significance as an indication that the King remained on good terms with Thebes despite Pammenes’ service with Artabazus.
8 Thebes provided soldiers to the King in 345, but it is unclear whether Olmstead 1948: 432 is correct in seeing a connection between their service and the King’s gift in 351.
9 Buckler and Beck 2008: 230-231 state that Pammenes’ success and popularity made Artabazus jealous, which, in addition to suspicions about his loyalty, led satrap to plot against the Theban. I find no evidence of this, however, in the accounts of Diodorus, Polyainenus, or Frontius.
10 Buckler and Beck 2008: 226.
Cawkwell does not address Artabazus’ decision to betray Pammenes, but Buckler and Beck adapt Polyaeus’ explanation, adding that the satrap’s petty jealousy over Pammenes’ popularity to the unfounded (in their view) suspicion that he was conspiring with loyalist satraps. Here, Ruzicka offers a more convincing solution. He argues that Artaxerxes had in fact attempted to bribe Pammenes into betraying Artabazus and that, once the satrap learned of Pammenes’ potential betrayal, he struck first and executed the Theban. This explanation also has the benefit of explaining the King’s positive relationship with Thebes in 351, particularly if Pammenes had agreed on Thebes’ behalf to accept an offer from the King before his death. Still, Ruzicka does not address the politics of Thebes’ decision to support Artabazus, framing the issue solely in financial terms.

In full, then, none of these reconstructions is entirely satisfactory. Buckler’s argument that Thebes had little to lose from angering the King is clearly false: very recently, the mere threat of royal intervention had caused Athens to withdraw troops from Artabazus’ army and give up its claims on Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes. That threat was credible because Artaxerxes was preparing for an invasion of Egypt and had already gathered a large army and fleet in Phoenicia. At any moment, he could choose to divert at least part of his force to the Aegean or simply send money to Thebes’ rivals in Greece. Additionally, the notion that Thebes was so financially exhausted that it would risk its relationship with the King by collaborating with a rebel is clearly problematic.

Prior to the start of the Sacred War, Thebes had not been involved in a major campaign

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12 See n. 9 above.
14 Actions that, as the previous chapter noted, Artaxerxes II and Pharnabazus had undertaken in order to undermine Sparta in the 390s.
since Mantinea in 362. It makes little sense to think that the *polis* was in such desperate financial straights after only one campaign season, especially one deemed so successful that the loan of a significant portion of the city’s military force was approved.

The real impediment to understanding Thebes’ behavior is the categorization of Artabazus as a rebel at the time of Pammenes’ arrival in Asia. If Xenophon’s portrayal of the dispute between Cyrus and Tissaphernes in the *Anabasis* is accurate, satraps could make war on one another without either being considered a rebel from the throne. The King was likely not concerned, so long as taxes and tribute continued to be paid and the conflict did not threaten his authority or his broader political agenda.

From this perspective, the King’s earlier warning to Athens had not been about declaring Artabazus a rebel and preventing Athenian aid to him. Instead, it signaled a shift in the King’s broader Aegean policy, namely the decision to support Mausolus’ attempts to expand his domain at Athens’ expense. As a result of this new direction, which was perhaps encouraged by the deployment of Athenian troops within the Empire’s territories, Athens’ relationship with Artabazus and claims to its recalcitrant eastern Aegean allies needed to be terminated.

It is possible, then, to acknowledge the King’s threat to wage war on Athens without also viewing Artabazus as a rebel, and as a result Thebes’ subsequent aid to the satrap need not be understood as a shift away from its previously sympathetic relationship with Persia. Apart from its single, relatively uneventful naval campaign into the Aegean, Thebes did not have naval ambitions, and as a result its arrangement with Artabazus, unlike the satrap’s previous alliance with Athens, did not threaten or hinder
Persian expansion west under Mausolus. The *polis* was simply dispatching an army to aid a satrap who, while in conflict with his colleagues, was not in revolt from the King.

Not long after Pammenes’ arrival, however, the King turned against Artabazus. The reasons for this are unsurprisingly obscure, given the lack of information even our sources would have had of internal Persian politics, but some speculations are more plausible than others. Perhaps Artaxerxes was not enamored with his satrap deploying a significant number of foreign – even if technically allied – troops within the borders of the Empire against other Persian forces. It is also possible that the conflict between Artabazus and his rivals had caused too much instability in the region, particularly if it resulted in an interruption in the revenues sent to Susa. At any rate, it is clear that Artabazus lost favor with the King and was eventually declared a rebel (Diodorus 16.52.3), but only after Pammenes had arrived in his service.

The King’s decision left Thebes in an awkward position, since the mercenaries under Pammenes were now in the service of a rebel and therefore threatened Thebes’ relationship with the King. Ruzicka’s suggestion that Pammenes was in contact with the King’s officials makes good sense at this point, as does Artabazus’ decision to execute the Theban upon discovering such contact. It must have been clear to the satrap that the Theban would attempt to extricate himself from Artabazus’ army, but, since Pammenes’ soldiers were probably not Theban citizens, the satrap may have still held out hope that he could retain their services in the event of Pammenes’ death, which he clearly attempted to do by giving command over to his brothers (Polyaenus 7.33.2).

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15 In this case, perhaps the provisions in the King’s Peace which had caused Timotheus to avoid campaigning on Asian soil (discussed in the previous chapter) still obtained.
Our sources do not say whether Pammenes’ mercenaries remained in the employment of the satrap. Regardless, his flight to Macedon makes it clear that Artabazus was unable to maintain his position in Hellespontine Phrygia or to regain the favor of Artaxerxes. One consequence of his execution of Pammenes must have been the confirmation of Thebes’ loyalty in the King’s eyes, which in turn meant that there was no need for Artaxerxes to overlook anything in 351: good relations between the polis and the King were never severed.

The first years of Artaxerxes III’s reign were marked by a string of successes. The new King consolidated his control of the Levant, suppressed a rebellion in the east, secured his position on the throne from potential rivals, reaffirmed his relationship with Thebes in Greece, and, at the cost of increased instability in Hellespontine Phrygia, oversaw the reduction of the Second Athenian Confederacy and the expansion of his territory in the southeast Aegean under Mausolus. His policy on the Empire’s western periphery remained in most respects the same as his father’s: by allowing his satraps to pursue their own ends with their own means, he was able to devote royal resources toward the invasion of Egypt.

Rebellion in Cyprus and the Levant

Artaxerxes III launched his first invasion of Egypt in 351. Apparently, it ended in complete disaster (Diodorus 16.48.1-2; Isocrates 5.101; Demosthenes 15.11-12). Our sources reveal few details about the campaign other than Diodorus’ report that Nectanebos’ forces were supplemented by Greeks serving under Diophantus of Athens
and Lamius of Sparta. Both of these generals were undoubtedly political figures, much as Chabrias and Agesilaus had been a decade earlier, and their service in Egypt should be understood to indicate that Athens and Sparta remained aligned with Egypt against the King. It is in this context that Artaxerxes’ financial aid to Thebes in 351 should be understood (Diodorus 16.40.1-2): with Athens and Sparta hostile to his interests, the King chose to support his strongest ally in Greece even as Thebes, at war with Phocis, was unable to provide any soldiers for the campaign against Egypt.

Much like the Persian invasion of the late 390s, failure in 351 sparked revolts in Phoenicia and on Cyprus (Diodorus 16.40.5; Isocrates 5.102). Artaxerxes immediately began plans for a second campaign, which he would personally command, against Sidon and Egypt (Diodorus 16.40.6). In the meantime, he directed Idrieus, the new Hecatomnid satrap of Caria, to secure Cyprus (16.42.6). Idrieus in turn appointed for this task

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17 Polyaeus 2.16 records an anecdote describing a stratagem used by Gastron of Sparta against the Persians in Egypt. Ruzicka 2012: 161-163 suggests that Gastron’s service might be dated to this invasion and also notes that Mentor of Rhodes may have already been in Egypt at this time.
18 Lamius is not mentioned by other sources, but, as Ruzicka 2012: 161 notes, Diophantus was a public figure at Athens and a trierarch. He may have died during his expedition to Egypt or soon after, since his trierarchy passed on to his son, also named Diophantus, in 349/348; if this is true, it would appear that Diophantus was in command of ship(s) provided by Athens to Nectanebos. See Gabrielsen 1994: 61-62.
19 The exact timing of the King’s gift to Thebes is unclear, since Diodorus’ chronology is unreliable at this point. Either the aid was provided prior to the invasion as a means of boosting Theban support and in view of the Athenian and Spartan presence in Egypt, or it was given after the campaign’s disastrous end – and the subsequent revolts in the Levant and on Cyprus – as a way of ensuring the King’s influence in the west did not further deteriorate.
20 The accession of Idrieus provides a good example of how confusing Diodorus’ chronology can be: he reports the King’s orders to the newly appointed ruler of Caria at 16.42.5, but only provides notification of Idrieus’ accession (in 352/351) at 16.45.7, after describing the King’s conquest of Sidon, which took place much later in 346/345.
Evagoras II, son of the earlier king of Salamis by the same name, who used his xenia connections in Athens to hire Phocion (16.42.7-8).

Although Athens had sided with Nectanebos against the King only a year earlier, the King likely had no qualms with the appointment of Phocion. With the revolts in Phoenicia and Cyprus, the growing strength of Egypt, and Thebes’ occupation in the Third Sacred War, Artaxerxes would have gladly taken the opportunity to remove Athens from the list of his enemies. Similarly, the rising threat of Macedon gave Athens reason to seek rapprochement with the King, whose financial resources far outstripped those of Nectanebos. The opportunity to return a historically pro-Athenian Evagorid to the throne at Salamis – and to therefore gain an ally within the Achamenid Empire – must have also enticed Phocion and the polis. Although there is no indication that Phocion’s service resulted in the renewal of an alliance between Athens and the King, it may have precipitated an Athenian withdrawal from Egypt, since no Athenians are mentioned during the King’s subsequent campaign there (discussed in the following section).

Ultimately, Phocion and Evagoras failed to capture Salamis, the primary target of their Cypriote expedition (16.46.2-3). In the meantime, the Sidonians and their king, Tennes, defeated the Persian regional forces under the command of Mazeus and Belesys,

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21 The exact chronology of these events is, once again, confused in Diodorus’ account. Phocion’s period of service lasted only until 349, at which point he returned to Athens; Evagoras, however, likely continued the siege of Salamis until the fall of Sidon in 346/345, at which point all of the Cypriote kings submitted to Artaxerxes, including Pnytagoras of Salamis. Although Evagoras failed to win back Salamis, he nevertheless received a different (unspecified) province from the King (Diodorus 16.46.2-3). See Tritle 1988: 152-156. Ruzicka 2012: 170-171 places Phocion’s campaign in 346, but this seems less likely to me than Tritle’s reconstruction – in 346, Isocrates 5.103-104 suggested that Idrieus would be amenable to joining the rebellion, yet he makes no mention of collaboration between Phocion or Athens and the satrap at that time.
the satraps of Syria and Cilicia (16.42.1-2). In this effort, the Sidonians were aided by Mentor of Rhodes and 4,000 Greek mercenaries.

Mentor and his soldiers had been furnished by Nectanebos in Egypt (16.42.2), and, while they played a role in the early success of the rebellion, their numbers were too small to give Tennes much hope of defeating the main army of Artaxerxes (16.43.1). Nectanebos offered no more soldiers to the Sidonians, but Diodorus later reveals that he pharaoh had a great number of Greek, Libyan, and Egyptian troops at his disposal (16.47.6-7). This raises two questions: first, why did Nectanebos send any soldiers to aid the Sidonian rebellion, if he was not committed to its success? From this perspective, he wasted four thousand soldiers and an experienced military commander by abandoning them in Phoenicia. Second, why did Nectanebos initially choose to send Mentor of Rhodes and his contingent, out of all his many soldiers?

Ruzicka offers what at first seems to be plausible answer to the first question, writing that “perhaps, in the face of Artaxerxes’ methodical preparation of a huge expeditionary force, Nectanebos recognized that if he deployed a comparably large army outside Egypt and it failed, Egypt would be completely vulnerable”. Yet there is one problem with this interpretation: it requires us to believe that Nectanebos dramatically underestimated the size of the force Artaxerxes would bring to bear against the rebels. Nectanebos had already defeated one Persian expedition against Egypt, and had seen another substantial force stop just short of invasion at the death of Artaxerxes II in

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22 Likely, these engagements came at the very beginning of the revolt, since Diodorus connects them with the outbreak of conflict on Cyprus (16.42.3-4).
23 Notably, this is one of few instances where Diodorus does not give Greek mercenaries more credit for victory than their native counter-parts. See discussion in chapter two.
24 Ruzicka 2012: 172.
359/358. Given this experience and his previous (and justifiable, considering the circumstances in which he took power from Tachos) reticence to venture beyond Egypt’s borders,\(^{25}\) it is hard to imagine the pharaoh misjudging the extent to which Artaxerxes III desired to conquer Egypt and the lengths to which he would go to ensure that the Levant did not remain outside his dominion for long. Nectanebos, recognizing that any resistance without the natural defenses of the Nile delta would be fruitless, never intended to provide Sidon with more aid than he did.

Mentor and his mercenaries were thus intentionally sacrificed by Nectanebos, and must have been chosen for this task because the pharaoh did not trust Mentor’s loyalty.\(^ {26}\) The Rhodian was, after all, no mere mercenary, but a former Persian landholder, a member of the Persian nobility, and the brother of Artabazus, the now-exiled satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Nectanebos may have suspected that Mentor’s ultimate aim was to win back the favor of the King,\(^ {27}\) and the apparent ease with which Mentor betrayed Sidon (16.45.1-4), gained a relatively high-ranking appointment in the army of Artaxerxes (16.47.4), and won pardons for his brother and father-in-law (16.52.3) supports this analysis.\(^ {28}\) By sending Mentor to Sidon at the start of the revolt, Nectanebos

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\(^{25}\) A reticence Ruzicka 2012: 166 also notes.

\(^{26}\) For the tenuous nature of Nectanebos’ position in Egypt, see discussion in the following section.

\(^{27}\) As the discussion above related, Mentor is not mentioned by Diodorus as a participant in the Egyptian defense during the Persian invasion of 351. It is possible that he did not arrive in Egypt until after that campaign, and so had not previously demonstrated his loyalty to Nectanebos; alternatively, his behavior during the defense had raised doubts about his reliability, which may also explain why Diodorus credited Diophantus and Lamius, but not Mentor, for Nectanebos’ success.

\(^{28}\) An obvious counter-argument to this would be that Mentor’s betrayal was merely opportunistic. My interpretation makes more sense, however, in light of the argument above that Artabazus never intended to rebel from the King in the 350s, but was instead forced to abandon his satrapy due to the slander and military pressure of rival satraps.
removed a potential traitor from his ranks and also used him to aid the rebellion at Sidon, where he would not have the opportunity to switch sides until the arrival of the King.\footnote{It would have made little sense to betray Tennes and the Sidonians to Belesys and Mazeus, since Mentor needed the King’s personal pardon. Ruzicka 2012: 173 makes the intriguing suggestion that it was Mentor and his soldiers who set the Sidonian fleet on fire, though he reasons that Mentor did this for the benefit of Nectanebos. Diodorus writes that this happened prior to the capture of the city, however, and I wonder if it was instead done to render Sidon more vulnerable, thus serving as a demonstration of fealty to Artaxerxes.}

Artaxerxes arrived in the Levant at the head of the main Persian force in 346. Sidon was quickly betrayed to him and, with the failure of the rebellion in Phoenicia, in 345 the various kings of Cyprus rushed to submit. Although this rebellion had occupied most of his attention and resources, Artaxerxes also improved his standing in Greece and the Aegean during this period: he continued to support Thebes, reconciled with Mentor of Rhodes, and, through Idrieus’ patronage of Evagoras II and Phocion, appears to have detached Athens from its alliance with Nectanebos. Only six years after the setback of 351, Artaxerxes was poised to launch another, successful invasion of Egypt.

The Conquest of Egypt

The defining achievement of Artaxerxes III’s reign was the conquest of Egypt. As my discussion in Chapter 2 made clear, credit for the conception and execution of the Persian conquest belongs to Artaxerxes and his Persian subordinates, whose invasion strategy incorporated Greeks but did not rely upon them for their singular abilities as commanders and soldiers. Here, I argue that, once again, politics provides a more
accurate explanation for Artaxerxes’ decision to hire Greeks for the campaign in 343-342 but not 351, and for Nectanebos’ decision to place his own Greeks in prominent positions throughout his network of defensive fortifications.

I begin with Nectanebos first: much like Cyrus the Younger sought out a Greek force both in order to supplement the size of his own Anatolian levies and to ensure their loyalty, the pharaoh increased the size and trustworthiness of his army by hiring Greek mercenaries whose officers had a strong political interest in his success. This is little different from his employment of Greeks during previous invasions, as the discussion above makes clear the direct interest Agesilaus, Chabrias, Lamius, and Diophantus had in his personal rule of Egypt and continued independence from Persia.

In 343, Nectanebos could still rely upon significant Greek support, despite Mentor’s desertion. Diodorus names two Greek commanders in particular: the first was a Spartan, Philophron, who was stationed at Pelusium, the most important fortress for the defense of the Egypt (16.46.7-8). Another Greek, Cleinius the Coan, led a contingent of mercenaries in an unnamed but obviously important location (16.48.5).30 Whereas Philophron was undoubtedly present as a representative of Sparta, much as Agesilaus and Lamius before him, Cleinius likely served as an exile, since Cos was at that time under the direct domination of Mausolus. In this way, his activity might be viewed similarly to Conon’s Persian service from 397-395, when that general collaborated with the King in order to undermine Spartan hegemony over Athens in Greece.31

30 Ruzicak 2012: 194 suggests Daphnae.
31 As suggested by Sherwin-White 1978: 73 (see 68-77 for full discussion of Hecatomnid control of the island).
At first glance, the lack of any Athenians on either side of the conflict seems curious. Diodorus makes it clear that Athens chose not to provide Artaxerxes with soldiers. The fact that Diodorus does not mention any Athenians serving Nectanebos does not necessarily mean none were there, and it is possible that Athens, like Sparta, continued to support the Egyptian cause. Still, it is more plausible that there was no significant Athenian presence in Egypt at this time. Diodorus always mentions their presence in prior campaigns, and it would be hard to understand why he would omit them from his most detailed Persian invasion narrative.

There was, in fact, good reason for the Athenians to remain neutral in the conflict between Persia and Egypt. Unlike the other poleis that sent soldiers – Thebes, Argos, and Sparta – Athens was increasingly threatened by the rising power of Macedon in Greece, which, even after the Peace of Philocrates, showed little sign of abating; more conflict with Philip was certainly on the horizon, and the Athenians probably could not afford to spare any soldiers for missions abroad. Furthermore, it may be that Phocion’s limited service on Cyprus only a few years earlier had thawed relations between Athens and Persia to the point that the polis had withdrawn its support from Egypt in hopes of future collaboration with the King.

Political considerations clearly played a large role in Greek decisions to supply Nectanebos II with mercenaries, and the pharaoh’s decision to seek Greeks was similarly politically motivated. Rather than establishing alliances with poleis such as Athens and Sparta merely for the utilitarian purpose of acquiring as many Greek mercenaries as possible, Nectanebos hired allies from specific states in the Greek world in order to

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32 Buckler and Beck 2008: 236-238.
increase both the size and political loyalty of his own forces. In other words, he sought
Greek soldiers under commanders from certain states primarily for their political
allegiances, not because he considered them to be objectively superior soldiers and
strategists.

Although none of our sources explicitly comment on any instability in Egypt prior
to Artaxerxes’ conquest in 343-342, there are several reasons to believe that Nectanebos
was not an especially popular ruler. The strongest evidence is found in the failure of the
Egyptian defense effort in 343-342, particularly in Nectanebos’ quick decision to flee
south, which is not explicable from a strategic or tactical perspective. Of course, the
Persian beachhead behind Pelusium put the fortress at risk and was not an insignificant
threat, but this was not the first time a Persian force had breached Egypt’s frontier
defenses. Nectanebos held a significant force in reserve, and the Persians had only
advanced along the easternmost Pelusiac branch of the river. Past Persian campaigns had
failed once the Nile’s flood season began, making resupply and campaigning extremely
difficult for large invasion forces, and there is no military justification for the Pharaoh to
abandon his intricate network of defenses so suddenly.

Even if the situation in Lower Egypt had become untenable, Nectanebos still had
a large army at his command and a stout fortress at Memphis, making his immediate
withdrawal further south nonsensical. Diodorus’ explanation, that the pharaoh panicked
and did not want to risk a large battle at Memphis (16.51.1), is not convincing.
Nectanebos was an experienced military commander, having won his rule in a civil war
and already once warded off a Persian invasion of his kingdom. The notion that he would
so abruptly abandon the bulk of his territory, which he had invested a great deal of time and resources fortifying, need not occupy much discussion.

Similarly, the idea that he would withdraw from Memphis, perhaps the most stoutly fortified position in all Egypt, for tactical reasons is unsatisfactory. The entire purpose of such a fortress is to allow defenders to avoid open, decisive battle with a superior force. If Nectanebos’ forces were loyal and prepared to vigorously defend Egypt from the Persians, there was nothing to prevent the him from withstanding a siege in Memphis, using the large fleet of riverboats he had constructed (16.47.6) to harass Persian supply lines and to launch attacks from the numerous unconquered fortresses throughout marshy Lower Egypt on any footholds the invading force managed to take.\textsuperscript{33} It is hard to see how this strategy, in combination with the annual inundation of the Nile during flood season, would have been ineffective.

Nectanebos’ abandonment must have been motivated by political rather than purely military considerations. As mentioned previously, Diodorus portrays the surrender of the garrisons at Pelusium and Bubastis, and indeed the rest of Lower Egypt, as a consequence of Nectanebos’ premature flight to Memphis and then further south. His explanation makes Nectanebos appear incompetent and serves the purpose of absolving from any blame in the defeat the Greek forces on the Egyptian side.

More sensible, however, is the reverse of Diodorus’ presentation. Nectanebos fled south, abandoning his network of fortifications and his stronghold at Memphis, because his own troops were unreliable and, after a single Persian victory, began to surrender en

\textsuperscript{33} Certainly his military capabilities far exceeded those of the Persians during the Egyptian rebellion of Inarus in the 450s, and they held out for several years (Thucydides 1.104, 109). As Diodorus himself notes, Nectanebos was not unprepared for a siege at Memphis (16.48.6).
masse, first at Pelusium and then at Bubastis. Given this situation, the decision to avoid risking a siege at his capital makes good sense, since he had cause to think that the fortress would also be betrayed.

Prior to the invasion, Nectanebos must have been aware of the questionable loyalty of his own Egyptian troops, and the balanced dispositions of his forces indicates the pharaoh’s lack of faith in the support of his own native troops. By placing hired Greeks and Libyans who were loyal only to Nectenabos himself alongside his own Egyptian soldiers (16.48.3-5, 49.7), the pharaoh hoped to minimize desertion from the native ranks, much like Cyrus the Younger had used his Greeks to guard against any uprising from his own Persians at the trial of Orontas.

Although this strategy ultimately failed, events nevertheless proved Nectanebos’ faith in the loyalty of his Greeks to be well founded. This is best evidenced by the fierce resistance that the Greeks under Philophron and Cleinius put up at Pelusium and elsewhere (16.46.8-9, 48.4-5, 49.1-2). It is noteworthy that Greek decisions to surrender at Bubastis and elsewhere were undertaken only in response to negotiations between Persian and Egyptian commanders, who seem to have willfully excluded their Greek allies from the discussions (16.49.7-50.4). Further supporting the disconnect between the Egyptian and Greek defenders at Pelusium and Bubastis are the reported conflicts – and even outright battles – between the two groups during the process of negotiation and surrender (16.49.3-6, 8, 50.3-6).

Artaxerxes must have been aware of Nectanebos’ tenuous political position, and indeed his strategy appears to have been calculated to take advantage of dissatisfaction in the Egyptian ranks. This is most clearly shown in the decision to spread word throughout
Lower Egypt that defectors would be given clemency and treated with mercy after Pelusium had been cut off by the expedition of Aristazenes and Nicostratus (16.49.7). As a result of the apparently overwhelming success of this gambit, the Persians do not appear to have needed to campaign throughout the Delta or to have fought any further battles.

In light of the peaceful surrender of most of Lower Egypt, it is likely that Artaxerxes found willing collaborators among the Egyptians. Although the evidence is tenuous, Ruzicka’s speculation that this collaborator was a certain Chababash, who appears to have successfully revolted from the Persians in 338 and was probably a descendent of the 29th dynasty from Mendes, is attractive.34 As Ruzicka also noted, it appears that Artaxerxes and the Persians made little effort to follow Nectanebos south of Memphis, where he may have continued for several years as pharaoh in Upper Egypt. This decision makes the most sense if the Persians held Lower Egypt down to Memphis with the aid of a native dynast, and therefore no longer felt that Nectanebos was a threat.

The potential collaboration between an Egyptian rival and Artaxerxes is all the more plausible considering the contested succession of Nectanebos II, who overthrew his uncle Tachos and defeated an unnamed rival from Mendes (Plutarch Agesilaus 38.1), seat of the 29th dynasty, which itself had been overthrown by Nectanebos I.35 Nectanebos’ employment of Agesilaus’ foreign soldiers in the battle for his succession itself does not prove that he lacked legitimacy, but it is hard to see how having Greek help in his coup would have increased his popularity. Furthermore, if Plutarch is to be believed Nectanebos’ Mendesian opponent had a larger army made up of artisans and other

34 Ruzicka 2012: 203, full discussion 199-205.
inexperienced soldiers (*Agesilaus* 38.1-2, 39.1-5) and, one might therefore presume, held more popular support in Lower Egypt.

Another indication of Nectanebos’ vulnerability is his continued employment of foreigners, both Greek and Libyan. Already mentioned above is the presence of Agesilaus, Diophantus, Lamius, Philophron, Cleinius, and perhaps Chabrias. Additionally, Diodorus writes that Nectanebos had in his employ a significant number of Libyans, whom he counts separately from the native Egyptian troops (16.47.6).

Finally, Nectanebos had undertaken one of the most comprehensive building programs in Egyptian history.\(^\text{36}\) This fact, along with his employment of a significant number of foreigners, does not necessarily mean that he was an unpopular ruler and in fact may be a sign of the strength and prosperity of his administration. Still, Nectanebos would not have been the first usurper to use foreign mercenaries to maintain political control while initiating extensive public works projects in an effort to win the support of the populace.\(^\text{37}\) Combined with the rapid surrender through Lower Egypt during the invasion (16.51.1), it seems most plausible to see Nectanebos’ employment of Greek soldiers as a necessity born of political more than military vulnerability.

The political aspects to Greek service in Egyptian ranks offer insight into why Artaxerxes desired to hire Greeks for his second campaign and why he decided to place them on the front lines of his army. Diodorus writes that “the Persian King, accounting it a matter of great importance, in view of his former defeat, to overthrow Egypt, dispatched envoys to the greatest cities of Greece requesting them to join the Persians”

\(^{36}\) Ruzicka 2012: 161.

The implication that Greek soldiers would be necessary for the success of any Persian invasion of Egypt – and further, that the King in this expedition was rectifying a previous mistake – is dubious, however, and the first three chapters of this project demonstrated that Greek soldiers were neither superior soldiers nor recognized as such by their Near Eastern counterparts and employers.

A more plausible explanation is that Artaxerxes did not rely upon any soldiers from the western satrapies of his Empire in 351. The brunt of this earlier invasion seems to have been borne by Cypriotes, Phoenicians, and troops from the interior of the Empire, and this heavy burden was a likely cause of the subsequent revolts in these territories.\(^{38}\) The absence of soldiers on the campaign from the western satrapies is indicated not only by the lack of attention our sources give this invasion, but also by consideration of the local political and military situation in Asia Minor: Hellespontine Phrygia was in turmoil,\(^ {39}\) Artabazus having only recently fled into exile; the coastal satrapy of Lydia and Ionia was similarly in no position to contribute, since its forces had likely been engaged in the war to force Artabazus from his position; finally, the fact that Artaxerxes assigned Idrieus of Caria with putting down the revolt on Cyprus in 351 is probably a sign that the satrap had limited, if any, involvement in the campaign against Egypt.\(^ {40}\)

While the invasion of 351 included neither Greeks nor western Anatolians, the conquest of 343-342 did so in great numbers, perhaps reflecting the greater stability of

\(^{38}\) Ruzicka 2012: 165-167.

\(^{39}\) Indicated by the establishment of local, independent tyrannies such as that of Hermias at Atarneus, which continued on the fringes of the Empire into the late 340s (Diodorus 16.52.2-8).

\(^{40}\) It should also be taken into consideration that, in 351/350, Athens and Sparta were not on friendly terms with the King or his satraps and Thebes was embroiled in the Third Sacred War.
Persian rule in western Anatolia following the exile of Artabazus. Accordingly, Diodorus reports that one of the three divisions of the King’s army was commanded by Rhosaces, satrap of Ionia and Lydia, whose forces included 1,000 Thebans under Lacrates and a “large force of cavalry and no small body of infantry” (16.47.2), presumably from Lydia and Ionia; a second division, commanded by Bagoas, included not only Mentor’s troops but also a division of the “King’s Greeks” from Anatolia (16.47.4). The third division of Artaxerxes’ army was commanded by Aristazanes and included 3,000 Argives under Nicostratus alongside 5,000 elite Persian soldiers and eighty triremes (16.47.3).

Artaxerxes, then, drew heavily from a region that had previously escaped significant contributions – and, of course, one which had not just rebelled – for his second invasion, supplementing or even to some degree replacing the armies he had relied upon to quell unrest in the Levant. While Diodorus records Artaxerxes’ preparations as if the inclusion of mainland Greeks was the King’s primary concern (16.44.1, quoted above), it is more likely that the Greeks were not recruited by the King himself, but instead by the satraps of western Anatolia, who sought the Greeks in order to supplement their own forces and reduce the direct impact of the levy on their own subjects. Diodorus, his sources, or even contemporary Greeks themselves, confused or intentionally conflated envoys to Greece sent by satraps, who operated under the authority of the King, with envoys sent directly by the King.

This form of recruitment explains the specific way in which the Greek forces were divided within the Persian army. The Thebans, who had historically held a strong relationship with the satraps of Sardis, were recruited by Rhosaces and therefore served in his division – which almost certainly included Greek soldiers from Ionia, even if
Diodorus merely refers to his Anatolian forces as *barbaroi* (16.47.2). Likewise, the so-called “King’s Greeks” hailed from Hellespontine Phrygia, and were placed under Bagoas owing to their connections with Mentor, who must have retained some influence in the Troad and the surrounding territories from his time spent there as a subordinate of Artabazus.

Least is known about Aristazanes, who directed the division which included Nicostratus and his Argives. It seems most plausible to see the Greeks from Argos as provided by Idreius of Caria, for three reasons. The first is by process of elimination: if Sardis procured the Thebans and Dascylium the “King’s Greeks” – alongside Mentor and his own mercenaries, who perhaps had originally been recruited by the Rhodian while he was in Artabazus’ service – then the only western satrap remaining would be that of Halicarnassus.

The second is the seaborne nature of Nicostratus’ expedition. While we do not know the origins of Aristazanes or his 5,000 elite Persians, this division also included 80 triremes. It seems unlikely that Artaxerxes would have put his faith in ships from the recently rebellious territories of Phoenicia or Cyprus, particularly considering the vital mission given to Aristazanes and Nicostratus. The only other known satrap to retain a standing navy was Idreius, who at this point controlled several Aegean islands and had undoubtedly required ships in his earlier campaign against Cyprus (16.42.7).

The third reason is that, despite the silence of our sources on previous Argive dealings with Persian satraps, Argos and Caria in the mid 340s had good reasons for collaboration. Of all the satraps, Idrieus had the most to gain by concluding an alliance

41 Who did not personally participate on the campaign, having died in 344.
with Argos: despite Phocion’s recent service with Evagoras, the Carian satrap’s possession of several eastern Greek islands naturally put him at odds with Athens as well as Sparta, which had become obstinately opposed to Persia following the loss of Messenia and the King’s decision to support Thebes in 368/367. Argos, sandwiched between these two traditional powers and in particular a rival of the latter, thus made a natural ally.

In this formulation, Idrieus provided Artaxerxes’ Egyptian invasion force with a small force of Greek clients and a significant number of ships, which the King placed under the command of one of his most loyal officials, Aristazanes. His contributions did not match those of Rhosaces in light of his previous service putting down the Cypriote rebellion and, perhaps, the need for Carian forces to serve as the King’s rearguard, stabilizing Cyprus, Phoenicia, and Cilicia while the royal army advanced into Egypt.

The presence of so many Greeks in the army of Artaxerxes during the 343-342 invasion of Egypt demonstrates the Empire’s continued influence in mainland Greece, even in spite of the rise of Macedonian power in the north and the hostility of Athens and Sparta during the bulk of the 340s. Similarly, the decision to place Greek mercenaries in the front ranks reveals the political nature of their position in the Persian army and the King’s acute awareness of Nectanebos’ political insecurities. Artaxerxes’ invasion strategy heavily relied upon the willingness of Nectanebos’ Egyptian troops to defect, leaving the pharaoh’s Greek mercenaries in the position of being his most reliable soldiers. By positioning his own Greeks along the front lines, Artaxerxes not only matched soldiers familiar with Greek warfare against his adversary’s Greeks, but he also put in place soldiers best able to negotiate with Nectanebos’ Greeks. While this strategy
was not wholly successful – Philophron of Sparta and his soldiers fiercely resisted at Pelusium and Cleinius of Cos fought to death elsewhere – it ultimately paid off when the Greeks at Pelusium, Bubastis, and likely other important strongholds surrendered to the Greeks in the King’s army rather than continuing to resist.

Indeed, from Diodorus’ narrative it is clear that the Greeks on the Egyptian side surrendered only to their Greek adversaries, who were empowered to negotiate with them and to protect them at both Pelusium (16.49.3-5) and Bubastis (16.50.3). This is the origin of Diodorus’ claim that Mentor developed and executed a strategy intended to induce the rapid surrender of Nectanebos’ troops and fortresses (16.49.7). In reality, Mentor did not have the authority to do so on his own, but negotiated at the behest of the King and his Persian officials, and his role was limited to negotiations with Egypt’s Greek defenders.

The success of Artaxerxes’ Greek strategy illustrates clearly the distinction between rank-and-file Greek mercenaries and their generals. The latter were – along, presumably, with their officers – political representatives of their home poleis, whether officially, as with Philophron, or as exiles working to undermine the occupiers of their home states, as with Cleinius, and so remained fiercely loyal to their employers to whom they were bound politically and socially as well as financially.

The former, however, were less reliable. Although they were dependent upon and had been recruited through the xenia connections of their generals and officers, they were not necessarily from the same poleis as their commanders and, consequently, did not share the same political loyalties. As a result, they were more readily induced to desert the cause of their employer when it became clear that his side was likely to be defeated
and it became evident that they were unlikely to receive their pay. By including Greeks in his own ranks and offering clemency to those who deserted, Artaxerxes was able to persuade even the most dependable troops to leave Nectanebos’ service after the first decisive victory of the campaign, thus leveraging the influence held in Greece through the *xenia* of his satraps in order to help conquer Egypt.

**Conclusion**

From his accession in 359/358 to the conquest of Egypt in 342, Artaxerxes III continued the policies and priorities established by his father. Despite several setbacks, most notably in 351, the King ultimately succeeded in Egypt where Artaxerxes II had failed. While devoting most of his attention and resources to that project and to the recovery of the Levant, the Artaxerxes III allowed his satraps to manage the Empire’s affairs in the Aegean and Greece, with the result that Mausolus drove the Athenians from Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, Thebes remained a strong ally of the King’s on the mainland, and several Greek states contributed *xenoi* to the campaign of 343-342 against Egypt. Even Artabazus, whose exile from Hellespontine Phrygia caused some deterioration of the King’s authority in that region, in the end aided the King through the service of his son-in-law, Mentor. Artaxerxes’ foreign policy did little to stem the rise of Macedon in Greece, but his satraps and his rival in Egypt, Nectanebos II, nevertheless retained sufficient influence to draw upon soldiers from the region throughout this period. Furthermore, when Artaxerxes did turn his attention to Macedon and the west, he found willing collaborators not only in Thebes, but also, as the following chapter relates, in Athens and other states.
Chapter 7

The Greco-Persian Resistance to Macedon

Prior to the Battle of Issus, Alexander acknowledged that Greeks would participate on both sides of the upcoming struggle. The difference, however, was that “so far as Greek will meet Greek, they will not be fighting for like causes; those with Darius will be risking their lives for pay, and poor pay too; the Greeks on our side will fight as volunteers in the cause of Greece” (Arrian 2.7.4).

These remarks are belied by the details provided in his account: Thessalians aside, more Greeks served in Darius’ army at Issus than in Alexander’s. Furthermore, the Persians positioned their Greeks in the center of the King’s line, while Alexander held his own Greek soldiers largely in reserve. Though he was the head of the League of Corinth, Alexander trusted his own Greek fleet so little that he disbanded it rather than risk its desertion. It appears that many Greeks preferred to earn poor pay in the ranks of Darius than to volunteer as allies of Alexander.

1 As de Souza, Heckel, and Llewellyn-Jones 2004: 201 note, “since Thessaly belonged to the political orbit of Macedon and Alexander was the archon of the Thessalian League, these troops must be regarded as distinct from those of the ‘allies’.”
2 According to Arrian 2.8.3-4, Alexander’s initial disposition did not include his Greek allies on the front lines. As the army advanced and the terrain became more open, he did send some of his Greeks to fill in the gaps or provide support to his front line troops (2.8.9, 9.3). Arrian 2.9.3 reports that the “foreign mercenaries were drawn up in support of the whole line,” but it is unclear whether these are distinct from the “Greek mercenaries” at 2.9.4. For Darius’ battle order, see Arrian 2.8.5-8.
3 Diodorus 17.22.5 and Arrian 1.20.1 report that this decision was made for financial reasons and that the fleet was no longer militarily necessary – an assertion which Briant 2002: 825 notes is belied by his decision not much later to reconstruct the fleet (Curtius 3.1.19-20). Arrian adds that Alexander did not wish to risk a defeat since, as he noted earlier at 1.18.8, the Greeks were ready to revolt at the first sign of his failure. Alexander’s uneasy control of the Greeks at this point is further underscored by the decision to keep twenty Athenian ships on hand. Diodorus relates that they were used for
Indeed, it has not gone unnoticed by scholars that the sympathies of many in Greece rested with the Persians rather than Macedon.\(^4\) Using the model developed and implemented in the foregoing chapters, here I demonstrate that the Greeks who fought in Achaemenid armies against Macedon were unofficially but undeniably political agents serving the interests of their home poleis, much like the Spartans who participated in Cyrus the Younger’s rebellion, Conon in the King’s fleet from 397-395 while Athens was technically an ally of Sparta, and Chabrias in Egypt during the period immediately following the King’s Peace.

This chapter begins with an examination of the final years of Artaxerxes III, when, I argue, the King turned his attention west and in many respects successfully stymied the expansion of Macedon. Next, I analyze the Persian resistance to Macedon during the tumultuous reign of Artaxerxes IV and the early years Darius III’s rule, concentrating on the collaboration between the Persian satrap Arsites, his subordinate and successor Memnon of Rhodes, and numerous anti-Macedonian politicians and generals from Athens. Finally, I examine the relationships with prominent figures from non-Athenian Greek poleis that Darius III exploited from the Battle of Issus to his assassination in 330 after the Battle of Gaugemala.

In each of these periods, I show that mercenaries serve as key indicators of political collaboration between Greek poleis and Persian officials. The ability to draw upon so Greeks for service against Macedon reflects the degree to which Persian influence continued to be a significant factor in Greek politics even after the Greek defeat of the transport of siege, but there can be little doubt, as Tarn 1948: 19 already argued, that their main purpose was to serve as hostages.

at Chaeronea in 338. In the early stages of the conflict, Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, used the threat posed by Macedon to increase Greek, and specifically Athenian, reliance upon Persian patronage to the extent that, had Alexander’s invasion failed, the Empire would have been in a position to exert its will in Greece more than it ever had before. Even as the conflict moved further into Asia, Darius continued to employ Greek clients from several *poleis* whose membership in the League of Corinth was less than voluntary. To the fall of the Empire, the presence of Greek mercenaries in Achaemenid armies indicates continued Greek dependence upon Persia rather than the reverse.

**Artaxerxes III’s Western Policy after the Egyptian Conquest**

With the benefit of hindsight, the Persian conquest of Egypt in 343-342 appears as mere prelude to war with increasingly powerful Macedon. From 359-357, Philip established himself on the Macedonian throne and consolidated his rule, fending off attacks from Paionia and Thrace; by 354, he had expanded his control in the north and east through conquest of Amphipolis, Methone, Potidea, Abdera, and Maronea; from 353-346, he participated in the Third Sacred War, with the result that he was elected *archon* of Thessaly, conquered the Chalcidice, entered into alliance with Thebes as the dominant partner, defeated Phocis, and made the Peace of Philocrates with Athens on terms favorable to himself; he then spent the next several years extending his control eastward into Thrace. This steady expansion finally brought Philip into conflict with Persia in 340 and 339, when he launched attacks on Perinthus and Byzantium, respectively. Some scholars argue that Artaxerxes III refused to take sides in the ongoing
struggle between Athens and Macedon beyond Perinthus.\textsuperscript{5} This allowed Philip to defeat an allied Greek army at Chaeronea in 338 and to unite nearly all Greece under his rule through the League of Corinth.\textsuperscript{6}

In the 340s, Philip’s position as the most powerful state in the Greek world was becoming clear to many (e.g., Isocrates 5.15, Demosthenes 10.10-12, 34). Given the progression of Macedonian expansion during the 350s and 340s, the conquest of central and southern Greece does not come as a surprise, nor does the pivot eastward in 336 and later, under Alexander. In this context, Persia’s apparently passive policy toward Macedon is puzzling, leading one scholar to criticize his approach as an utter failure, whether due to overconfidence, over-caution, or ignorance of the threat posed by Macedon.\textsuperscript{7} Such explanations are problematic, however, due to their assumption that conflict between Macedon and Persia was inevitable and foreseeable already in 342-341. As Briant warns, this is “an image that comes out of a prophetic or eschatological history – that is, a history that presumes that Alexander’s conquest was a matter of necessity”.\textsuperscript{8}

In fact, Artaxerxes had little reason to fear Macedon in 342. The kingdom, lacking a fleet and control of Thrace to the Hellespont or Bosporus, had no access to Asia. Moreover, Philip was opposed in Greece by Sparta and Athens, the latter of which continued to maintain a strong fleet. It is true that Macedon controlled Thessaly and counted Thebes as his ally, but the King’s agents also retained their own influence in Greece, evidenced by the presence of Argive and Theban soldiers in the Persian army

\textsuperscript{5} At least Briant 2002: 690 interpreted this to be the case based on Aeschines 3.238. See also Mildenberg 1999: 219-222 on Artaxerxes III’s supposed inactivity after Perinthus and Byzantium. I challenge this below.
\textsuperscript{6} For an overview of Macedon’s rise under Philip, see Heskel 1996: 177-186.
\textsuperscript{7} Mildenberg 1999: 219-220.
\textsuperscript{8} Briant 2002: 688.
during the still-recent Egyptian conquest. Indeed, to this point the King may have viewed Macedon as a sympathetic, if not allied, power.  

Both states were patrons of Thebes, and, with the repatriation of Mentor, Memnon, and Artabazus, Philip’s xenoi held prominent positions in the Troad and at the King’s court.

Surveying the longue durée of Greco-Persian interactions would have given Artaxerxes III little cause to believe that any western power posed a serious threat. Even at the heights of their power, neither Athens nor Sparta did serious damage to the Empire. The Delian League failed utterly in Egypt during the 450s, was unable to conquer Cyprus despite several attempts, and never detached from Persian control any significant territory inland of the Ionian and Carian coasts. For all the accomplishments of Athens in the fifth century, the polis never once matched the burning of Sardis by the Ionian states in 499. Similarly, Sparta’s Anatolian campaigns of the 390s accomplished little beyond plundering the countryside. The Spartans and their allies managed to threaten Susa only as auxiliaries of Cyrus the Younger. Historically, then, the states of mainland Greece had only endangered the King’s authority when they acted in support of rebellious Anatolians.

After the success in Egypt, Artaxerxes moved to reconsolidate Achaemenid control in western Anatolia. Mostly this was accomplished with the return of the officials and soldiers that had been conscripted for the Egyptian campaign, but there also remained

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9 Although recent scholarship has rejected it, my reconstruction revives the possibility of an official treaty between Persia and Macedon in this period, referenced by Arrian 2.14.2. See Mildenberg 1999: 220 n. 101; Buckler and Beck 2008: 243-245. Briant 2002: 1005-1006 has further bibliography related to the existence of this treaty.

10 Mentor and Memnon probably resumed control of their previous estates and became subordinates of Arsites in Hellespontine Phrygia, while Artabazus seems to have spent the remainder of his life at court; he only reappears in our sources following the defeat of Darius at Gaugamela in 331. See Arrian 3.21.4; Curtius 5.11-12.
some coastal cities, such as those ruled by Hermias of Atarneus, which had become increasingly independent in the wake of Artabazus’ exile from Hellespontine Phrygia. These were quickly reintegrated into the Empire by Arsites and his newly returned subordinates, Mentor and Memnon (Diodorus 15.52.5-8).

Peace between Philip and the King did not last long after the Persian reconsolidation efforts in Hellespontine Phrygia were completed. In response to Philip’s aggression at Perinthus (Diodorus 16.74.2) and Byzantium (16.77.3), Artaxerxes authorized his satraps to aid in the Greek resistance against Philip; in turn, his satraps called upon their Greek allies and clients. Mercenaries were a key part of this political collaboration: Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, dispatched supplies and soldiers under the command of the Athenian Apollodorus (Diodorus 16.75.1-2; Pausanias 1.29.10). Meanwhile Pixodarus, the Hecatomnid satrap of Caria, ordered his clients in Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to send ships to Byzantium, where they helped relieve the city from Philip’s siege alongside Chares and his Athenian fleet (16.77.2).\footnote{Diodorus makes no reference to Pixodarus’ role, but it is not hard to see that he must have had a hand in the response. These islands had been under the control of Halicarnassus since the end of the Social War in 355, and Diodorus’ earlier report mentions that the King ordered his “satraps” to action; thus Arsites sent aid to Perinthus, and Pixodarus, who had garrisons on Chios, Cos, and Rhodes offered support to Byzantium, which had been an ally of these islands and of Mausolus during the Social War. See Berthold 1980: 44-45; Sealey 1993: 187-190; Ruzicka 1996: 122. For Chares’ collaboration with the Persian satraps, see Parke 1933: 178 n. 1.}

These efforts were a success, and Philip soon broke off the sieges and moved north into Scythia (Justin 9.1.9). While there, the Macedonian-controlled Delphic Amphictyony declared the Fourth Sacred War against Amphissa, an Athenian ally, and Thebes broke its alliance with Philip in favor of Athens. Philip moved his army south and
defeated the Theban and Athenian-led Greek coalition at Chaeronea in 338, the same year Artaxerxes III was assassinated, and formed the Corinthian League in 337.\footnote{For summary and discussion, see Munn 1996: 98-102.}

Mildenberg again criticizes Artaxerxes for failing to press his advantage following Philip’s withdrawal from Byzantium and Perinthus, arguing that more aggressive action against Macedon could have prevented the defeat at Chaeronea and, in turn, the fall of the Empire.\footnote{Mildenberg 1999: 220-221.} This critique once more makes sense only if Alexander’s conquest is understood as both predictable and inevitable, a reality which could hardly have been imagined in 339. What reason would Artaxerxes have to fear Philip after having driven his armies from Perinthus and Byzantium? Macedon still had no direct access into Asia at the Hellespont or Bosporus, and, as a result of Persian cooperation with Athens and several other Greek island states, the King and his allies held hegemony over the Aegean.

Furthermore, the King’s agents were far from inactive in Greece itself following Philip’s defeat. Diodorus does not mention Persian influence as a factor in the Theban break with Macedon (16.84-85.5), but it is difficult to see how the decision could have been made without consideration of the recent success of the Persian-Athenian collaboration and without assurances of support from Persian satraps.\footnote{Diodorus does give much of the credit for persuading the Thebans to turn against Philip to Demosthenes, who had stressed the possibility and decisiveness of Persian aid earlier in his \textit{Fourth Philippic} (10.31-34). Plutarch’s \textit{Ten Orators} 847e-f report that the King gave Ephialtes money in order to agitate for war against Philip, and that Demosthenes received from him three hundred darics, may belong to this moment, though Sealey 1993: 204 prefers to place it in 340.} In this context, it is important to recall that Thebes had only four years earlier aided the conquest of Egypt and that there is little reason to believe the Theban relationship with Artaxerxes had been severed since. Until 339/338, Thebes continued to be aligned with both Macedon and
Persia; earlier in 340, the *polis* was able to remain neutral in their conflict but, with the prospect of war between Athens and Macedon in central Greece on the horizon, neutrality was an option no longer. The Thebans made common cause with the Athenians, and were defeated by Philip at Chaeronea.\footnote{15 Notably, Argos took the opposite route. Having aided the King in 343-342, the Argives found their interests in Greece were better served through alliance with Philip than with the King. They did not join Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea and welcomed Philip upon his arrival in the Peloponnese. See Roebuck 1948: 84-85.}

Artaxerxes died within months of the Greek defeat.\footnote{16 Mildenberg 1999: 223.} Prior to this, the King’s policies toward Greece and Macedon had been nothing but a success: in only two years, his satraps had driven Philip from the King’s borders, re-established a strong relationship, if not an alliance, with Athens, and helped convince Thebes to break its own alliance with Macedon. Short of sending an army to Greece in support of the Athenian-Theban coalition, an unprecedented and unrealistic option,\footnote{17 Persian soldiers had not stepped foot on Greek soil since 479, unless the raids made in the Peloponnese by the fleet of Conon and Pharmabazus in 393 are counted.} Artaxerxes could not have done more to stop Philip’s victory.\footnote{18 Arrian even hints that the King’s forces campaigned against Philip’s territory in Thrace after Perinthus and Byzantium (2.14.5).} The Greeks faced Philip with roughly equal numbers at Chaeronea, and financial support from the King, if it was not already provided, likely would not have changed the outcome. As at Leuctra in 371, the King’s Greeks were defeated by a superior army.

**Arsites, Memnon, and Athens**

Artaxerxes III was briefly succeeded by Artaxerxes IV, who was assassinated in 336 and replaced by Darius III, formerly the satrap of Armenia. Upon his accession,
Darius was faced with a rebellion in Egypt.\textsuperscript{19} That same year, Philip sent a Macedonian force of ten thousand into Anatolia, the vanguard for a much larger invasion to come. Despite the King’s preoccupation with more pressing matters in Egypt and the interior,\textsuperscript{20} Persian officials in the west continued working with Greek collaborators to undermine Macedonian hegemony following Chaeronea. In the early years of the conflict, most of the Persian resistance to Alexander was founded on an alliance between anti-Macedonian Athenians and Arsites/Memnon, which is most clearly indicated by the presence of Athenian mercenaries in the armies of the Empire.

Arsites had, of course, already employed Athenian mercenaries under Apollodorus against Philip of Macedon at Perinthus in 340, and he also likely provided support to the Athenian fleet, led by Chares,\textsuperscript{21} at Byzantium the following year. Arsites probably remained in contact with prominent anti-Macedonian politicians in Greece even after Chaeronea, and he is the most plausible source of Persian support during the disastrous uprising sparked by the false rumors of Alexander’s death in 335 (Arrian 1.7.1-3; Diodorus 17.8.2). He was the conduit for the King’s gold which arrived in Athens at this time (Aeschines 3.239), and likely encouraged the Thebans to resist Alexander, allowing the polis to proclaim that “anyone who wished to join the Great

\textsuperscript{19} Of which not much is known, but the revolt probably began during the reign of Artaxerxes IV. See Ruzicka 2012: 202-205.
\textsuperscript{20} As a participant in the conspiracy to assassinate Artaxerxes IV, Darius must have taken measures to consolidate his control. One of these was the assassination of Bagoas, who had played a role in the deaths of both Artaxerxes III and IV. See Briant 2002: 769-780.
\textsuperscript{21} Chares was a likely a xenos of both Arsites and Memnon, especially considering the general’s residence at Sigeium in the Troad following the destruction of Thebes in 335 (1.12.1).
King and Thebes in freeing the Greeks and destroying the tyrant of Greece should come over to them” (Diodorus 17.9.5).  

Alexander’s decision to punish Thebes with destruction sufficiently cowed Athens, which would not again openly resist Macedon until his death in 323.  

Still, prominent citizens were unsatisfied with the city’s subjection and, like Conon sixty years earlier, collaborated with the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia in an effort to secure Athenian independence. Arsites and Memnon aided many of the leaders of the anti-Macedonian faction at Athens, sheltering Chares at an estate in their territory (Arrian 1.12.1), hiring Ephialtes as a mercenary (Diodorus 17.25.6), providing Charidemus with access to the King (Diodorus 17.30.2), and supplying Demosthenes with bribes (Aeschines 3.239; Plutarch Demosthenes 20).  

Several thousand Greeks fought for Arsites and the Persians at the Battle of the Granicus in 334. Many, if not most, of these Greeks were from Athens, and Athens sent several embassies to Alexander for the purpose of freeing its citizens who had been captured at Granicus (Arrian 1.29.5-6, 3.6.2; Curtius 4.8.12-13). Although Arsites committed suicide shortly after the defeat (Arrian 1.16.3), some of the Athenians, including Ephialtes and Thrasybulus, escaped with Memnon, who fled to Halicarnassus.

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22 The victory he had against Callas and the Macedonian vanguard in the same year (see discussion in chapter 3) may have also made the Thebans and, briefly, the Athenians optimistic for similar success in Greece. Plutarch Demosthenes 23.1 makes it clear that the Greeks and Persians were collaborating at this time.

23 For an overview of Athenian-Macedonian relations, particularly from Chaeronea onward, see Will 1983.

24 A group easily defined by the list of individuals Alexander demanded be exiled or handed over to him after the destruction of Thebes in 335. See Arrian 1.10.4; Plutarch Demosthenes 23.
Additionally, the Samians, allies of Athens, provisioned the Persian fleet after it had been driven from Mycale during Alexander’s siege of Miletus (Arrian 1.19.8).

No Athenians are mentioned as participants at the Battle of Issus in 333. Still, there is some reason to believe that they were among the rank-and-file there: Charidemus had probably brought some soldiers with him to the King’s muster at Babylon, where he is supposed to have been executed for insulting Darius III (Diodorus 17.30.2-5; Curtius 3.2.10-19). Likewise, after the Persian defeat, Alexander captured Athenian ambassadors, including Iphicrates the Younger, in the royal retinue at Damascus (Arrian 2.15.4; Curtius 3.13.15).

Chares did not participate at Granicus or Issus, and even made conciliatory gestures to Alexander upon his crossing into Asia (Arrian 1.12.1). Later, however, he played a prominent role in the Persian counter-offensive in the Aegean, garrisoning Mytilene after its capture by Persian forces (Arrian 3.2.3-7; Curtius 4.5.22). His surrender likely ended active Athenian resistance to Macedon. Despite the presence of several Athenian envoys in Darius’ entourage after Gaugamela (Arrian 3.24.4), Alexander no longer considered the polis a threat, evidenced by his release of the Athenian captives from Granicus in 331 (Arrian 3.6.2; Curtius 4.8.12-13) and by Athens’ refusal to join the Spartan rebellion in 331 (Arrian 3.6.3; Diodorus 17.62.7; Curtius 4.1.39-40, 6.1.1-21).

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25 Ephialtes and Thrasybulus are only mentioned at Halicarnassus, but are clearly identified as subordinate to Memnon. They either followed Memnon from the Granicus or joined him first at Ephesus (Diodorus 17.22.1). Given the number of Athenians present (and captured) at Granicus, it seems most plausible to me that they were present for the battle.

26 Sealey 1993: 205-207 explains why Athens refused to join the Spartan rebellion, but fails to mention the number of Athenians who had joined the Persians in Asia.
The collaboration between Arsites and, after his death, Memnon and Athens is one of the best examples of the political nature of Greek mercenary service in the Achaemenid Empire. The provision of soldiers to Arsites and the Persians allowed those Athenian citizens who desired independence from Macedon to continue their opposition unofficially, even after Alexander’s destruction of Thebes made clear the consequences of failed official resistance. Like Conon and his supporters in the 390s, the politicians and generals (e.g., Demosthenes, Chares) who led this resistance stood to gain substantial personal influence in the event of Alexander’s defeat, but their illicit activities were also carried out with the interests of the polis in mind.

Beyond simply increasing the size of his own armed forces, Arsites also stood to benefit politically from collaboration with Athens. His sponsorship of Athenian soldiers and officers, as well as politicians in Athens itself, placed him in an advantageous position should Alexander fail. In that circumstance, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia could anticipate similar results that Pharnabazus’ sponsorship of Conon had produced: his own clients would come to power in Athens and the city, through his patronage, would gain hegemony of the Aegean. Consequently, his own influence in the Aegean and Greece would be unmatched by the satraps in Sardis and Halicarnassus, and the King’s dominion would be expanded through his own personal success.

Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of Arsites’ alliance with Athens was Memnon of Rhodes. His importance to the resistance against Macedon is found not in his exaggerated skill as a general, but instead in his socio-political background. Along with his brother

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27 This point is also made by Habicht 1997: 18-19.
28 For analysis of Memnon’s skill as a general, see Chapter 3. For discussion of his and Mentor’s service with Artabazus prior to their flight to Macedon, see Chapter 5.
Mentor, Memnon left Rhodes in the late 360s when his sister married the newly arrived satrap of Dascylium, Artabazus. The Rhodian brothers became members of the Persian aristocracy by virtue of this marriage, and were granted estates in the Troad. It is likely that they maintained strong ties with Athens from early on: they began their careers as citizens of Rhodes, a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy until 357; they hired Charidemus of Oreus, who would later earn Athenian citizenship, for a brief period ca. 360; and they served with Artabazus during Chares’ brief collaboration with the satrap in the 350s.²⁹

Memnon’s close relationship with Athens is more obvious during the Macedonian conquest. It is surely not an accident that Chares fled to Sigieum in the Troad after Alexander razed Thebes or that Charidemus, his former employee, was given passage to the court of Darius.³⁰ Memnon directly commanded the Athenian exiles Thrasybulus and Ephialtes at Halicarnassus, furthermore, and he may have held Chares in his service when he died during the siege of Mitylene, since the Athenian was later put in charge of the city’s garrison by his nephew, Pharnabazus (Arrian 3.2.3-7; Curtius 4.5.22).

Given all of these connections, it is not difficult to reconstruct a position for Memnon as the liaison between Arsites and the anti-Macedonian politicians of Athens. It may be no coincidence that Arsites and Athens began their collaboration shortly after the return of Memnon and Mentor to the Troad, and it is not unreasonable to think that the Rhodian played a role in the coordination of the joint Persian-Athenian resistance at Perinthus and Byzantium in 340-339. A later inscription at Athens honoring his entire

²⁹ That they, along with Artabazus, went into exile in Macedon rather than Athens does not diminish the reality of their connections with Athens. The polis could hardly have afforded to harbor Persian exiles after the King’s demands and threats in 355.
³⁰ Where, it should be noted, Artabazus was probably in residence. See n. 10 above.
family illustrates the influence Memnon and the entire house of Pharnabazus held in Athens, and provides further context for how he came to command the Persian resistance in the Aegean. Following the death of Arsites and other Persian officials at the Granicus (Arrian 1.16.3), he became one of the highest ranking Persian nobles in the area. This, in combination with his connections in Athens and throughout the Aegean made him an ideal choice for the position.

Even during the tumultuous years after the death of Artaxerxes III, the Persian coastal satraps continued to contest the growing threat of Macedon. In much the same way their predecessors had, they patronized prominent Greek politicians and generals in order to spur resistance to Philip and Alexander in Greece itself and in exchange for the provision of mercenaries to Anatolia. Arsites in particular, and Memnon after him, used their relationships with Athenian xenoi to supplement their own forces and to position themselves for future hegemony in the Aegean should the Macedonian invasion end in failure. The participation of Athenian soldiers and generals on the Persian side during the early stages of the campaign indicates the persistence of Achaemenid influence in Greece even after Chaeronea, not the shortcomings of the Persian military.

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31 Rhodes and Osborne 2003 (GHI): #98.
32 Memnon received embassies from the Cycladic islands, for example (Diodorus 17.29.3). See discussion in chapter 3 for the extent of his command, which is greatly overstated in our sources. Memnon’s connections in Athens probably ensured that his exploits were recorded from a sympathetic perspective, and the mere fact of his Greek heritage also made him an excellent foil for Alexander in the early stages of the campaign, before Darius III directly joined the conflict.
Darius III and the Other Greeks

Our sources provide few details about non-Athenian Greeks serving with the Persians during the initial stages of Alexander’s invasion. While it stands to reason that not all of the Greeks who fought at the Granicus or who garrisoned the numerous citadels of western Anatolia were Athenian, their *poleis* of origin are never given. Early in the campaign, the collaboration between Athens and Memnon overshadows all else.

As the campaign moved inland and away from the Aegean, traditionally dominated by Athenian (and, to a much lesser degree, Rhodian) interests, new details emerge regarding coordination between Darius III and several other Greek states. One of these is Sparta, the lone *polis* to openly resist Alexander in Greece after 335 (Arrian 3.6.3; Diodorus 17.62.7; Curtius 4.1.39-40, 6.1.1-21). Instead of sending mercenaries east, the Spartans received financial aid from Persia and recruited several thousand Greeks who had served in Asia for its rebellion ca. 331. For the most part, however, those Greeks who chose to resist did so in much the same way the Athenians did, using Persian money to recruit and send mercenaries to join the armies of Darius, even as their *poleis* were officially members of the Macedonian dominated League of Corinth.

This becomes clear starting with ancient accounts of the Battle of Issus in 333, where Darius III had in his service several mainland Greek officers in addition to Amyntas, a defector from Macedon, and Thymondas, the son of Mentor (Arrian 2.6.3-7; Curtius 3.8.1-11; Plutarch *Alexander* 20.1-4). They were Aristomedes of Pherae, Bianor

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33 Indeed, Curtius 3.1.9 reports that Alexander held prisoners from Greek states besides Athens. See Chapter 3 for a detailed list of Greek garrisons in Persian Anatolia during Alexander’s conquest.
34 For the Spartan-led revolt, see Poddighe 2009: 114-115.
35 Many Greek states and individuals found collaboration with Alexander and Macedon preferable to resistance, of course. Tritle 2009 provides a overview.
of Acarnania, Patron of Phocis, and Glaucus of Aetolia. Following the Persian defeat, Aristomedes and Bianor fled to Cyprus and ultimately joined the Spartan-led revolt of Agis III in 331 (Arrian 2.13.2-3). Bianor, Patron and, between two and four thousand other Greeks remained with Darius until his death (Arrian 3.16.2; Curtius 5.11-12).

The poleis of each of these Greeks were unwilling subjects of Macedon. Pherae and Phocis were allies against Philip during the Third Sacred War (Diodorus 16.35.1-6) and were each subsequently been conquered by Macedon (Diodorus 16.37.3, 59.1-60.2). Acarnania stood with Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea, and many of its leading politicians went into exile at Athens after Chaeronea. Aetolia was allied with Philip as early as 342, but subsequently turned against him and remained on poor terms with Alexander (Diodorus 17.3.3, 111.3).

Much like Charidemus, Chares, Thrasybulus, and Ephialtes of Athens, Patron, Bianor, Aristomedes, and Glaucus were more than mere exiles or political opportunists. Although we know nothing of their backgrounds aside from the fact that Aristomedes was already in Persian service at Perinthus in 340, it is logical to view their service as an effort to free their home states from Macedonian hegemony and to drive pro-Macedonian leaders from power. They willingly submitted themselves to Darius III and provided him with Greek mercenaries, presumably in exchange for his continued patronage following the defeat of Alexander.

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36 Diodorus 17.3.3 references this obliquely; see discussion by Roebuck 1948: 76; Grainger 1999: 46.
37 Roebuck 1948: 77 notes that Philip granted the Aetolians Naupactus in 338 in exchange for their alliance. Bosworth 1976: 169-173, Mendels 1984: 132, and Grainger 1999: 41-49 argue that Philip reversed his decision in 337, helping the Achaeans retake the city. Merker 1989 argues instead that Aetolian frustration with Philip after Chaeronea was caused by his refusal to grant them other cities in addition to Naupactus.
38 Reported by Didymus 9.45. See Parke 1933: 177-178.
Their dedication to the anti-Macedonian cause is seen in the refusal to join Alexander after his victory at Issus. In particular, Glaucus and Patron chose instead to march east with Darius, surrendering to Alexander only once the King was assassinated by Bessus in the aftermath of Gaugamela. While Curtius has certainly overly dramatized his account of Darius’ final days (Curtius 5.11-12), his insistence that Glaucus, Patron, and their Greek soldiers were the King’s most loyal supporters may not be far off the mark. After losing two battles to Alexander, Darius had lost the confidence of his Persian subordinates – hence their support for Bessus’ betrayal – but, like the Greeks in Cyrus the Younger’s rebellion, the Greeks in this final Persian army were utterly reliant upon the success of Darius, and probably lacked any relationship with the satrap of Bactria. Near the end, Darius may have placed Greek mercenaries in his bodyguard, and their loyalty may have been a factor in his decision to place them near his own position in at Gaugamela (Arrian 3.2.7).

Conclusion

Artaxerxes III was successful to the end of his reign. He continued and even improved the western policies of his father, Artaxerxes II, which allowed him to leverage the influence of his satraps in Greece and to conquer Egypt. With this task completed, he turned his attention west, consolidating his control over the western fringes of Anatolia, especially in Hellespontine Phrygia. His satraps strengthened the Achaemenid position in Greece by patronizing Athenian resistance to Philip once it became clear that Macedon was a threat. Such was the sway the King’s alliance held that, when forced to choose between Macedon on the one hand and the King and Athens on the other, Thebes sided
against Philip II. Of course, Persian support was insufficient in the face of the superior Macedonian army at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338, the same year Artaxerxes III was assassinated. The result was that all the major states of Greece, excepting Sparta, were forced to join the League of Corinth and officially acknowledge Philip as hegemon of Greece.

Despite the Greek defeat at Chaeronea and the turmoil in the Persia and Egypt during the brief kingship of Artaxerxes IV and the early stages of Darius III, Achaemenid influence in Greece remained potent thanks to the efforts of Arsites and his subordinate, Memnon of Rhodes. With their support, the Thebans were encouraged to revolt from Alexander in 335; although that effort ended in disaster, Arsites and Memnon were still able to recruit Athenian soldiers for the war against Macedon in Anatolia and the Aegean. Even as Alexander pushed further inland, Darius III was able to call upon Greeks from Phocis, Aetolia, Acarnania, and Pherae at Issus and Gaugamela, while Memnon’s nephew Pharnabazus encouraged the Spartan rebellion under Agis III in 331. To the very end, the King and his agents retained the influence to levy mercenaries from their clients in Greece.
Conclusion

From 401 to 330 BCE, the Achaemenid Empire employed Greek mercenaries more frequently and in greater numbers than it ever had before. Traditionally, the appearance of so many Greeks in the King’s armies has been explained as a result of an Achaemenid deficiency in heavy infantry, thus explaining the Persian need for the services of Greek hoplites. From this perspective, Achaemenid foreign policy in the fourth century had two goals: first, to acquire Greek mercenaries; second, to promote division among the Greek poleis since, with their superior soldiers, these states together posed a mortal threat to the Empire.

Closer inspection of our ancient sources has revealed the superiority of Greek mercenaries to be a mirage. Classical Greek authors, writing for Greek audiences, exaggerated the importance and the contributions of Greek soldiers campaigning in the Near East. Using a variety of narrative techniques, they shaped their historical accounts in order to attribute responsibility to their fellow Greeks in victory and, in defeat, to their Near Eastern counterparts. Writers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods adopted and adapted these stories, with the result that even today Greeks are often erroneously considered to have been the preeminent soldiers of the fourth century BCE.

This dissertation has advocated a different interpretation of Greek mercenary service in this period. The acquisition of Greek mercenaries was not the goal of a defensive Persian foreign policy, but instead was the sign of increased Persian influence throughout Greece and the Aegean. Using this influence, the King and his agents promoted Greek unification, not division, so long as the hegemonic power(s) remained dependent upon and sympathetic to the Empire. Consequently, Greek mercenary service
was inextricably intertwined with fourth century politics in Greece and the Near East, and Greek mercenaries served as a form of political currency, cement relationships between various Greek citizens, *poleis*, satraps, and Egyptian pharaohs.

In my reconstruction of the fourth century, Persian satraps patronized prominent Greek *poleis* and citizens for three reasons: first, such patronage increased their own personal authority and prestige vis-à-vis their satrap colleagues; second, by virtue of having Greek states and individuals as clients, satraps were able to guide and direct the King’s foreign policy on the Empire’s western periphery; third, this patronage offered Persian satraps a means of procuring soldiers from Greece in order to supplement or replace subject levies, offering Persian satraps a way of increasing their military capabilities relative to rival satraps. It also provided satraps with a means of reducing the impact of conscription on the production capacity of their own satrapy when the King ordered them to provide soldiers for royal campaigns elsewhere.

Egyptian pharaohs likewise benefitted from patronizing Greek states and citizens in several ways. Their patronage allowed the Egyptians to procure soldiers from Greece in order to reduce the numerical superiority Achaemenid armies held when invading Egypt. It also offered a way to resist the King outside of Egypt, since establishing alliances with and providing resources to sympathetic Greeks helped thwart Persia’s allies from achieving or maintaining hegemony in Greece, preventing the King from fully securing the Empire’s western frontier.

In exchange for becoming the clients of foreign rulers, Greek individuals received support in their attempts to gain power in their home *poleis*. Likewise, Greek *poleis* which were governed by Persian or Egyptian clients received moral, material, and
financial support in their struggles to achieve and maintain hegemony in Greece. Alternatively, they received help in undermining the attempts at hegemony of their rival poleis. In this way, the patron-client relationships between foreign potentates and Greek politicians was mutually beneficial. The provision of Greek mercenaries was not the main purpose of such relationships, but merely one transactional aspect of them.

In the final analysis, then, the ‘explosion’ of Greek mercenary service in the Near East throughout the fourth century had little to do with the idea that Greeks were more formidable soldiers and generals than their foreign counter-parts. Rather than indicating the decline of the Achaemenid Empire, the ability to enlist Greek soldiers demonstrates the continued, even growing, influence of the King and his satraps in the Greek world during this period, even when faced with rebellion in Egypt and invasion from Macedon. In the fourth century, the difference between Greek mercenary and conscript was a matter of perspective; in Persian eyes, they were all the King’s Greeks.
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